[Wittrs] Re: Minds, Brains and What There Is

  • From: "SWM" <SWMirsky@xxxxxxx>
  • To: wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
  • Date: Sun, 27 Sep 2009 02:14:10 -0000

--- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, "Cayuse" <z.z7@...> wrote:
>
> SWM wrote:
> > "Cayuse" wrote:
> >> The /union/ of two sets of elements consists of the set of elements
> >> that is in /either/ set, in contrast to the /intersection/ of two
> >> sets of elements, which consists of the set of elements that is in
> >> /both/ sets.
> >
> > This, I'm afraid, is no clearer. What "union" of "elements" or "sets
> > of elements" are you referring to? And what has a contrast between a
> > "union" and an "intersection" to do with this? Who here has spoken of
> > an "intersection" anyway?
>
> I borrowed the term 'union' from the algebra of sets. If you're
> seriously interested in the algebra of sets then there's no shortage
> of links available on the web, but it's fine to be disinterested.
>

Yes, in a nod to Neil's prior correction I am uninterested in algebraic sets at 
the moment though I am interested to understand by your reference to the 
significance of the union of the categories of "subjective" and "objective" in 
the present discussion. I'm not sure that an algebraic union is the correct 
paradigm for understanding what you have in mind here. But I will gladly await 
your clarification.

>
> >> That would still leave us with all the BS metaphysics that is
> >> grounded in the objectification of consciousness. Such metaphysics
> >> is nonsensical, including the prevalent belief that the "problem of
> >> consciousness" will eventually fall to the inexorable progress of
> >> the scientific enterprise.
> >
> > You are the one who is imposing the metaphysics, albeit mainly in
> > order to decry it. Or to hold out for a non-scientific view of
> > consciousness.
>
> More precisely, the view that p-consciousness has no place
> in a physicalist pardigm.
>
>

I'm sorry but I don't understand that. A physicalist paradigm does not imply no 
place for phenomenal consciousness (i.e., awareness). In fact that is precisely 
what is at issue here: How do we understand the relation between the obvious 
existence of non-aware phyical matter and aware physical matter in the same 
world?

If you start with a presumption that there is "no place" for phenomenal 
consciousness in a world described in physical terms, you are merely assuming 
your conclusion which, of course, is circular and cannot serve to sustain the 
conclusion.


> >> You said:
> >> "I was making the point that consciousness involves experience
> >> which means experiencing what we call experiences and that
> >> to be in THAT position is what it means when we speak of
> >> being a subject, i.e., having a point of view, etc."
> >>
> >> The "problem of consciousness" (that drives some into BS metaphysics)
> >> is the problem of the relationship between the conceived first-person
> >> experiencer and experiences, or between the third-person experiencer
> >> and the conception of his experiences. Physicalist, idealist, and
> >> dualist approaches to this "problem" all follow hot on the heels of
> >> the failure to recognize that the "problem" has no sense.
> >


> > The only "problem" I am talking about is that of explaining how it is
> > that brains produce subjectivity (all that that entails) as seen in
> > subjective entities like ourselves, i.e., creatures with minds.
>
> You defined "being a subject" as "experiencing what we call experiences",
> and this needs a little more digging in terms of the relationship between
> experiencer, experiences, and experiencing.


What kind of "digging" do you have in mind? You seem to want to exclude 
scientific digging so presumably you are arguing for something more conceptual. 
But that is just where we get into trouble since you keep imputing a different 
concept to me than I am talking about (while insisting that THAT concept which 
you have in mind, but I insist I don't, is inexpressible)!


> All three arise in mutual
> dependence and inter-relatedness as parts of the "contents of
> consciousness".
>

What has THAT to do with the question of how brains do what they do (and 
whether we can intelligibly ascribe to brains the power to produce that which 
we recognize as our mental lives)?


>
> >> I have a suggestion. In his paper "On a confusion about the function
> >> of consciousness" (1995), Ned Block distinguishes between what
> >> he called "access consciousness" and "phenomenal consciousness".
> >> Regardless of my conviction that this is too simplistic a distinction,
> >> we could agree that you're interested in a-consciousness and I'm
> >> interested in p-consciousness.
> >
> > I believe this is, word for word, a suggestion you have previously
> > made.
>
> You believe correctly. I don't recall you addressing this suggestion.
>

I recall addressing it. I said that I was fine with the distinction as long as 
you stuck by it. But you haven't. However, in further discussion it appears 
that by "access consciousness" you mean mental processes whereas I mean those 
aspects of our mental lives which we are aware of and can speak about, e.g., 
the sensations we have, the ideas, the mental images, the recollections, 
understanding, etc. So, perhaps we cannot abide by the distinction if you 
persist in wanting to say these things (which you have elsewhere called 
"contents" of consciousness) are part of "the microcosm" or "the all", etc., 
etc.

>
> >>> Yes, I have hopefully shown you that we can speak of subjectness,
> >>> etc., without having to have recourse to the idea of a mysterious,
> >>> inexplicable vessel of containment.
> >>
> >> This "mysterious, inexplicable vessel of containment" is the source
> >> of your confusion here -- there is no such thing. It is this mistaken
> >> belief that leads to the misguided attempts to provide a physical
> >> account of consciousness.
> >
> > Then why do you talk about contents without containers?
>
> I employ an extant mode of reference because it is already
> in widespread use.
>

There are better available, e.g., to speak of "features" or "characteristics". 
Very often, as Wittgenstein famously noted, we are sometimes led astray by a 
word choice which inspires in us a misleading picture. Speaking of the 
"contents" of mind implies that something contains them. Just as we cannot 
speak of experiences without assuming an experiencer, so we cannot speak of 
contents if they are not contained. While we can stipulate to an idiosyncratic 
usage here (and I suppose you are prepared to do that), it would be better by 
far, for ongoing clarity's sake, to choose words that don't require or suggest 
such misleading pictures and the proof of that is how you then go on to assume 
there must be something beyond the contents, however inexpressible for whatever 
reason (to vast?).

Here is something from McGuinness in Young Ludwig which addresses your 
reference to "the microcosm" in The Tractatus which may have a bearing on your 
interpretation of what Wittgenstein had in mind -

Beginning on page 311 and continuing to page 312

If the subject of a judgement is . . . a complex (and hence not really a soul 
at all -- 5.5421), it is perhaps natural that Wittgenstein should turn next to 
the topic of solipsism:

The limits of my language mean the limits of my world.
I am my world. (The microcosm.) (56. and 5.63)

At some point certainly Wittgenstein needed to make clear that there was not a 
metaphysical subject, outside both world and language and set over against 
them, an idea to be found in some form in Schopenhauer, and perhaps in the 
history of philosophy, generally. Otherwise his demonstration (if we may allow 
it to be one) that natural science consisted in the normal use of language to 
affirm what was true but might be false, and formal science in the exhibition 
of inevitable features of that language, would after all leave room for a 
metaphysical science of necessary features of the world: the subject would be 
one such feature or would incorporate all such. His answer is that everything 
describable, and therefore everything psychological also, belongs in the world 
and is mere fact. When it is further said that this world is still described 
from a point of view, the answer is that the point of view is given by language 
and its limits: there is no other restriction, nor is this restriction 
describable -- its removal or lifting is literally inconceivable and hence it 
too is inexpressible.

[Note that MY reference to the components or features of our mental lives is a 
reference to psychological facts, NOT a reference to anything that is 
inexpressible, lacking as you have put it, grammar and referent. So there is 
really no point in persisting in an effort to replace my use of "consciousness" 
with some more spurious use that is purported to refer to some referentless 
referent as in Wittgenstein's "microcosm" as found in The Tractatus which, 
precisely because it is inexpressible is outside the realm of this discussion.]


>
> >>>> To take this "third-person world" as the primary datum (in which
> >>>> this "first-person perspective" now has to be accounted for) is to
> >>>> put the cart before the horse.
> >>>
> >>> There is no horse if you are right vis a vis "the all".
> >>
> >> There is no "third-person world"?
> >> Or there is no "first-person perspective"?
> >

> > If consciousness is "the all" and "the all" is inexpressible because
> > the term lacks a referent or any grammar for using it, then if your
> > "horse" is "consciousness", there is no horse.
> >
> > On the other hand, if your "horse" is "this first-person perspective"
> > and that is simply to speak of being a subject which is to speak of
> > consciousness, then again: no horse.
>
> I have to admit that eliminativism is a view that I have great trouble
> in understanding. Perhaps you could help me to understand it.
>

I'm not sure what you have in mind by "eliminativism". If you would specify 
what you mean AND it is something I think I uderstand, I will offer my 
thoughts, of course, for what they're worth. As I understand it, 
"eliminativism" is a particular thesis concerning the mind. What do you take 
this thesis to be? Are you after a discussion of the standard or traditional 
expressions of the thesis (in which case we can Google it and take what is 
available on wikipedia and/or the Stanford Encyclopedia of philosophy and go 
from there.

SWM


WEB VIEW: http://tinyurl.com/ku7ga4
TODAY: http://alturl.com/whcf
3 DAYS: http://alturl.com/d9vz
1 WEEK: http://alturl.com/yeza
GOOGLE: http://groups.google.com/group/Wittrs
YAHOO: http://groups.yahoo.com/group/Wittrs/
FREELIST: //www.freelists.org/archive/wittrs/09-2009

Other related posts:

  1. Home
  2. wittrs
  3. Archive
  4. 09-2009