[Wittrs] Re: Minds, Brains and What There Is

  • From: "Cayuse" <z.z7@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
  • To: <wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
  • Date: Sat, 26 Sep 2009 15:45:47 +0100

SWM wrote:

"Cayuse" wrote:

The /union/ of two sets of elements consists of the set of elements
that is in /either/ set, in contrast to the /intersection/ of two
sets of elements, which consists of the set of elements that is in
/both/ sets.


This, I'm afraid, is no clearer. What "union" of "elements" or "sets
of elements" are you referring to? And what has a contrast between a
"union" and an "intersection" to do with this? Who here has spoken of
an "intersection" anyway?


I borrowed the term 'union' from the algebra of sets. If you're
seriously interested in the algebra of sets then there's no shortage
of links available on the web, but it's fine to be disinterested.



That would still leave us with all the BS metaphysics that is
grounded in the objectification of consciousness. Such metaphysics
is nonsensical, including the prevalent belief that the "problem of
consciousness" will eventually fall to the inexorable progress of
the scientific enterprise.


You are the one who is imposing the metaphysics, albeit mainly in
order to decry it. Or to hold out for a non-scientific view of
consciousness.


More precisely, the view that p-consciousness has no place
in a physicalist pardigm.



You said:
"I was making the point that consciousness involves experience
which means experiencing what we call experiences and that
to be in THAT position is what it means when we speak of
being a subject, i.e., having a point of view, etc."

The "problem of consciousness" (that drives some into BS metaphysics)
is the problem of the relationship between the conceived first-person
experiencer and experiences, or between the third-person experiencer
and the conception of his experiences. Physicalist, idealist, and
dualist approaches to this "problem" all follow hot on the heels of
the failure to recognize that the "problem" has no sense.


The only "problem" I am talking about is that of explaining how it is
that brains produce subjectivity (all that that entails) as seen in
subjective entities like ourselves, i.e., creatures with minds.


You defined "being a subject" as "experiencing what we call experiences",
and this needs a little more digging in terms of the relationship between
experiencer, experiences, and experiencing. All three arise in mutual
dependence and inter-relatedness as parts of the "contents of
consciousness".



I have a suggestion. In his paper "On a confusion about the function
of consciousness" (1995), Ned Block distinguishes between what
he called "access consciousness" and "phenomenal consciousness".
Regardless of my conviction that this is too simplistic a distinction,
we could agree that you're interested in a-consciousness and I'm
interested in p-consciousness.


I believe this is, word for word, a suggestion you have previously
made.


You believe correctly. I don't recall you addressing this suggestion.



Yes, I have hopefully shown you that we can speak of subjectness,
etc., without having to have recourse to the idea of a mysterious,
inexplicable vessel of containment.


This "mysterious, inexplicable vessel of containment" is the source
of your confusion here -- there is no such thing. It is this mistaken
belief that leads to the misguided attempts to provide a physical
account of consciousness.


Then why do you talk about contents without containers?


I employ an extant mode of reference because it is already
in widespread use.



To take this "third-person world" as the primary datum (in which
this "first-person perspective" now has to be accounted for) is to
put the cart before the horse.


There is no horse if you are right vis a vis "the all".


There is no "third-person world"?
Or there is no "first-person perspective"?


If consciousness is "the all" and "the all" is inexpressible because
the term lacks a referent or any grammar for using it, then if your
"horse" is "consciousness", there is no horse.

On the other hand, if your "horse" is "this first-person perspective"
and that is simply to speak of being a subject which is to speak of
consciousness, then again: no horse.
I have to admit that eliminativism is a view that I have great trouble in understanding. Perhaps you could help me to understand it. 

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