[Wittrs] Re: Minds, Brains and What There Is

  • From: "SWM" <SWMirsky@xxxxxxx>
  • To: wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
  • Date: Wed, 23 Sep 2009 14:44:33 -0000

--- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, "Cayuse" <z.z7@...> wrote:
>
> SWM wrote:
> > "Cayuse" wrote:
> >> If your use of the word 'minds' includes phenomenal consciousness
> >> then it involves a misguided attempt to account for the fact of the
> >> existence of the "contents of consciousness".
> >
> <snip>
> > How can we think of mind as anything but "phenomenal
>> consciousness"?What other kind of consciousness is there, even if >> we mean 
>> just to be aware as in to be attentive! At the bottom of >> it all MUST be 
>> an experiencing experiencer. What other "contents >> of consciousness" can 
>> there be than the many aspects, facets and >> bits of experience?
>
> Ned Block's term "access consciousness" describes certain processes that are
> associated with brain activity, and that are likely amenable to explanation.
>

What is "accessible" this way are brain processes, e.g., which series or 
complex of cells fires when certain behaviors are observed and/or certain 
experiences reported on by the subject. But we were speaking of the experiences 
themselves which the subject is reporting on. These are accessible to the 
subject in a direct way but only indirectly to the observer, through 
interpretation of observations or reporting by the subject. When I speak here 
of mental events, phenomena and so on, THAT is what I have in mind. On the 
other hand, I agree that being a subject, the experiencing itself cannot be 
isolated or directly accessed in the same way by the subject since everything, 
as per Hume, that the subject thinks about or observes in him or herself is 
already an observation, an object to that subject. So in this sense, being a 
subject is transparent to the subject and only recognizable by inference (from 
the fact that observing, experiencing, is occurring to the 
observer/experiencer).

So when I speak here of mental processes I am not talking about brain processes 
though there may, in fact, be a one to one correlation that is waiting to be 
discovered.


>
> >> "Subjective" and "objective" are /categories/ of the
> >> "contents of consciousness", the union of which is
> >> therefore /neutral/ in that respect.
> >
> > What does THAT mean? This, too, reads like mere words to me with
> > no underlying meaning. Can you provide one in clearer language?
>
> The union of two categories falls into neither of those categories.
>

And what does THAT mean in reference to the discussion we are having?

Recall the discussion is about whether YOUR equating consciousness (most 
recently refined by you to mean experience) is relevant to my claim that we can 
we can speak intelligibly about the mind-brain relation and can say that it is 
causal. My claim is based on asserting there is such a thing as "mind" that it 
is equivalent with what we mean by "consciousness" in certain contexts and 
that, if the evidence points to an existential dependency of minds on brains, 
then we can follow that evidence and speak about this relationship and 
understand consciousness in terms of it.

To this you have said things like: "'Subjective' and 'objective' are 
/categories/ of the 'contents of consciousness', the union of which is 
therefore /neutral/ in that respect." Now what has THAT to do with this 
discussion since, presumably, you feel you have offered something we should 
take account of here!


>
> > You previously accused me of wrongly complaining that you were
> > speaking about minds when we were talking about consciousness and
> > noted that the thread in question had "consciousness" in its title,
> > not minds and I accepted that. But now you accuse me of wrongly
> > invoking the idea of minds even though the thread in question
> > explicitly refers to minds! You can't have it both ways, Cayuse.
> >
> > Anyway, if you're speaking about MY use of "consciousness" THAT is
> > what I mean, i.e., mind = consciousness.
>
> Then the title of this thread might just as well have been "Consciousness,
> Brains, and What There Is". You can't have it both ways, Stuart.
>

I use "mind" and "consciousness" interchangeably and have been quite clear on 
that. You want to talk about "consciousness" but not about "mind". I don't know 
how you propose to do that unless you want to say we can have consciousness 
without mind. Now perhaps you just want to redefine "mind" to mean the level of 
mental capacities we and creatures close to us in development have. But you 
have NEVER responded in that way. Instead you have talked about "microcosms" 
and ""visual rooms" and "the all". Lately you have moved away from that, first 
to "subjective experience" and now just to "experience".

When I ask you what your point is you say things like "The union of two 
categories falls into neither of those categories". Do you really think this is 
responsive? And do you really believe that you can criticize my use of 
consciousness by claiming it has nothing to do with minds?


>
> >>> Certainly we seem to be interested in very different things.
> >>> The kind of "consciousness" that seems to intrigue you is
> >>> the mystery of the first person perspective in an apparently
> >>> third person world.
> >>
> >> Your portrayal of my view is inaccurate. If the "first-person"
> >> category of the "contents of consciousness" stands in contrast to
> >> the "third-person" category, then the "contents of consciousness"
> >> (being the union of those categories)
> >
> > What is "the union of those categories"?
>
> It is the collecting together of the "first-person" category
> and the "third-person" category.
>

And how does that affect either my view or my portrayal of your view which 
you're challenging and which has been, at least to this point, to assert that 
consciousness is indescribable because it is nothing less than "the all", etc.?


>
> >> is /neutral/ in that respect. If these categories /don't/ stand in
> >> contrast to one another then what is their relationship?
> >
> > What are you talking about?
>
> The relationship between the "first-person" category
> and the "third-person" category.
>

I figured that out already. I'm asking:

1) What this has to do with what we're discussing in this thread?

and

2) How is saying "If these categories /don't/ stand in
contrast to one another then what is their relationship?" to say anything at 
all?

Let's put this another way. What do you mean by your reference to their being 
"categories"? Of course they are but why is that significant or relevant? 
Secondly, why is the fact that they "stand in contrast to one another" 
important or meaningful here? And what is the point of asking what their 
relationship is? I wasn't challenging that they meant different things or that 
they contrast with one another.

I was making the point that consciousness involves experience which means 
experiencing what we call experiences and that to be in THAT position is what 
it means when we speak of being a subject, i.e., having a point of view, etc.

And I further noted that being a subject is everywhere and always associated IN 
OUR EXPERIENCE OF THE WORLD with having a physical platform or medium in which 
the subject is situated (which in creatures like us means to have a working 
brain in good order). Now to what extent is it a response to these points to 
assert that first person and third person are 1) categories and 2) stand in 
opposition to one another? Who questioned either claim and how do such claims 
bear on anything I've said here about minds, brains and what there is?

SWM


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