I'm thinking Wittgenstein's diagnosis for so many perplexities was "overlapping grammars" i.e. we juxtapose two language games and the patterns of one bewitch us into warping the other, almost as if we'd entered a gravitational field. To take an example: we have what I'll call the medical meaning of "conscious" which has to do with "able to experience pain" and then gradations of that ability such as "able to signal or communicate type and level of pain" (by means of language, gesture, other signal). Then we have a rather different meaning of "conscious" as in "aware of the rules" i.e. "understanding of one's circumstances". To further tease these apart, we have a pet python and procure mice from the local pet store, once a week, to keep it conscious (medical meaning). When a mouse is placed in the aquarium with the snake, there's no observable behavior of fear or anxiety on the part of the mouse i.e. it has no idea what's coming, and pretty soon it's all over. The mouse is perfectly conscious, yet is *oblivious* to (unconscious of) the fact that it's about to die. In many language games, including in movies, we're privy to information that others are not, and so we say they are unaware or unconscious of whatever critical information, are therefore subject to surprise (maybe) when the secret is revealed, whatever that may be. They "become conscious of" some fact or nuance of the situation that was hitherto missing from their knowledge bank. However, a medical doctor watching these screen images, applying the medical meaning of conscious, will be alert to "awake" or "asleep" i.e. it doesn't matter that X is oblivious, unaware, uninformed, in the dark, is making a fool of himself, is about to be surprised or whatever the hell. Now in the Buddhist tradition there's this meaning for "mindfulness" that has more to do with "not being oblivious" in the sense of "tracking" and/or "being aware". To be mindful is not the same thing as to be medically conscious. Lots of medically conscious people, tourists say, visit sacred sites in Bhutan and carry on in a loud and obnoxious manner, completely oblivious to the rules of the road. They'll also dress inappropriately, behave like assholes. From a Buddhist vantage point, we could judge them "unconscious" ("unmindful", "mindless") and yet they're medically quite "conscious". From a behaviorist perspective, there are all kinds of differences in what we look for, depending on whether we're judging for "consciousness" or "mindfulness". It's easy to imagine a tribe or school of thought in which "mindful behavior" was considered a "mind function" and "medically conscious behavior" was considered a "brain function". When judging the health of a brain, we merely look for the latter kinds of behavior. When judging for the health of a mind, we apply different criteria and tests. We might say "consciousness is a prerequisite for mindfulness, is necessary but not sufficient". A perfectly healthy brain might host a completely oblivious consciousness and I think that's a source of confusions in these discussions. The word "conscious" is over-determined, is like a piece in a board game used in more than one board game. You get this pawn off the chess board, and start moving it around on a Monopoly board as if this were still chess -- that's what so much of philosophy is like, according to Wittgenstein (oblivious nonsense engaged in by otherwise healthy people with perfectly fine brains). Concepts associated with unmindful would include: thoughtless, selfish, self-absorbed, self-centered, unaware, oblivious, ignorant, inappropriate. Concepts associated with medical unconsciousness would include: asleep, in a coma. Obviously the first set of concepts has a lot to do with cultural mores, taboos, behavior in community i.e. social settings. In this sense, "the mind" would be a socio-political matrix populated with many players and characterized by lots of rules, many of them breakable. That's why calling mindfulness a "mind function" (a product of social institutions) as distinct from a "brain function" makes plenty of sense, as individual brains needn't be immersed in a civilization, subculture or ethnic context. Bare medical consciousness, without mental functioning, is sort of the default "ground state" we expect from those endowed with healthy working brains. Whether they're mindful in addition will depend on other criteria. Again, we have lots of gradations, degrees, of both kinds of consciousness i.e. there are plenty of similarities in the respective language games. For purposes of achieving clarity however, I think we might want to commit "mind" and "brain" to different service. Conflating their meanings seems wasteful to me, and simply saying the one is hosted by the other doesn't sufficiently take into account the institutional factors involved in mindfulness. You need the Internet for some kinds of awareness, not for others. Television is also a part of our mindfulness training, religious texts etc. Individual brains are neither that repository nor solo developers of these forms of awareness, so I'd be reluctant to say "my brain hosts my mind". I'd rather say "brains attune to mind" or "brains participate in mind". However, I'm fine with "brains sustain medical consciousness, as well as medical unconsciousness." In sum, having a brain and being medically conscious is no guarantee against mindlessness, obliviousness. Unless we keep this important aspect of our grammar in view, I'm afraid a lot of AI people will remain in an unconscious state, victims of their own mindless BS. As Wittgensteinians, we should provide them with institutional assistance, as a kind of public service. Whadda y'all think? Kirby