[THIN] Re: speaking of security nazis

  • From: Berny Stapleton <berny@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
  • To: thin@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
  • Date: Tue, 25 Aug 2009 17:36:23 +0100

The only problem is that they are wondering what you are tunneling through
ICA, virtual channels can carry a lot of stuff...

2009/8/25 Greg Reese <gareese@xxxxxxxxx>

> that's kind of the cool thing about CAGS/CSG.  It only tunnels the ICA
> protocol.  if the client pc is infected with something, it's not going to
> jump from there to your servers.  If the client is infected with a keystroke
> logger, then you have a different problem but not different that you would
> have if they were infected with on and using a traditional vpn.
>
>
> On Tue, Aug 25, 2009 at 11:22 AM, Berny Stapleton <berny@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> > wrote:
>
>> CSG / CAG is SSL, they can't see in it with a packet sniffer, it is a
>> tunneling protocol, so they are worried about what else might get tunneled
>> over it.
>>
>> If they are that worried about it, give it to them for them to manage.
>> That will allay a lot of their fears.
>>
>> For the price of AppSense, you might be able to do two factor auth, which
>> apparently is one of their primary concerns. Also, have you looked at
>> something like SMS passcode or something like that as a cheaper two factor
>> auth?
>>
>> Berny
>>
>> 2009/8/25 Greg Reese <gareese@xxxxxxxxx>
>>
>> and Nazi mutants could over run the walls and raze the whole place to the
>>> ground.
>>>
>>> If they are happy with VPN, they should be happy with a CSG/CAG.
>>> Happier, since with a CSG/CAG, the client device is not an active node on
>>> the network like it is with a VPN.
>>>
>>> You can do a double hop DMZ with this if that will help them sleep better
>>> at night.
>>>
>>>
>>> On Tue, Aug 25, 2009 at 10:22 AM, Wilson, Christopher <
>>> CMWilson@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>>>
>>>>  It seems to be more about their perimeter security philosophy than
>>>> anything.  Multi-hop DMZ, with three rings to get through before you are
>>>> internal.  They don’t like that it hops right by their perimeter rings.
>>>> They also don’t like that it runs on Windows, so maybe the CAG would 
>>>> appease
>>>> that.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> I’m not sure the kind of attack, but the argument goes something like
>>>> this.  If we provide remote access to this Citrix server, someone could
>>>> potentially hack it and get administrative access, and then what?  It seems
>>>> like an anti-windows bias coming from a unix oriented team.  In this
>>>> argument, vague as it is, if the server is the vulnerability I thought I
>>>> would attack it at the server level.  (Obviously we already patch and run
>>>> AV).  So I brought in AppSense.  I thought they would dig the lock down of
>>>> processes on the server, and security policies that filter on client
>>>> location.  They weren’t impressed. They want something else that sits in 
>>>> the
>>>> DMZ as a barrier.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> This team has apparently been pretty dogmatic about their policies, but
>>>> I am hoping to find someone who will reason with me J.   I appreciate
>>>> you guys helping me make my case.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>  ------------------------------
>>>>
>>>> *From:* thin-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx [mailto:thin-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx] *On
>>>> Behalf Of *Robert K Coffman Jr. -Info From Data Corp.
>>>> *Sent:* Tuesday, August 25, 2009 10:04 AM
>>>> *To:* thin@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
>>>> *Subject:* [THIN] Re: speaking of security nazis
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> >The security team believes Citrix Secure Gateway with single factor
>>>> authentication doesn’t provide enough protection from external attack
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> What kind of attack are they trying to prevent?
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Both CSG and CAG use SSL...  With the CAG you could limit the exposure
>>>> of  WI to the internet.  I don't know CAG that well (yet), but other than
>>>> that I don't know that it is more secure than CSG.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> - Bob Coffman
>>>>
>>>
>>>
>>
>

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