[THIN] Re: speaking of security nazis

  • From: Greg Reese <gareese@xxxxxxxxx>
  • To: thin@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
  • Date: Tue, 25 Aug 2009 11:30:44 -0500

that's kind of the cool thing about CAGS/CSG.  It only tunnels the ICA
protocol.  if the client pc is infected with something, it's not going to
jump from there to your servers.  If the client is infected with a keystroke
logger, then you have a different problem but not different that you would
have if they were infected with on and using a traditional vpn.

On Tue, Aug 25, 2009 at 11:22 AM, Berny Stapleton
<berny@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>wrote:

> CSG / CAG is SSL, they can't see in it with a packet sniffer, it is a
> tunneling protocol, so they are worried about what else might get tunneled
> over it.
>
> If they are that worried about it, give it to them for them to manage. That
> will allay a lot of their fears.
>
> For the price of AppSense, you might be able to do two factor auth, which
> apparently is one of their primary concerns. Also, have you looked at
> something like SMS passcode or something like that as a cheaper two factor
> auth?
>
> Berny
>
> 2009/8/25 Greg Reese <gareese@xxxxxxxxx>
>
> and Nazi mutants could over run the walls and raze the whole place to the
>> ground.
>>
>> If they are happy with VPN, they should be happy with a CSG/CAG.  Happier,
>> since with a CSG/CAG, the client device is not an active node on the network
>> like it is with a VPN.
>>
>> You can do a double hop DMZ with this if that will help them sleep better
>> at night.
>>
>>
>> On Tue, Aug 25, 2009 at 10:22 AM, Wilson, Christopher <
>> CMWilson@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>>
>>>  It seems to be more about their perimeter security philosophy than
>>> anything.  Multi-hop DMZ, with three rings to get through before you are
>>> internal.  They don’t like that it hops right by their perimeter rings.
>>> They also don’t like that it runs on Windows, so maybe the CAG would appease
>>> that.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> I’m not sure the kind of attack, but the argument goes something like
>>> this.  If we provide remote access to this Citrix server, someone could
>>> potentially hack it and get administrative access, and then what?  It seems
>>> like an anti-windows bias coming from a unix oriented team.  In this
>>> argument, vague as it is, if the server is the vulnerability I thought I
>>> would attack it at the server level.  (Obviously we already patch and run
>>> AV).  So I brought in AppSense.  I thought they would dig the lock down of
>>> processes on the server, and security policies that filter on client
>>> location.  They weren’t impressed. They want something else that sits in the
>>> DMZ as a barrier.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> This team has apparently been pretty dogmatic about their policies, but I
>>> am hoping to find someone who will reason with me J.   I appreciate you
>>> guys helping me make my case.
>>>
>>>
>>>  ------------------------------
>>>
>>> *From:* thin-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx [mailto:thin-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx] *On
>>> Behalf Of *Robert K Coffman Jr. -Info From Data Corp.
>>> *Sent:* Tuesday, August 25, 2009 10:04 AM
>>> *To:* thin@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
>>> *Subject:* [THIN] Re: speaking of security nazis
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> >The security team believes Citrix Secure Gateway with single factor
>>> authentication doesn’t provide enough protection from external attack
>>>
>>>
>>> What kind of attack are they trying to prevent?
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Both CSG and CAG use SSL...  With the CAG you could limit the exposure
>>> of  WI to the internet.  I don't know CAG that well (yet), but other than
>>> that I don't know that it is more secure than CSG.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> - Bob Coffman
>>>
>>
>>
>

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