that's kind of the cool thing about CAGS/CSG. It only tunnels the ICA protocol. if the client pc is infected with something, it's not going to jump from there to your servers. If the client is infected with a keystroke logger, then you have a different problem but not different that you would have if they were infected with on and using a traditional vpn. On Tue, Aug 25, 2009 at 11:22 AM, Berny Stapleton <berny@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>wrote: > CSG / CAG is SSL, they can't see in it with a packet sniffer, it is a > tunneling protocol, so they are worried about what else might get tunneled > over it. > > If they are that worried about it, give it to them for them to manage. That > will allay a lot of their fears. > > For the price of AppSense, you might be able to do two factor auth, which > apparently is one of their primary concerns. Also, have you looked at > something like SMS passcode or something like that as a cheaper two factor > auth? > > Berny > > 2009/8/25 Greg Reese <gareese@xxxxxxxxx> > > and Nazi mutants could over run the walls and raze the whole place to the >> ground. >> >> If they are happy with VPN, they should be happy with a CSG/CAG. Happier, >> since with a CSG/CAG, the client device is not an active node on the network >> like it is with a VPN. >> >> You can do a double hop DMZ with this if that will help them sleep better >> at night. >> >> >> On Tue, Aug 25, 2009 at 10:22 AM, Wilson, Christopher < >> CMWilson@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: >> >>> It seems to be more about their perimeter security philosophy than >>> anything. Multi-hop DMZ, with three rings to get through before you are >>> internal. They don’t like that it hops right by their perimeter rings. >>> They also don’t like that it runs on Windows, so maybe the CAG would appease >>> that. >>> >>> >>> >>> I’m not sure the kind of attack, but the argument goes something like >>> this. If we provide remote access to this Citrix server, someone could >>> potentially hack it and get administrative access, and then what? It seems >>> like an anti-windows bias coming from a unix oriented team. In this >>> argument, vague as it is, if the server is the vulnerability I thought I >>> would attack it at the server level. (Obviously we already patch and run >>> AV). So I brought in AppSense. I thought they would dig the lock down of >>> processes on the server, and security policies that filter on client >>> location. They weren’t impressed. They want something else that sits in the >>> DMZ as a barrier. >>> >>> >>> >>> This team has apparently been pretty dogmatic about their policies, but I >>> am hoping to find someone who will reason with me J. I appreciate you >>> guys helping me make my case. >>> >>> >>> ------------------------------ >>> >>> *From:* thin-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx [mailto:thin-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx] *On >>> Behalf Of *Robert K Coffman Jr. -Info From Data Corp. >>> *Sent:* Tuesday, August 25, 2009 10:04 AM >>> *To:* thin@xxxxxxxxxxxxx >>> *Subject:* [THIN] Re: speaking of security nazis >>> >>> >>> >>> >The security team believes Citrix Secure Gateway with single factor >>> authentication doesn’t provide enough protection from external attack >>> >>> >>> What kind of attack are they trying to prevent? >>> >>> >>> >>> Both CSG and CAG use SSL... With the CAG you could limit the exposure >>> of WI to the internet. I don't know CAG that well (yet), but other than >>> that I don't know that it is more secure than CSG. >>> >>> >>> >>> - Bob Coffman >>> >> >> >