I do see your point....... We don't want to make the Security bods sad because then they impose all sorts of rules that brighten their day and make us sad :) I like to avoid that at all costs. Bill Foster Sr. Systems Engineer, IT Infrastructure WellCare Health Plans, Inc. 8735 Henderson Road Ren1, 1st Floor Tampa, Florida 34609 Office: 813-290-6200 ext 1158 bill.foster@xxxxxxxxxxxx From: thin-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx [mailto:thin-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx] On Behalf Of Andrew Wood Sent: Wednesday, August 26, 2009 10:37 AM To: thin@xxxxxxxxxxxxx Subject: [THIN] Re: speaking of security nazis But that in itself can be a problem - if you've got an SSL tunnel coming in - and potentially encrypted data going all the way from the end device to the XenApp server security bods can't 'see' into it; and if they can't see into it then they can't inspect it; and if they can't inspect it - it makes them really quite sad. When you eventually explain its keyboard and mouse movements and screen updates it can calm them down a bit, until they realise you've now got access into the corporate network from a remote device to a windows application/environment. A windows environment is not renowned for its tight security so you have to go through it all again explaining how you lock down the environment that the remote user is working within. You can work with them on that by developing with them a profile of vulnerabilities, then addressing those vulnerabilities and then getting independent analysis of the environment that's been built. Security bods are never happy tho' - the best you can hope for is 'less unhappy grudging acceptance of risk' :? From: thin-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx [mailto:thin-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx] On Behalf Of Foster, Bill Sent: 26 August 2009 14:57 To: thin@xxxxxxxxxxxxx Subject: [THIN] Re: speaking of security nazis I'm just having trouble seeing what a malicious attack would gain from the ICA stream if you properly locked it down. Bill Foster Sr. Systems Engineer, IT Infrastructure WellCare Health Plans, Inc. 8735 Henderson Road Ren1, 1st Floor Tampa, Florida 34609 Office: 813-290-6200 ext 1158 bill.foster@xxxxxxxxxxxx From: thin-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx [mailto:thin-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx] On Behalf Of Berny Stapleton Sent: Wednesday, August 26, 2009 9:50 AM To: thin@xxxxxxxxxxxxx Subject: [THIN] Re: speaking of security nazis Debatable. Depends on what you set for the settings on the published app. 2009/8/26 Foster, Bill <Bill.Foster@xxxxxxxxxxxx<mailto:Bill.Foster@xxxxxxxxxxxx>> Even if you could see inside the tunnel ICA is compressed and encrypted right? Bill Foster Sr. Systems Engineer, IT Infrastructure WellCare Health Plans, Inc. 8735 Henderson Road Ren1, 1st Floor Tampa, Florida 34609 Office: 813-290-6200 ext 1158 bill.foster@xxxxxxxxxxxx<mailto:bill.foster@xxxxxxxxxxxx> From: thin-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx<mailto:thin-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> [mailto:thin-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx<mailto:thin-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>] On Behalf Of Wilson, Christopher Sent: Tuesday, August 25, 2009 2:13 PM To: thin@xxxxxxxxxxxxx<mailto:thin@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> Subject: [THIN] Re: speaking of security nazis Yup, that's exactly what they are concerned about. Can't see inside the tunnel. I'm looking into the 2 factor options. I did see SMS Passcode, but SMS is not a standard feature on company cell phones for, you guessed it, security reasons. This is all helpful discussion. I'm still optimistic that problem can be resolved with negotiation. ________________________________ From: thin-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx<mailto:thin-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> [mailto:thin-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx<mailto:thin-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>] On Behalf Of Berny Stapleton Sent: Tuesday, August 25, 2009 11:23 AM To: thin@xxxxxxxxxxxxx<mailto:thin@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> Subject: [THIN] Re: speaking of security nazis CSG / CAG is SSL, they can't see in it with a packet sniffer, it is a tunneling protocol, so they are worried about what else might get tunneled over it. If they are that worried about it, give it to them for them to manage. That will allay a lot of their fears. For the price of AppSense, you might be able to do two factor auth, which apparently is one of their primary concerns. Also, have you looked at something like SMS passcode or something like that as a cheaper two factor auth? Berny 2009/8/25 Greg Reese <gareese@xxxxxxxxx<mailto:gareese@xxxxxxxxx>> and Nazi mutants could over run the walls and raze the whole place to the ground. If they are happy with VPN, they should be happy with a CSG/CAG. Happier, since with a CSG/CAG, the client device is not an active node on the network like it is with a VPN. You can do a double hop DMZ with this if that will help them sleep better at night. On Tue, Aug 25, 2009 at 10:22 AM, Wilson, Christopher <CMWilson@xxxxxxxxxxxxx<mailto:CMWilson@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>> wrote: It seems to be more about their perimeter security philosophy than anything. Multi-hop DMZ, with three rings to get through before you are internal. They don't like that it hops right by their perimeter rings. They also don't like that it runs on Windows, so maybe the CAG would appease that. I'm not sure the kind of attack, but the argument goes something like this. If we provide remote access to this Citrix server, someone could potentially hack it and get administrative access, and then what? It seems like an anti-windows bias coming from a unix oriented team. In this argument, vague as it is, if the server is the vulnerability I thought I would attack it at the server level. (Obviously we already patch and run AV). So I brought in AppSense. I thought they would dig the lock down of processes on the server, and security policies that filter on client location. They weren't impressed. They want something else that sits in the DMZ as a barrier. This team has apparently been pretty dogmatic about their policies, but I am hoping to find someone who will reason with me :). I appreciate you guys helping me make my case. ________________________________ From: thin-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx<mailto:thin-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> [mailto:thin-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx<mailto:thin-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>] On Behalf Of Robert K Coffman Jr. -Info From Data Corp. Sent: Tuesday, August 25, 2009 10:04 AM To: thin@xxxxxxxxxxxxx<mailto:thin@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> Subject: [THIN] Re: speaking of security nazis >The security team believes Citrix Secure Gateway with single factor >authentication doesn't provide enough protection from external attack What kind of attack are they trying to prevent? Both CSG and CAG use SSL... With the CAG you could limit the exposure of WI to the internet. I don't know CAG that well (yet), but other than that I don't know that it is more secure than CSG. - Bob Coffman Privacy Notice: This electronic mail message, and any attachments, are confidential and are intended for the exclusive use of the addressee(s) and may contain information that is proprietary and that may be Individually Identifiable or Protected Health Information under HIPAA. If you are not the intended recipient, please immediately contact the sender by telephone, or by email, and destroy all copies of this message. 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