I can't revoke the second factor. I can disable is account in ADS. In security, the biggest risk is always the human factor like your doctor. There's nothing that we can do about that... just make their life harder. The fact is that here in quebec, the hospital is running partially in a private network regulated by the government and they don,t allow the use of public certificate, and since we don'T own that domain, no Public certificate company will allow us to get a certificate for a domain that we don't own. We cannot access internet and that setup is strictly for internal access between hospitals via this private network. Slowly, we are implementing the secure computing but meanwhile, they use that private certificate. _____ De : Joe Shonk [mailto:joe.shonk@xxxxxxxxx] Envoyé : 17 août 2005 18:03 À : thin@xxxxxxxxxxxxx Objet : [THIN] Re: Securing MFXP What government regulation is that? I'm currently at a hospital and have built WI/CSG for many other hospitals. And even then a private root can't be considered second factor. You'd be surprised what people do... One guy put his securid token on the web via a webcam. There is nothing that is preventing doctors and nurses from copying the private root ca or posting it to a website. Also, how do you revoke this "second factor" after the user's employment has been terminated? Joe _____ From: thin-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx [mailto:thin-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx] On Behalf Of Marc-Andre Lapierre Sent: Wednesday, August 17, 2005 2:38 PM To: thin@xxxxxxxxxxxxx Subject: [THIN] Re: Securing MFXP For sure this is the best. Actually, I use a combination of CSG + Secure Computing Safe word for citrix or premiere access. I was just talking about the situation of ILMS (original post) which include only the use of Certificate. But I've got some customer (hospital) that couldn't use a public certificate since the government does not let them do that. I had to do it that way + they required two factor authentication and the cheapest way possible. The combination of a private root + username password met their needs. It's not the best, I agree. Another cool solution I use: RadIIS on the WI + a radius server that holds a second user database. You got to authenticate to the radius first with a username + a java passcode generator (kind of soft token + PIN) that change on a daily basis and give you the WI login page then after you authenticate to your ADS through the WI to get your Ticket and your icons. _____ From: Steve Greenberg [mailto:steveg@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx] Sent: Wednesday, August 17, 2005 5:32 PM To: thin@xxxxxxxxxxxxx Subject: [THIN] Re: Securing MFXP I tend to agree, but rather than target the CERT for improvement, I would use a third party security add on such as Secure Computing and require another factor of authentication to gain access... Steve Greenberg Thin Client Computing 34522 N. Scottsdale Rd D8453 Scottsdale, AZ 85262 (602) 432-8649 www.thinclient.net steveg@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx _____ From: thin-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx [mailto:thin-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx] On Behalf Of Marc-Andre Lapierre Sent: Wednesday, August 17, 2005 2:02 PM To: thin@xxxxxxxxxxxxx Subject: [THIN] Re: Securing MFXP What if you use Entrust Authority? Right now, the weakest aspect of a CSG setup is the username/password... If you use a private Cert that you don't give, the hacker has to find the Username/Password + hack/fake or whatever your private CA certificate, which is not that easy even with MS technology. If you use the public one, yes your encryption might be stronger, but anyone can get that CA certificate and the only wall they have in front of your network is, in most cases, a username/password to find. The hacker that has the knowledge/ability to break in a Microsoft CA certificate is probably able to break in a Thawte/Verisign one... While a username/password guess/try is easily feasible to anyone. Maybe I'm wrong, but if I have to choose, I prefer having a slightly week encryption (specially knowing that the content of an ICA packet is almost useless) with an easy to create and a private MS CA Cert than having a stronger encryption but easier to break in a Username Password only! _____ From: Bray, Donovan (ESC) [mailto:BrayD@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx] Sent: Wednesday, August 17, 2005 4:29 PM To: thin@xxxxxxxxxxxxx Subject: [THIN] Re: Securing MFXP From a security standpoint I don't think what you are suggesting is entirely true. I guarantee you Thawte and Verisign run a much more secure CA, than the rest of us can. What you are suggesting is potentially more hoops for an attacker, but if the hoops are easier to get around, there's no security advantage. Also as stated before it increases your training costs, and ongoing TCO for additional helpdesk calls, that you could have reduced by paying $300/yr to a reputable publicly available CA. I wouldn't consider anybody's self setup CA to be more secure than a reputable public CA, unless you are in the business of setting up Certificate Authorities and you had a considerable amount of money to invest in the PKI infrastructure. Setting up a secure CA and PKI infrastructure is well beyond running just running Microsoft's CA software on a single box. It's about the business practices of the CA as much as it is about the technology. _____ From: Marc-Andre Lapierre [mailto:malapierre@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx] Sent: Wednesday, August 17, 2005 1:00 PM To: thin@xxxxxxxxxxxxx Subject: [THIN] Re: Securing MFXP But using a private cert is more secure than using a public one since the ICA has to trust the Root certificate of the CSG box. It's a king of two factor authentication since you need to give the private certificate to your users. _____ From: Joe Shonk [mailto:joe.shonk@xxxxxxxxx] Sent: Wednesday, August 17, 2005 1:26 AM To: thin@xxxxxxxxxxxxx Subject: [THIN] Re: Securing MFXP I would look at using CSG; it's more secure and free with your SubAdv. It's much simpler to setup and maintain than SSL Relay, even with 2 servers. I would also look into using a Public cert. They can be had for only $50 dollars and saves a bunch of time and hassle trying to teach end users how to install the root cert. Joe _____ From: thin-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx [mailto:thin-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx] On Behalf Of ILMS (Air) Sent: Tuesday, August 16, 2005 9:24 PM To: thin@xxxxxxxxxxxxx Subject: [THIN] Securing MFXP Hii friends! We have 2 MFXP FR3/W2k3 servers, users logging in using WI over LAN/WAN. Would like to implement SSL. What I have in mind is: 1. Setup CA on one MF server. Create root cert. Issue Server cert to both MF servers (IIS servers) and install through IIS. 2. Direct WI to use HTTPS (or Citrix SSL??) on 443, also set MF server name same a certificate name. 3. Setup citrix ssl relay on both MF servers (required??). 4. Install root cert on clients. 5. Open only 443 port. 6. Direct users to use https://server waiting for your feedback!! thnx in advance!