[ppi] [ppiindia] Waging war, and the wages of war

** ppi-india **
Waging war, and the wages of war   
 
By Ari Shuali 
 
The resemblance between certain aspects of the Lebanon War and the war in Iraq 
today makes one feel that the Americans may be sinking in the Iraqi mud, just 
as Israel was mired in Lebanon. Nevertheless, it appears that the U.S. may 
achieve a more successful ending.  
 
The continuing sequence of terror attacks on American forces in Iraq creates 
the impression of the occupier sinking on the shores of the Arabian Gulf, 
similar to the way the Israel Defense Forces sank in the Lebanese swamp. 
Naturally, the question arises as to whether the similarities between the two 
wars necessarily indicate that the United States will be mired in the Iraqi mud 
and will end up the same way as did the Israeli presence in Lebanon. At the 
moment it appears that what the two wars have in common - more than pointing 
toward the expected end of American activity - is that they reflect the dynamic 
of a Muslim nation that has been occupied by a technological Western state. 
 
The populations of Iraq and Lebanon are not homogeneous. In Lebanon, an 
intricate mix of ethnic groups and religions has created a system of rule that 
has faithfully reflected the numerical relations among them, but has not worked 
at all. In Iraq, however, there are three different religious-ethnic focuses of 
power - the Sunnis, the Shi'ites and the Kurds - and even though all of them 
are Muslim, they are distinct and mutually hostile groups. The American attempt 
to bring them together under a single umbrella - the temporary governing 
council - is an official, cosmetic solution to the problem, but it is not 
leading to rapprochement or the healing of rifts. 

Israel and the U.S. decided on war, the former in Lebanon and the latter in 
Iraq, long before they actually waged it. They prepared for it as well as they 
could, according to their particular considerations, in the knowledge that the 
enemy did not constitute a real challenge to their superior strength. The 
interests of both countries regarding embarkation on the military struggle were 
many and complex, but the casus belli as presented to the public did not 
reflect all of them. 

Israel declared that its intention was to prevent the activities launched 
against it by Palestinian organizations operating from Lebanon, but in fact it 
was aiming at a fundamental change in the Lebanese political structure and at 
expelling the Syrian forces. Some say that Israel also aspired to getting the 
Palestinians pushed out of Lebanon and into Jordan, and to the creation of a 
Palestinian state there. The U.S. declared that its intention in Iraq was to 
act against Saddam Hussein, to wipe out "the axis of evil" and to prevent 
Iraq's acquisition of weapons of mass destruction, whereas in fact it appears 
that America's goals were the Iraqi oil reserves and a fundamental change in 
the balance of power in the Persian Gulf, vis-ý-vis both its Arab friends and 
Iran. 

Ties with local allies

It was clear to both countries even before the fighting began that military 
success would enable the advancement of their policy goals and, in light of 
this, they prepared to strengthen their ties with local power elements. Israel 
built up its ties with representatives of the Christian community in Lebanon, 
and especially with the Lebanese forces headed by Bashir Gemayel, while the 
U.S. worked hand in hand with the Iraqi Kurds - Masoud Barazani and Jalal 
Talibani - as well as with the Iraqi opposition in exile. Presumably, it also 
built up ties with Shi'ite and Sunni elements inside Iraq.

Israel's military moves in Lebanon and America's in Iraq ended within a short 
period of time with a clear outcome and few casualties; at the end of the 
fighting, both invading forces controlled most of the territories of the 
countries, including the capital cities. In both arenas, the initial reaction 
by the local populations, which had been expecting the move, were 
demonstratively favorable - whether out of fear or hope that the move would 
lead to a change in the standard of living and political freedom.

At the end of the fighting, Israel brought about the election of Gemayel as 
president of Lebanon and the expulsion of Palestinian leaders from the country, 
and began to prepare for the signing of a peace treaty with official Lebanon. 
The U.S. appointed a governor on its behalf in Iraq, set up the provisional 
governing council and began the process of rebuilding the country. Both in the 
U.S. and Israel, there were optimistic forecasts at the time concerning the 
realization of their plans. However, in both cases a political assassination 
was the turning point in the status of the occupation forces vis-ý-vis the 
local population's attitude toward them. 

In Lebanon, at the initiative of the Syrians, the chosen president Gemayel, who 
was the keystone of the Israeli connection in Lebanon, was assassinated. In 
Iraq, during a sermon in a mosque, there was the assassination of Shi'ite 
leader Bakr al-Hakim - a key, if not critical, player in America's policy. The 
political assassinations in both countries removed a constraint in the local 
populace with regard to the occupying force, and immediately after the 
killings, an escalation in terror attacks against it occurred.

The wave of terror in both cases is closely, if not exclusively, linked to 
Iran's involvement in them; the terror was then and is now aimed at realizing 
Iran's regional interests. Lebanon was the production center and experimental 
laboratory for Shi'ite-Iranian terror, where the ayatollahs' regime applied its 
view of "exporting the Islamic revolution."

At that time, Iran did not yet have at its disposal well-constructed mechanisms 
for nurturing terror, but this was compensated for by the revolutionary fervor 
that prevailed among its leadership. The latter developed and refined suicide 
terror, defining it in religious terms - jihad (holy war) and shaheed (martyr) 
- and promising benefits in this world and the next. Success led to greater 
boldness, to an increase in the number of candidates for suicide and the circle 
of those who helped them, and to the development of new terror methods, along 
with a continuing radicalization of the Shi'ites in Lebanon, and the 
strengthening of the bodies that support Iran at the expense of the traditional 
leadership. 

In Iraq, the Iranian interest is derived partly from considerations related to 
the outcome of conflicts of interest with a country with which it shares a 
border and oil resources. Iran also has its global interests, especially with 
respect to the U.S., on the assumption that arrangements made under the 
auspices of the U.S. will lead the American administration to direct its 
resources against Iran. And there is more: The achievement of a "pax Americana" 
in Iraq arouses Iran's fears that the focus of Arab attention will move from 
the Israeli-Arab conflict to disputes between the Arab states, especially in 
the Persian Gulf. Although revolutionary fervor in Iran has been waning for 
years, at this time the leadership has at its disposal well-oiled mechanisms, 
practiced and proven methods of action and available resources. The humiliating 
capture of Saddam Hussein and his replacement by "unbelievers from the West" 
has only improved the leaders' ability to act and the motivation to 
 act in Iraq. 

U.S. commitment

Alongside the similarities in the course of the two wars, different principles 
of action and patterns of behavior have developed around them. The Israeli 
agenda in Lebanon did not include any significant thought about the Lebanese 
people and its future. The U.S., however, planned from the outset to invest 
considerable input in changing the situation in Iraq by building an economic, 
constitutional and political infrastructure, stressing its commitment to 
realizing a comprehensive change in the country. The capture of Saddam Hussein 
and most of the people in "the deck of cards" has rightly been perceived, both 
in Iraq and in other countries of the region, as proof of America's 
determination and commitment. Inherent in this is also the potential for 
reducing the terror against the American army and its allies, as a result of 
getting rid of Saddam - the symbol and identifying factor - and the reduction 
of a potential constraint on the new Iraqi government.

Another significant difference between the two wars has to do with the attitude 
of the international community toward them. While the Israeli move in Lebanon 
did not win any support from even a single international source, the American 
move is gathering increasing support, even in Europe. The U.S. has managed to 
establish a media spin in which the war in Iraq is perceived as part of the 
international aim of dealing with the wave of Islamic terror. This has occured 
even though in reality, the two have nothing at all to do with each other. Thus 
the legitimacy for the occupation of Iraq is increasing, and at the same time a 
justification and an explanation are taking shape for the increasingly high 
price in human lives and material resources.

The success of the suicide guerrilla fighting in hitting the occupying forces, 
measured by the number of casualties and the media coverage of the attacks, 
feeds into the Islamic perception that at some future stage, the price being 
paid by the U.S. forces will be too high for American society, which will lead 
to the toppling of President George W. Bush and the departure of the foreign 
forces from Iraq, just as Israel withdrew - or, in the Arab perception, fled - 
from Lebanon. 

The similarity between the characteristics of the two wars and the violent 
resistance to the occupation creates a sense that the U.S. is floundering in 
Iraqi mud, just as Israel sank in Lebanon. The clash between the occupying 
technological Western civilization that values human life in this world and the 
occupied Islamic civilization, which feels a practical and psychological sense 
of inferiority, but is encouraged by a belief in rewards in the world to come - 
reinforces, if only ostensibly, the sense that the end of America's action in 
Iraq will be like that of the Israelis in Lebanon. 

However, in light of the significant differences between Israel and the U.S., 
it would seem that the latter can bring about a different and more successful 
end to its activity in Iraq. Therefore, the chances for change and the 
strengthening of its position in the entire Persian Gulf region are not 
inconsiderable, certainly as long as the current administration continues in 
Washington.



The writer is currently a member of the directorate of the Center for Strategic 
Dialogue at Netanya Academic College and formerly a senior Mossad official.  

© Copyright 2004 Haaretz. All rights reserved 
 
 
 
 

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