[ppi] [ppiindia] SOS to 'disgraced' Ba'athists

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http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/FD24Ak01.html

SOS to 'disgraced' Ba'athists
By Erich Marquardt

Washington's ultimate success in creating a stable Iraq completely hinges on
its ability to create viable Iraqi security forces capable of handling all
of the security tasks currently being undertaken by US-led forces. While the
United States is presently taking the majority role in attempts to bring
security to Iraq, it will be able to fulfill this role at its present
intensity for only so long. Washington does not have the funds, troop
reserves, or domestic support to sustain a permanent occupation with troops
numbering in the tens of thousands and coming under consistent guerrilla
attack. Washington will have to replace the bulk of its troops with
indigenous Iraqi security forces, or else risk the chance of having to end
the occupation of Iraq on terms not in synch with US regional interests.

This is not the first time in the history of US foreign policy that it has
faced the difficult task of creating indigenous security forces in the midst
of an ongoing guerrilla struggle. Back during Washington's involvement in
the Vietnam conflict, spanning from the 1950s to the 1970s, subsequent
presidential administrations realized that their ultimate success in
creating a stable South Vietnam generally in line with US interests depended
on their ability to create indigenous Vietnamese security forces capable of
quelling the Vietnamese nationalist and communist insurgency.

Washington never managed to achieve its aims in Vietnam, and was finally
forced out of the country when Vietnamese guerrillas and North Vietnamese
regulars overran the South and established military and political control
over Saigon two years after the departure of US troops. There were a
multitude of reasons why Washington failed in its objectives in Vietnam, but
a central one was the fact that the US was never able to create viable
Vietnamese security forces that were not corrupt or ineffective. Instead, US
policymakers consistently had to deal with a Vietnamese security apparatus
that often stole from Vietnamese peasants, or performed poorly in combat
against nationalist and communist insurgents in addition to the North
Vietnamese Army.

In Iraq, Washington faces a similar predicament. Thus far, the indigenous
Iraqi security forces trained by the US have been both corrupt and
ineffective. For instance, much of the equipment supplied to the new Iraqi
security forces has fallen into the hands of Iraqi insurgents, and it is
believed by Pentagon officials that various individuals in the Iraqi
security forces reveal critical and sensitive information to the guerrillas.

The US has trained and fielded more than 200,000 Iraqi security forces
serving in police, border patrol and site protection. But the process of
setting up the armed forces has been fraught with problems. Most members of
the first Iraqi battalion formed quit within weeks because of
dissatisfaction over pay and conditions.

And the newly trained Iraqi security forces have also been quite
ineffective, which was brutally evident during the recent Shi'ite uprising
throughout central and southern Iraq. According to Major General Martin
Dempsey, the commander of the US 1st Armored Division, who recently spoke
with Associated Press reporters, during the Shi'ite uprising and violence in
Fallujah, 10 percent of Iraq's security forces "actually worked against" US
troops, implying that some of this 10 percent took up arms against the
US-led coalition.

Indeed, during the uprising, many insurgents were seen still wearing
US-issued uniforms, and using US-issued military equipment to fight against
US-led troops. As one lieutenant of the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps told the
New York Times: "We may work for the government now. But if anything
happens, we all work for [Muqtada al-]Sadr." Muqtada is the Shi'ite leader
who called on his private militia, the Mahdi Army, to forcefully resist US
governance.

Just as concerning, Dempsey said that an additional 40 percent of Iraq's
security forces simply quit due to either fear or out of an unwillingness to
fight fellow Iraqis under the orders of the US government. Dempsey said:
"It's very difficult to convince [Iraqi security forces] that Iraqis are
killing fellow Iraqis and fellow Muslims, because it's something they
shouldn't have to accept. Over time I think they will probably have to
accept it."

If Washington has any hopes of creating a stable Iraq, then Dempsey's words
must not go unheeded and Iraq's security forces will "have to accept"
standing with the US in fighting against the present insurgency. One way to
accomplish this may be reincorporating former Ba'athist leaders who have
knowledge and experience in running Iraq's military services, despite their
history of repression over much of the Iraqi populace. While such a decision
may be scorned on by ideological thinkers inside the current Bush
administration, considering the lack of options on the ground in Iraq, this
option may be one that has to be pursued.

Administration officials have recognized this, and there are now attempts to
bring back former members of Ba'athist leader Saddam Hussein's military
establishment. In the same interview, Dempsey articulated this policy shift,
stating that "part of me says our jobs may have been easier had we just
found a way to keep some of the Ba'ath Party in place". Other US military
commanders have made similar statements, such as Major General John Batiste
and Brigadier General Carter Ham.

US Central Command General John Abizaid made parallel comments in the early
days after the start of the Shi'ite uprising, announcing: "It's also very
clear that we've got to get more senior Iraqis involved - former military
types involved in the security forces." He continued: "In the next couple of
days, you'll see a large number of senior officers being appointed to key
positions in the Ministry of Defense and the Iraqi joint staff and in Iraqi
field commands."

And US Army Brigadier General Mark Kimmitt said: "Sooner or later, there
would come a time when we need senior officers, and there are many senior
officers remaining from this country who can meet all the criteria
established in the 'de-Ba'athification' policy and still have a significant
contribution to offer the nation of Iraq in the defense structure."

In the end, however, even if Washington is able to create effective Iraqi
security forces, the stability of Iraq will largely depend on how well
Washington can isolate the insurgents from the rest of the population. As in
all guerrilla conflicts, in order to destroy an insurgency, the occupying
power must discredit it in the eyes of its own people. Failure to do this
will mean that the insurgency can only be destroyed by overwhelming force at
such a level that is often considered politically unacceptable by the
occupying power's domestic population. In the case of Iraq, if Washington
fails to isolate the insurgents, it is highly unlikely that the American
people would support their government in its attempts to destroy the
insurgency using the level of force that will be required.

In the meantime, a senior US defense official said this week that the total
US force in Iraq was likely to remain at more than 130,000 for another three
months - well after the scheduled June 30 handover of sovereignty.

Published with permission of the Power and Interest News Report, an
analysis-based publication that seeks to provide insight into various
conflicts, regions and points of interest around the globe. All comments
should be directed to content@xxxxxxxx



Apr 24, 2004



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