With that logic, why not just write a trigger to not allow access to non-whitelisted user IDs to access the database, except through appropriate programs (blocking SQL*Plus, or Access). I'm not disagreeing with your points about security, but if you are going to lock down ALL_ views, why not lock down access to the instance. Joseph D'Antoni Synthes USA ________________________________ From: Dennis Williams <oracledba.williams@xxxxxxxxx> To: Mayen.Shah@xxxxxxxxxx Cc: Andrew Kerber <andrew.kerber@xxxxxxxxx>; "oracle-l@xxxxxxxxxxxxx" <oracle-l@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>; oracle-l-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx Sent: Wednesday, April 1, 2009 10:52:06 AM Subject: Re: Removing ALL_ views from users - more info List, My auditor pointed to this paragraph in a paper posted on Pete Finnigan's site, Database Security 101 by Richard D. Newallis, SPRINT www.geocities.com/ckempster/wpapers/oracle/databasesecurity101.pdf As innocent as the all_users view may seem, it can allow users to find potential holes in your defenses by giving the names of accounts which the DBA may not have protected.At this point I'm considering revoking ALL_USERS from PUBLIC and based on Mayen's note, maybe ALL_SOURCE. Fortunately we are just preparing for an application release cycle that will provide an opportunity to test this a bit. I think the philosophy is "defense in depth". Not just placing total reliance on a password. Reminds me of my days in the nuclear power plant industry. Prove that no pipe can break. Then assume the worst pipe does break, prove that the containment vessel (which Chernobyl didn't have) can contain the mess. The assume the containment vessel breaches, count the casualties for a given wind direction. And you thought your day was bad :-) Dennis On Wed, Apr 1, 2009 at 8:06 AM, <Mayen.Shah@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: Dennis, In my case auditors had objected PUBLIC grant to few of the ALL_ views (ALL_SOURCE, ALL_VIEWS and few more). Revoked privilege from PUBLIC for these views. Only problem or issue came up was some of developers using SQL Navigator could not look at their own source code. Asked them to get source code using USER_ views from sqlplus. I did not have any need for ALL_ views as I use DBA_ views.Instead of me fighting with auditors, I simply asked developers to have their manager get approval from auditors. That resolve political battle. It was on solaris, 10.2.0.4 Thanks Mayen "Dennis Williams" <oracledba.williams@xxxxxxxxx> Mar 31 2009 05:03 PM To Mayen Shah/ITS/Lazard@Lazard NYC cc "Andrew Kerber" <andrew.kerber@xxxxxxxxx>, "oracle-l@xxxxxxxxxxxxx" <oracle-l@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>, oracle-l-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx Subject Re: Removing ALL_ views from users Mayen, Just so I understand you correctly, you took a list of each of the ALL_ views, and revoked each of them from PUBLIC? Any database problems afterward? Which database version? Thanks, Dennis On Tue, Mar 31, 2009 at 11:10 AM, <Mayen.Shah@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: I had similar request from auditors. I lost half the battle. Instead of dropping ALL_ views, I revoked PUBLIC privilege to satisfy auditors. When developers complained, I asked them to get approval from auditors...never heard back. Thanks Mayen "Dennis Williams" <oracledba.williams@xxxxxxxxx> Sent by: oracle-l-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx Mar 31 2009 12:03 PM Please respond to oracledba.williams@xxxxxxxxx To "Andrew Kerber" <andrew.kerber@xxxxxxxxx> cc "oracle-l@xxxxxxxxxxxxx" <oracle-l@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> Subject Re: Removing ALL_ views from users Thanks Andrew, That was pretty much my first response. Unfortunately this has gone further than that. What I'm asking is: Has anyone removed access to any of the ALL_ views? I'm guessing that since the views are PUBLIC, that would need to be revoked first. Thanks, Dennis On Mon, Mar 30, 2009 at 9:40 AM, Andrew Kerber <andrew.kerber@xxxxxxxxx> wrote: You are talking to an ignorant auditor who thinks the all views show everything in the database. If he seriously thinks that knowing other usernames is a security risk, go ahead and revoke that one, then explain to him that the all* views actually just show objects that each user has access to, not everything in the database. I ran into this before, and the problem was the guy was trained in accounting, not oracle. On Mon, Mar 30, 2009 at 9:32 AM, Dennis Williams <oracledba.williams@xxxxxxxxx> wrote: List, Some security auditors are stating that the ALL_ views are a security risk and are recommending that I revoke them. In particular, they are pointing to ALL_USERS as offering a hacker useful information. My guess is that the ALL_ views are granted to PUBLIC. Has anyone had this requirement? Has anyone successfully revoked this access? Dennis -- Andrew W. Kerber 'If at first you dont succeed, dont take up skydiving.'