Re: Removing ALL_ views from users - more info
- From: Joey D'Antoni <jdanton1@xxxxxxxxx>
- To: oracledba.williams@xxxxxxxxx
- Date: Wed, 1 Apr 2009 07:57:41 -0700 (PDT)
With that logic, why not just write a trigger to not allow access to
non-whitelisted user IDs to access the database, except through appropriate
programs (blocking SQL*Plus, or Access).
I'm not disagreeing with your points about security, but if you are going to
lock down ALL_ views, why not lock down access to the instance.
Joseph D'Antoni
Synthes USA
________________________________
From: Dennis Williams <oracledba.williams@xxxxxxxxx>
To: Mayen.Shah@xxxxxxxxxx
Cc: Andrew Kerber <andrew.kerber@xxxxxxxxx>; "oracle-l@xxxxxxxxxxxxx"
<oracle-l@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>; oracle-l-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
Sent: Wednesday, April 1, 2009 10:52:06 AM
Subject: Re: Removing ALL_ views from users - more info
List,
My auditor pointed to this paragraph in a paper posted on Pete Finnigan's site,
Database Security 101 by Richard D. Newallis, SPRINT
www.geocities.com/ckempster/wpapers/oracle/databasesecurity101.pdf As innocent
as the all_users view may seem, it can allow users to find potential holes in
your defenses by giving the names of accounts which the DBA may not have
protected.At this point I'm considering revoking ALL_USERS from PUBLIC and
based on Mayen's note, maybe ALL_SOURCE. Fortunately we are just preparing for
an application release cycle that will provide an opportunity to test this a
bit.
I think the philosophy is "defense in depth". Not just placing total reliance
on a password. Reminds me of my days in the nuclear power plant industry. Prove
that no pipe can break. Then assume the worst pipe does break, prove that the
containment vessel (which Chernobyl didn't have) can contain the mess. The
assume the containment vessel breaches, count the casualties for a given wind
direction. And you thought your day was bad :-)
Dennis
On Wed, Apr 1, 2009 at 8:06 AM, <Mayen.Shah@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
Dennis,
In my case auditors had objected PUBLIC grant to few of the ALL_ views
(ALL_SOURCE, ALL_VIEWS and few more). Revoked privilege from PUBLIC for these
views. Only problem or issue came up was some of developers using SQL Navigator
could not look at their own source code. Asked them to get source code using
USER_ views from sqlplus.
I did not have any need for ALL_ views as I use DBA_ views.Instead of me
fighting with auditors, I simply asked developers to have their manager get
approval from auditors. That resolve political battle.
It was on solaris, 10.2.0.4
Thanks
Mayen
"Dennis Williams" <oracledba.williams@xxxxxxxxx>
Mar 31 2009 05:03 PM To Mayen Shah/ITS/Lazard@Lazard NYC
cc "Andrew Kerber" <andrew.kerber@xxxxxxxxx>, "oracle-l@xxxxxxxxxxxxx"
<oracle-l@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>, oracle-l-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
Subject Re: Removing ALL_ views from users
Mayen,
Just so I understand you correctly, you took a list of each of the ALL_ views,
and revoked each of them from PUBLIC? Any database problems afterward? Which
database version?
Thanks,
Dennis
On Tue, Mar 31, 2009 at 11:10 AM, <Mayen.Shah@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
I had similar request from auditors. I lost half the battle. Instead of
dropping ALL_ views, I revoked PUBLIC privilege to satisfy auditors. When
developers complained, I asked them to get approval from auditors...never heard
back.
Thanks
Mayen
"Dennis Williams" <oracledba.williams@xxxxxxxxx>
Sent by: oracle-l-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
Mar 31 2009 12:03 PM
Please respond to
oracledba.williams@xxxxxxxxx
To "Andrew Kerber" <andrew.kerber@xxxxxxxxx>
cc "oracle-l@xxxxxxxxxxxxx" <oracle-l@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Subject Re: Removing ALL_ views from users
Thanks Andrew,
That was pretty much my first response. Unfortunately this has gone further
than that. What I'm asking is:
Has anyone removed access to any of the ALL_ views?
I'm guessing that since the views are PUBLIC, that would need to be revoked
first.
Thanks,
Dennis
On Mon, Mar 30, 2009 at 9:40 AM, Andrew Kerber <andrew.kerber@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
You are talking to an ignorant auditor who thinks the all views show everything
in the database. If he seriously thinks that knowing other usernames is a
security risk, go ahead and revoke that one, then explain to him that the all*
views actually just show objects that each user has access to, not everything
in the database. I ran into this before, and the problem was the guy was
trained in accounting, not oracle.
On Mon, Mar 30, 2009 at 9:32 AM, Dennis Williams <oracledba.williams@xxxxxxxxx>
wrote:
List,
Some security auditors are stating that the ALL_ views are a security risk and
are recommending that I revoke them. In particular, they are pointing to
ALL_USERS as offering a hacker useful information. My guess is that the ALL_
views are granted to PUBLIC. Has anyone had this requirement? Has anyone
successfully revoked this access?
Dennis
--
Andrew W. Kerber
'If at first you dont succeed, dont take up skydiving.'
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