[lit-ideas] Re: lit-ideas Digest (editing) and Missouri)
- From: "Phil Enns" <phil.enns@xxxxxxxxx>
- To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Sat, 15 Nov 2008 15:34:28 +0700
Walter O. wrote:
"The now broadened claim is that independent of an evidentiary manner
of believing, one has no reason(s) - obviously - for believing P, or
beleving not-P or believing that one no longer knows what to believe.
And not having reasons, one cannot really decide whether to believe
any of the 3 options. Hence, none of the 3 (or more, perhaps) options
are rationally available in such circumstances."
However, by definition, all beliefs make claims about the world and
therefore require justification. That is, reasons must be available
for a belief to be a belief. Without those reasons, one is trading in
opinion or preferences. If one cannot decide whether to believe any
of 3 options, it is not because there are no reasons but rather
because those reasons are not convincing.
Walter continues:
"Since we're talking about propositional beliefs and not articles of
faith, I'm not sure I can agree to that. If I believe P on grounds q
and r, the cogency of that belief requires me to believe that anyone
else would also believe P on those same grounds."
That would be true if we are talking about knowledge, but we are
talking about beliefs. It is the case that to hold a belief is to
require that anyone else could believe likewise, but the mere fact of
a lack of agreement does not condemn the epistemic status of a belief.
(Note: The lack of any agreement, on the other hand, is probably a
good indicator that the relevant belief is most likely nutty.) To
hold the belief that democracy operates at its best with the minimum
of government involvement, is to also believe that all people could
agree. The fact that there are people who disagree and believe
significant government involvement is essential does not alter the
epistemic status of the former. Both beliefs are able to offer good
reasons and there is no way of evaluating them except by the degree to
which we find those reasons more or less convincing.
Walter again:
"The function of subjectivity here appears deeply mysterious. ... I
think we're broaching psychological or sociological matters here which
have no necessary relevance to the rationality of belief."
I agree that we are broaching psychology and sociology but I don't see
why that moves us beyond the rationality of belief. Surely Habermas'
insistence on a dialogical approach to deliberative matters is of
sociological significance. Wasn't the whole Frankfurt School
'project' an attempt to move beyond the prejudice that rationality was
independent of psychological and sociological consideration?
Walter continues:
"Phil seems to want to invest epistemic authority both in rationality
and in individual particularity simultaneously. But that task is
incoherent since the class of beliefs that rely on rational grounds is
not co-extensive with the class of grounds that are convincing for the
holder. The former is an epistemological matter, while the latter is a
psychological matter."
Consideration of why some people are convinced by particular reasons
and others not, is not a psychological matter, as Walter suggests, but
a philosophical matter. Psychology does not concern itself with the
epistemic status of beliefs. Following Wittgenstein, the exploration
of certainty is a philosophically revealing enterprise.
Walter continues:
"What any particular individual is convinced by is of no necessary
relevance to the epistemic matter of the truth or rightness of P."
This is true if we are discussing knowledge, but when it comes to
beliefs, epistemic validity depends on the reasons one offers as
convincing for holding said beliefs. If I want to convince someone
that they are wrong for holding a particular belief, then I will need
to show that the reasons they find convincing for holding that belief
are not as valid as they might appear. To further my case in favour
of a different belief, I may also offer alternative reasons that I
will argue are more convincing. That this person will change their
belief about what is true of the world will depend on whether some
reasons become less convincing and other reasons more.
Walter:
"Interestingly, I agree with all of the above. (Do I have the right to do so?)"
I believe, not. I think it is in the charter of this list that
agreement is strongly frowned upon.
Thanks to Walter for taking the time to respond. I wish we were doing
this in person at his favourite pub on the Rock, drinking Glen's
liver.
Sincerely,
Phil Enns
Yogyakarta, Indonesia
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