[lit-ideas] Re: lit-ideas Digest (editing) and Missouri)
- From: wokshevs@xxxxxx
- To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx, Phil Enns <phil.enns@xxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Fri, 14 Nov 2008 15:35:25 -0330
Just a few comments on Phil's meditations ----------------------->
Quoting Phil Enns <phil.enns@xxxxxxxxx>:
> Walter O. wrote:
>
> "Imagine that what one thought one believed - call the propositional
> content of the belief 'P' - really was believed. In that case, it's
> possible for one to 'no longer' believe P, and believe not-P, since
> there was indeed a time at which one did believe P."
>
PE:
> Imagine that one holds the belief that real estate is one of the
> safest forms of investment. Then, there is the current
> unpleasantness, requiring one to change this belief. At one point in
> time one held a belief, then at another point in time one held a
> different belief.
---------> But that different belief entails not-P. To change one's belief from
"r.e. is one of...." is to now believe that that belief is false - i.e, not-P.
PE:
> It makes no sense to say that this is a case of
> someone believing P and believing not-P. One changed one's beliefs
> rather than holding both at the same time.
----------------> I'm unclear as to what Phil refers to here. "No longer
believing" does not necessarily commit one to holding contradictory beliefs. My
point was that to hold a belief in a non-evidentiary way is philosophically
equivalent to holding the contradictory belief in a non-evidentiary way. (A
maxim that accords with moral law and is willed from self-interest is morally
equivalent to a maxim that does not accord with the moral law and is willed
from self-interest. Neither is of any moral worth.)
PE:
> Walter continues:
>
> "For a rational mind, the only difference between P and not-P is the
> evidence for and againstP. If, however, P is not something that one
> chooses to believe or not believe, then one is not believing in an
> evidentiary and rational manner. One chooses or decides to believe P/
> not-P only because the evidence or probative force for (or against) P
> is stronger than against (or for) P. In not choosing, one forfeits the
> rational grounds of one's belief. In such a condition, the required
> distinction between P and not-P is not to be had. Independent of
> rational warrant for belief, one may as well believe P and not-P
> simultaneously and in the same respect."
----------> Parenthetical note: In a recent post I allowed the agnostic
entrance
to the pub on the advice of RP and John McC. The now broadened claim is that
independent of an evidentiary manner of believing, one has no reason(s) -
obviously - for believing P, or beleving not-P or believing that one no longer
knows what to believe. And not having reasons, one cannot really decide whether
to believe any of the 3 options. Hence, none of the 3 (or more, perhaps)
options
are rationally available in such circumstances. Saul could not rationally have
become Paul. My conclusion soundly follows, I believe, despite its mundaneity,
I admit. "Conversions" by definition are irrational
events - at best, a-rational.
PE:
> One aspect of beliefs is that they are distinguishable from knowledge.
> We expect all rational people to agree with what we know is true of
> the world, but we do not expect the same of beliefs. We hope for that
> agreement, like to have it, but accept that people will disagree over
> beliefs.
----------> Since we're talking about propositional beliefs and not articles of
faith, I'm not sure I can agree to that. If I believe P on grounds q and r, the
cogency of that belief requires me to believe that anyone else would also
believe P on those same grounds. (We're not free to believe whatever; though if
we're rational beings, we do decide what to believe on the basis of evidence
and
reasons. Stephen Toulmin is very good on this topic.)
PE:
>There is, then, something misleading in the suggestion that
> mere reference to rational grounds will decide P or not-P. In the
> case of beliefs, both P and not-P will have rational grounds.
> (Caveat: I will assume that something lacking rational grounds is not
> a belief but a prejudice, opinion, preference, etc) While there are
> rational grounds for evaluating beliefs, beliefs also rely on the
> holder being convinced that a particular set of beliefs is true. In
> short, beliefs involve both cognitive content and subjectivity. The
> subjectivity refers to the manner in which we are convinced by
> particular rational grounds.
-------------> Not sure I got all that. The function of subjectivity here
appears deeply mysterious. What precisely does "manner" here mean? I think
we're broaching psychological or sociological matters here which have no
necessary relevance to the rationality of belief.
PE:
> Unlike knowledge, the grounds of which
> are universal,
-----------------> I'm sorry to interrupt but in these postmodern days it is
important to remind people of this epistemic fact. But surely nobody in this
pub would disagree with Phil's claim here.
>beliefs rely on rational grounds that are convincing
> for the holder. This element of finding a particular form of rational
> grounds convincing is itself not entirely rational (i.e. it relies on
> the particularity of the individual) but not divorced from rationality
> (i.e. it is oriented towards holding 'good' reasons).
-------------> I find this somewhat confusing. Phil seems to want to invest
epistemic authority both in rationality and in individual particularity
simultaneously. But that task is incoherent since the class of beliefs that
rely on rational grounds is not co-extensive with the class of grounds that are
convincing for the holder. The former is an epistemological matter, while the
latter is a psychological matter.
PE:
> If this is the
> case, then the difference between P and not-P is not simply the
> evidence for and against P but the degree to which this evidence is
> convincing for the relevant individual. One might find, then, that
> what was at one point convincing evidence for holding P, may no longer
> be convincing, and overwhelmed by the convincing nature of evidence
> for not-P.
-----------> The difference between P and not-P consists in the validity
conditions for the truth or rightness of P and not-P. What any particular
individual is convinced by is of no necessary relevance to the epistemic matter
of the truth or rightness of P.
PE:
> If it is the case that beliefs rely on rational grounds and
> subjectivity, then it is reasonable to think that at some point one
> may be either more or less convinced. I can think of beliefs I held
> in the past that I no longer find convincing. Furthermore, I
> anticipate that in the future I will no longer believe some of the
> things I believe now. That is, I hold the beliefs I have now because
> I think they are true, but I also understand that these beliefs do not
> constitute knowledge and so I can imagine that, in the future, I may
> change my mind. This is not the case with knowledge.
-------> Interstingly, I agree with all of the above. (Do I have the right to do
so?)
PE:
>
> Walter concluded:
>
> "Who was it that said: 'It is always both morally and epistemically
> wrong to believe independent of reasons for the belief.'"
>
> 'It is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything
> upon insufficient evidence.' - William Clifford
-------------------> God love ya!! (Metaphorically speaking, of course.) Yes, I
think it was indeed Billy Clifford. Whether he had sufficient evidence to make
such a bold universal claim is an interesting question, to be sure.
Tanks to Phil for his interesting and astutely probing replies on these
matters.
Walter O
MUN
>
>
> Sincerely,
>
> Phil Enns
> Yogyakarta, Indonesia
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