[lit-ideas] Re: lit-ideas Digest (editing) and Missouri)

Walter O. wrote:

"Imagine that what one thought one believed - call the propositional
content of the belief 'P' -  really was believed. In that case, it's
possible for one to 'no longer' believe P, and believe not-P, since
there was indeed a time at which one did believe P."

Imagine that one holds the belief that real estate is one of the
safest forms of investment.  Then, there is the current
unpleasantness, requiring one to change this belief.  At one point in
time one held a belief, then at another point in time one held a
different belief.  It makes no sense to say that this is a case of
someone believing P and believing not-P.  One changed one's beliefs
rather than holding both at the same time.


Walter continues:

"For a rational mind, the only difference between P and not-P is the
evidence for and aginst P. If, however, P is not something that one
chooses to believe or not believe, then one is not believing in an
evidentiary and rational manner. One chooses or decides to believe P/
not-P only because the evidence or probative force for (or against) P
is stronger than against (or for) P. In not choosing, one forfeits the
rational grounds of one's belief. In such a condition, the required
distinction between P and not-P is not to be had. Independent of
rational warrant for belief, one may as well believe P and not-P
simultaneously and in the same respect."

One aspect of beliefs is that they are distinguishable from knowledge.
 We expect all rational people to agree with what we know is true of
the world, but we do not expect the same of beliefs.  We hope for that
agreement, like to have it, but accept that people will disagree over
beliefs.  There is, then, something misleading in the suggestion that
mere reference to rational grounds will decide P or not-P.  In the
case of beliefs, both P and not-P will have rational grounds.
(Caveat: I will assume that something lacking rational grounds is not
a belief but a prejudice, opinion, preference, etc)  While there are
rational grounds for evaluating beliefs, beliefs also rely on the
holder being convinced that a particular set of beliefs is true.  In
short, beliefs involve both cognitive content and subjectivity.  The
subjectivity refers to the manner in which we are convinced by
particular rational grounds.  Unlike knowledge, the grounds of which
are universal, beliefs rely on rational grounds that are convincing
for the holder.  This element of finding a particular form of rational
grounds convincing is itself not entirely rational (i.e. it relies on
the particularity of the individual) but not divorced from rationality
(i.e. it is oriented towards holding 'good' reasons).  If this is the
case, then the difference between P and not-P is not simply the
evidence for and against P but the degree to which this evidence is
convincing for the relevant individual.  One might find, then, that
what was at one point convincing evidence for holding P, may no longer
be convincing, and overwhelmed by the convincing nature of evidence
for not-P.

If it is the case that beliefs rely on rational grounds and
subjectivity, then it is reasonable to think that at some point one
may be either more or less convinced.  I can think of beliefs I held
in the past that I no longer find convincing.  Furthermore, I
anticipate that in the future I will no longer believe some of the
things I believe now.  That is, I hold the beliefs I have now because
I think they are true, but I also understand that these beliefs do not
constitute knowledge and so I can imagine that, in the future, I may
change my mind.  This is not the case with knowledge.

Walter concluded:

"Who was it that said: 'It is always both morally and epistemically
wrong to believe independent of reasons for the belief.'"

'It is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything
upon insufficient evidence.' - William Clifford


Sincerely,

Phil Enns
Yogyakarta, Indonesia
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