The point about "whistling it" is that, as an expression (with a kind of sense that is common in certain kinds of intellectual culture), it offers some everyday notion to explicate something that here goes beyond the everyday [compare Einstein's determinism explained in terms of a God who doesn't play dice: does God play anything? Or is this a loaded way of suggesting God would not allow chance-like events?]. Is "whistling it" not just a loaded way of conveying dissatisfaction with a saying-showing distinction? But it is best to stick to "showing" - for clearly in any literal sense W was not "whistling it": and it is hard to see in what non-literal sense W was "whistling it" either. Ramsey's reaction may be thought to reflect a kind of philosophical prejudice. And by "whistling it" we are trying to say something that lacks literal or non-literal sense in terms of what is said about what W puts forward - we are perhaps merely trying to show, and with a pejorative sense, that there is something wrong in an account of language which uses a notion of what is shown but not said by language. The problem may be partly how something can be conveyed in a way that is not contained in language: this strikes some as a stretch; whereas for others it may seem obvious that the sense of language is not generally [or even ever] contained in language. For these others, it may seem obvious that language conveys much more than language: it conveys sense, and while sense may be expressed by language that does not mean it is reducible to something stateable in linguistic terms. [Compare: paint may express a sense - as in a painting - but that sense need not be reducible to something stateable in terms of paint simpliciter.] For these others, it may seem obvious that a squint or a tone [or a whistle, or 'pah-pah'] may convey some sense without using language, unless of course we extend the application of the term 'language' to such cases in a way that renders it vacuous. And that when language has sense it has sense because of its role as a tool much as a squint or a tone can be taken up as tools. W's say-show distinction is probably problematic for anyone who conceives that the analysis for language must be in language and must be in language in a way that the analysis does not depend on anything that transcends linguistic terms. But it may be doubted that W found the idea that the sense of language was not contained in language was particularly problematic - and it may be doubted that the view that it is problematic is anything much more than a philosophical prejudice (indeed, a 'positivistic' one?). There is doubtless something problematic in the TLP but it is not simply that it uses a say-show distinction, for even if we admit any such distinction is somewhat 'problematic' that would not mean it was any more problematic that any approach that tried to avoid drawing any such distinction - and so it would not constitute an argument against it. Again: is it more than philosophical prejudice to think that any approach that tried to avoid drawing any such distinction would be less problematic? We may ask how it is that certain things are shown and find that this cannot be answered beyond a point of trying to show that they are shown: the manifest is manifest, and we cannot look behind it to see how or why it is manifest. We cannot look behind because we would be seeking to go beyond certain inescapable limits, including the "limits of language". This may be unsatisfactory, particularly because it limits the kind of explanation we might obtain, but it is not obviously false for that. And its unsatisfactory character in this way should not be mistaken for an argument that it is be dismissed as an untenable position. This is to merely to whistle against such a position. Donal Plymouth ________________________________ From: "Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx" <Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx> To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx Sent: Sunday, 8 July 2012, 3:19 Subject: [lit-ideas] Wittgenstein's Whistle Whistle and I'll be there -- A. E. Housman We are discussing Frank Plumpton Ramsey's counterexample (alleged), to Witters, as per R. Paul, in "Re: The Philosopher's Show" and P. M. S. Hacker, "Was he trying to whistle it?" at http://info.sjc.ox.ac.uk/scr/hacker/docs/Was%20he%20trying%20to%20whistle%20 it.pdf Hacker indeed quotes from F. R. Ramsey, ’General Propositions and Causality’, in R.B. Braithwaite ed. F.P. Ramsey: The Foundations of Mathematics (Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1931), p.238: "But what we can’t say, we can’t say, and we can’t whistle it either." Hacker comments: "So can one whistle what one cannot think, i.e. can one apprehend truths which one cannot even think?" Later, in dealing with a quotation by Max Black, "Black’s suggestion is in effect that Wittgenstein was, as Ramsey had suggested, trying to whistle what he held one could not say." Hacker adds: "In recent years a quite different defence of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus has gained popularity, particularly in the United States. On this view, Wittgenstein was not trying to whistle it." "[T]he question," Hacker goes on, "is whether Ramsey is right in thinking that Wittgenstein was trying to whistle it, or whether Diamond is right that he was not.Diamond and Conant, like Ramsey, argue (rightly) that if you can’t say it, you can’t say it, and you can’t whistle it either." "Unlike Ramsey, they think that Wittgenstein was not trying to whistle it." "Nevertheless, Ramsey retained the impression that Wittgenstein was ‘ trying to whistle it’." Indeed, "[w]hat one means when one tries to state these insights is perfectly correct, but the endeavour must unavoidably fail. For the ineffable manifests itself, and cannot be said. He was indeed, as Ramsey claimed, trying to whistle it." One problem with Hacker's account is the _oratio obliqua_ of 'whistle'. I read from Etymology Online: "whistle", from "O.E. hwistlian, from P.Gmc. *khwis-, of imitative origin. Used also in Middle English of the hissing of serpents. Related: Whistled; whistling. To whistle for (with small prospect of getting) is probably from nautical whistling for a wind. To whistle "Dixie" is from 1940." R. Paul quotes from N. Malcolm: "[h]e whistled for me, with striking accuracy and expressiveness, some parts of Beethoven's 7th Symphony." To simplify, I'll refer to Witters having whistled _one_ part of Beethoven's 7th symphony. And now I go back to the Hacker quotes. KEYWORD: WHISTLING "Was he trying to whistle it?" at http://info.sjc.ox.ac.uk/scr/hacker/docs/Was%20he%20trying%20to%20whistle%20 it.pdf Was he trying to whistle it. Mrs. Malcolm: Was he trying to whistle a part of Beethoven's 7th Symphony? Mr. Malcolm: And successfully, too. (??) Ramsey, who obviously beared with Witters's whistling (for why even mention it otherwise?) has it simply by using the "it" -- postphoric, rather than anaphoric -- cfr. Cole Porter: Let's do _it_: let's fall in love. Ramsey: "But what we can’t say, we can’t say, and we can’t whistle it either." Fill, in the above, the 'it' with "a part of Beethoven's 7th Symphony" Ramsey: "We can't _say_ a part of Beethoven's 7th Symphony." YET: "We _can_ whistle (it)." --- Hacker then adds: "So can one whistle what one cannot think, i.e. can one apprehend truths which one cannot even think?" Again, having 'a part of Beethoven's 7th Symphony' in mind, the above becomes: The question is whether one is justified to extend the meaning of 'whistle' (as in "he whistled a part of Beethoven's 7th Symphony") to mean "apprehend a truth" (and even one that cannot even be thought). "Black’s suggestion is in effect that Wittgenstein was, as Ramsey had suggested, trying to whistle what he held one could not say." --- At this point, it is clear that by 'it', Ramsey meant 'nonsense'. It's nonsense that one cannot apparently _whistle_ (according to Ramsey). "In recent years", Hacker notes, "a quite different defence of Wittgenstein ’s Tractatus has gained popularity, particularly in the United States. On this view, Wittgenstein was not trying to whistle it." -- where 'it' is again nonsense, rather than, say 'a part of Beethoven's 7th symphony'. "[T]he question," Hacker goes on, "is whether Ramsey is right in thinking that Wittgenstein was trying to whistle it, or whether Diamond is right that he was not. Diamond and Conant, like Ramsey, argue (rightly) that if you can’t say it, you can’t say it, and you can’t whistle it either." ---- In fact, this relates to a further cliam: can you whistle _AND_ say it? "Unlike Ramsey, they think that Wittgenstein was not trying to whistle it." -- even if he could. Note that while Wittgenstein could allegedly whistle "a part of Beethoven's 7th Symphony", it becomes rather a conceptual issue whether Witters could whistle "nonsense". "Nevertheless, Ramsey retained the impression that Wittgenstein was ‘ trying to whistle it’." -- If we exemplify with a piece of nonsense, represented in logical form by "p" -- the issue is whether "whistle" behaves like "say" (or "show") in 'reported' oratio obliqua claims. Indeed, "[w]hat one means when one tries to state these insights is perfectly correct, but the endeavour must unavoidably fail. For the ineffable manifests itself, and cannot be said. He was indeed, as Ramsey claimed, trying to whistle it." ----- The issue then becomes whether Ramsey's point is conceptual: can we define, a priori, the class of things that cannot be _whistled_? The Etymology Online notes that "to whistle for", "with small prospect of getting" is probably from nautical "whistling for a wind" -- as in: "He whistled for a wind" But hardly, "he whistled that he wanted a wind" --. The implicature about the 'small prospect of getting' surely adds weight to Ramsey's proposal that even if Witters MEANT to whistle nonsense (unlike whisting a part of Beethoven's 7th symphony) he did not succeed. Cheers, Speranza In a message dated 7/7/2012 5:44:31 P.M. Eastern Daylight Time, rpaul@xxxxxxxx writes: he whistled for me, with striking accuracy and expressiveness, some parts of Beethoven's 7th Symphony.' —Malcolm, Ludwig Wittgenstein: a Memoir, 1958, p.84. There are a number of other comments on Wittgenstein's whistling talent. I'm sure there are some in Monk's biography. ------------------------------------------------------------------ To change your Lit-Ideas settings (subscribe/unsub, vacation on/off, digest on/off), visit www.andreas.com/faq-lit-ideas.html