[lit-ideas] Re: Wittgenstein's Whistle

  • From: Donal McEvoy <donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx>
  • To: "lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx" <lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
  • Date: Sun, 8 Jul 2012 17:25:18 +0100 (BST)

The point about "whistling it" is that, as an expression (with a kind of sense 
that is common in certain kinds of intellectual culture), it offers some 
everyday notion to explicate something that here goes beyond the everyday 
[compare Einstein's determinism explained in terms of a God who doesn't play 
dice: does God play anything? Or is this a loaded way of suggesting God would 
not allow chance-like events?]. Is "whistling it" not just a loaded way of 
conveying dissatisfaction with a saying-showing distinction?


But it is best to stick to "showing" - for clearly in any literal sense W was 
not "whistling it": and it is hard to see in what non-literal sense W was 
"whistling it" either. Ramsey's reaction may be thought to reflect a kind of 
philosophical prejudice. And by "whistling it" we are trying to say something 
that lacks literal or non-literal sense in terms of what is said about what W 
puts forward - we are perhaps merely trying to show, and with a pejorative 
sense, that there is something wrong in an account of language which uses a 
notion of what is shown but not said by language.


The problem may be partly how something can be conveyed in a way that is not 
contained in language: this strikes some as a stretch; whereas for others it 
may seem obvious that the sense of language is not generally [or even ever] 
contained in language. For these others, it may seem obvious that language 
conveys much more than language: it conveys sense, and while sense may be 
expressed by language that does not mean it is reducible to something stateable 
in linguistic terms. [Compare: paint may express a sense - as in a painting - 
but that sense need not be reducible to something stateable in terms of paint 
simpliciter.] For these others, it may seem obvious that a squint or a tone [or 
a whistle, or 'pah-pah'] may convey some sense without using language, unless 
of course we extend the application of the term 'language' to such cases in a 
way that renders it vacuous. And that when language has sense it has sense 
because of its role as a tool much as a
 squint or a tone can be taken up as tools.


W's say-show distinction is probably problematic for anyone who conceives that 
the analysis for language must be in language and must be in language in a way 
that the analysis does not depend on anything that transcends linguistic terms. 
But it may be doubted that W found the idea that the sense of language was not 
contained in language was particularly problematic - and it may be doubted that 
the view that it is problematic is anything much more than a philosophical 
prejudice (indeed, a 'positivistic' one?).


There is doubtless something problematic in the TLP but it is not simply that 
it uses a say-show distinction, for even if we admit any such distinction is 
somewhat 'problematic' that would not mean it was any more problematic that any 
approach that tried to avoid drawing any such distinction - and so it would not 
constitute an argument against it. Again: is it more than philosophical 
prejudice to think that any approach that tried to avoid drawing any such 
distinction would be less problematic?

We may ask how it is that certain things are shown and find that this cannot be 
answered beyond a point of trying to show that they are shown: the manifest is 
manifest, and we cannot look behind it to see how or why it is manifest. We 
cannot look behind because we would be seeking to go beyond certain inescapable 
limits, including the "limits of language". 


This may be unsatisfactory, particularly because it limits the kind of 
explanation we might obtain, but it is not obviously false for that. And its 
unsatisfactory character in this way should not be mistaken for an argument 
that it is be dismissed as an untenable position. This is to merely to whistle 
against such a position.


Donal
Plymouth











________________________________
 From: "Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx" <Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx>
To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx 
Sent: Sunday, 8 July 2012, 3:19
Subject: [lit-ideas] Wittgenstein's Whistle
 
Whistle and I'll be there -- A. E. Housman

We are discussing Frank Plumpton Ramsey's counterexample (alleged), to  
Witters, as per R. Paul, in "Re: The Philosopher's Show" and 

P. M. S.  Hacker,
"Was he trying to whistle it?"  at
http://info.sjc.ox.ac.uk/scr/hacker/docs/Was%20he%20trying%20to%20whistle%20
it.pdf

Hacker  indeed quotes from F. R. Ramsey,
’General Propositions and Causality’, 
in  R.B. Braithwaite ed. F.P. Ramsey: The Foundations of 
Mathematics (Routledge  and Kegan Paul, London, 1931), p.238:

"But what we can’t say, we can’t  say, 
and we can’t whistle it either."

Hacker comments: "So can one  whistle what one cannot think, i.e. can one 
apprehend truths which one cannot  even think?" Later, in dealing with a 
quotation by Max Black,

"Black’s  suggestion is in effect that Wittgenstein was, as Ramsey 
had suggested,  trying to whistle what he held one could not say."

Hacker adds: "In  recent years a quite different defence of Wittgenstein’s 
Tractatus has gained  popularity, particularly in the United States. On this 
view, Wittgenstein was  not trying to whistle it."

"[T]he question," Hacker goes on, "is whether  Ramsey is right in thinking 
that 
Wittgenstein was trying to whistle it, or  whether Diamond is 
right that he was not.Diamond and Conant, like
Ramsey,  argue (rightly) that if you can’t say it, 
you can’t say it, and you can’t  whistle it either."
"Unlike Ramsey, they think that Wittgenstein was not  trying to whistle it."
"Nevertheless, Ramsey retained the impression that  Wittgenstein was ‘
trying to whistle it’."
Indeed, "[w]hat one means when one  tries to state these insights is 
perfectly correct, but the endeavour must  unavoidably fail. For the ineffable 
manifests itself, and cannot be said. He was  indeed, as Ramsey claimed,
trying to whistle it."

One problem with  Hacker's account is the _oratio obliqua_ of 'whistle'. I 
read from Etymology  Online:

"whistle", 

from "O.E. hwistlian, from P.Gmc. *khwis-, of  imitative origin. Used also 
in Middle English of the hissing of serpents.  Related: Whistled; whistling. 
To whistle for (with small prospect of getting) is  probably from nautical 
whistling for a wind. To whistle "Dixie" is from  1940."

R. Paul quotes from N. Malcolm:

"[h]e whistled for me, with  striking accuracy
and expressiveness, some parts of Beethoven's 7th  Symphony."

To simplify, I'll refer to Witters having whistled _one_ part  of 
Beethoven's 7th symphony. And now I go back to the Hacker quotes. KEYWORD:  
WHISTLING

"Was he trying to whistle it?"  at
http://info.sjc.ox.ac.uk/scr/hacker/docs/Was%20he%20trying%20to%20whistle%20
it.pdf

Was  he trying to whistle it.

Mrs. Malcolm: Was he trying to whistle a part of  Beethoven's 7th Symphony?
Mr. Malcolm: And successfully, too.   (??)

Ramsey, who obviously beared with Witters's whistling (for why even  
mention it otherwise?) has it simply by using the "it" -- postphoric, rather  
than 
anaphoric -- cfr. Cole Porter: Let's do _it_: let's fall in  love.

Ramsey:

"But what we can’t say, we can’t say, and we can’t  whistle it either."

Fill, in the above, the 'it' with "a part of  Beethoven's 7th Symphony"

Ramsey:

"We can't _say_ a part of  Beethoven's 7th Symphony." YET: "We _can_ 
whistle  (it)."

---

Hacker then adds:

"So can one whistle what one  cannot think, i.e. can one apprehend truths 
which one cannot even  think?"

Again, having 'a part of Beethoven's 7th Symphony' in mind, the  above 
becomes:

The question is whether one is justified to extend the  meaning of 
'whistle' (as in "he whistled a part of Beethoven's 7th Symphony") to  mean 
"apprehend a truth" (and even one that cannot even be  thought).


"Black’s suggestion is in effect that Wittgenstein  was, as Ramsey 
had suggested, trying to whistle what he held one could not  say."

--- At this point, it is clear that by 'it', Ramsey meant  'nonsense'. It's 
nonsense that one cannot apparently _whistle_ (according to  Ramsey). 

"In recent years", Hacker notes, "a quite different defence of  Wittgenstein
’s Tractatus has gained popularity, particularly in the United  States. On 
this view, Wittgenstein was not trying to whistle it."

--  where 'it' is again nonsense, rather than, say 'a part of Beethoven's 
7th  symphony'.


"[T]he question," Hacker goes on, "is whether Ramsey is  right in thinking 
that 
Wittgenstein was trying to whistle it, or whether  Diamond is 
right that he was not. Diamond and Conant, like
Ramsey, argue  (rightly) that if you can’t say it, 
you can’t say it, and you can’t whistle  it either."

---- In fact, this relates to a further cliam: can you  whistle _AND_ say 
it?


"Unlike Ramsey, they think that Wittgenstein  was not trying to whistle it."

-- even if he could. Note that while  Wittgenstein could allegedly whistle 
"a part of Beethoven's 7th Symphony", it  becomes rather a conceptual issue 
whether Witters could whistle "nonsense".  

"Nevertheless, Ramsey retained the impression that Wittgenstein was  ‘
trying to whistle it’." -- If we exemplify with a piece of nonsense,  
represented 
in logical form by "p" -- the issue is whether "whistle" behaves  like 
"say" (or "show") in 'reported' oratio obliqua claims.


Indeed,  "[w]hat one means when one tries to state these insights is 
perfectly correct,  but the endeavour must unavoidably fail. For the ineffable 
manifests itself, and  cannot be said. He was indeed, as Ramsey claimed,
trying to whistle  it."

----- The issue then becomes whether Ramsey's point is conceptual:  can we 
define, a priori, the class of things that cannot be  _whistled_?

The Etymology Online notes that 

"to whistle for",  "with small prospect of getting" is probably from 
nautical "whistling for a  wind" -- as in:

"He whistled for a wind"

But hardly, "he whistled  that he wanted a wind" --. The implicature about 
the 'small prospect of getting'  surely adds weight to Ramsey's proposal 
that even if Witters MEANT to whistle  nonsense (unlike whisting a part of 
Beethoven's 7th symphony) he did not  succeed.

Cheers,

Speranza


In a message dated 7/7/2012  5:44:31 P.M. Eastern Daylight Time, 
rpaul@xxxxxxxx writes:
he whistled for  me, with striking accuracy
and expressiveness, some parts of Beethoven's 7th  Symphony.'

—Malcolm, Ludwig Wittgenstein: a Memoir, 1958,  p.84.

There are a number of other comments on Wittgenstein's  whistling
talent. I'm sure there are some in Monk's biography. 

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