[lit-ideas] Wittgenstein's Key
- From: Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx
- To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Sun, 1 Jul 2012 00:30:02 -0400 (EDT)
Re: the Key Tenet
McEvoy:
>>>without understanding the 'key
>>>tenet', PI cannot be properly understood.
R. Paul:
>>This implies that I have never 'properly understood' the Philosophical
>>Investigations
McEvoy:
"In its typical sense "He understood me" means "He understood me
properly"."
But McEvoy gives another example:
i. He understood me to be suggesting he was mistaken.
This, McEvoy notes, need not imply
ii. He understood me PROPERLY to be suggesting he was mistaken.
"In context, (i) may even have the implicit sense that he did NOT
understand me properly.
"In fact, because (i) "may typically have the sense that he did NOT
understand me PROPERLY, in this construction it may be best to include a
"properly" if we want to show that is not the intended sense: as in
(ii)."
Point taken. Back to R. Paul:
>>>without understanding the 'key
>>>tenet', PI cannot be properly understood.
>>This implies that I have never 'properly understood' the Philosophical
>>Investigations
What about "appropriately", then?
HPG: As far as I know, the ruthless and unswerving associations of
philosophy with the study of ordinary language was peculiar to the Oxford
scene,
and has never been seen anywhere before or since. A classic miniature of this
kind of procedure common at the Play Group was Austin's request to Warnock
to tell him
the difference between playing golf correctly and playing golf properly."
----
When it comes to "understand" -- again, it's best to understand
'understand' to mean, "get what you mean".
Here, the issue is slightly more complex in that we have to postulate that
by uttering the "Philosophical Investigations", Witters meant that p, say.
So, we understand Witters in "Philosophical Investigations" when we get
(or recognise) what he meant (by it).
Back to the other example:
i. He understood me to be suggesting he was mistaken.
This seems to trade on 'understand'. Note that in slang, a leg is referred
to as an 'understanding'. So perhaps etymologically, 'understanding' won't
do. Comprehend may be a better, more precise (if Latinate) term.
While McEvoy is right that there is (what I call a LOOSE, involving a
DISIMPLICATURE, technically) of 'understand', as in ii, this I hold is a loose
use, because on examination it can be demonstrated that it involves a
reductio ad absurdum.
For Grice, if you mean more than you say, you IMPLICATE.
If you mean LESS than you say, you DISIMPLICATE.
i. He understood me to be suggesting he was mistaken; but I was NOT thus
suggesting. So surely he never 'understood' me.
In this case, 'take' may do. Austin considers 'uptake' as a colloquial
term for 'understanding' and was obsessed with it.
A: Is this your car?
B: You bet!
---- While 'you bet' is becoming too colloquial, Austin used it correctly,
as meaning 'formal betting':
A: I bet you he won't be there.
B: Mmm.
A: Come on. Do you take my bet, or not?
For Austin, a bet needs an uptake. It does not count as a bet unless B
does agree to _take_ the bet.
----
If "proper" Cicero applies to orgies, it may do to consider "appropriate",
which is a favourite term for philosophers of Grice's ilk. A condition of
'appropriatenes' was one of Grice's obsessions at the beginning of "Logic
of Conversation", and some have regarded his category of "Relation" ('be
relevant') to imply some sense of 'appropriateness'.
And so on. Again, I'll re-read the legal case and see if I can contribute.
Cheers,
Speranza
And so on.
Cheers,
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