[lit-ideas] Re: What is a transcendental claim?


-- On Tue, 23/12/08, wokshevs@xxxxxx <wokshevs@xxxxxx> wrote:

> Please scroll down to "non sequitor:"
> --------------->
> 
> > We might agree that for anything to be actual it must
> be possible (i.e.
> > 'possibly actual'):- this means that from (the
> truth of) 'a.' we can deduce,
> > trivially, that _it is possible_ that there is no
> occasion on which this
> > particular stove will ever work right. After all if it
> is not possible, it
> > cannot be actually the case that 'a.'.
> 
> ---------------> Non Sequitor:
> 
> It is surely true, as Donal writes, that if P is actual,
> then P
> must be possible. But Donal goes on to claim in his example
> that from 'a'
> ("There is no occasion on which this particular stove
> will ever work right") we
> can "trivially deduce" the conclusion: "It
> is possible that there is no
> occasion
> on which this particular stove will ever work right."
> As such, Donal maintains
> that from the actuality claimed in 'a', the
> possibility claim in the conclusion
> necessarily follows. 
 
> I believe that the deduction is neither trivial nor valid,
> and I also am
> prepared to go on record for saying that  I believe the
> Toronto Maple Leafs
> have a better chance of winning the Stanley Cup this year
> than Donal's
> deducation has of being sound. Where have things
> gone wrong. Surely in incorrectly rendering equivalent the
> expression "it must
> be possible" and "it is possible." 

Perhaps this is too subtle for me, but I don't see the non sequitur as yet nor 
do I see _in this context_ the importance of a distinction between (1) "It must 
be possible that [x]..." and (2)"It is possible that [x]..."

What might be the distinction between these two expressions? Here is one 
possibility:- '(2)' merely asserts that [x] may be the case but '(1)' goes 
further and asserts that it is by some kind of necessity - or _must_ - that [x] 
may be the case. That is, '(2)' claims that [x] may be the case contingently 
whereas '(1)' claims [x] may be the case of necessity.

Put another way, '(1)' asserts that the impossibility of [x] is, by some kind 
of necessity, not possible; '(2)' merely asserts that the impossibility of [x] 
is not actual i.e. that it is the case, though it need not be the case, that 
[x] is possible. 

This kind of distinction might make sense when we are dealing merely with 
questions of modality without any futher givens.

But in my deduction 'a' is a given. Given (the truth of) 'a' then, so I 
suggested, we can deduce that (the truth of) 'a' is possible; and we can 
equally deduce that - given 'a' - 'a' must be possible, as the _must_ here is 
the _must_ of a logical deduction from 'a is actual' to 'a is possible'. This 
must be a valid deduction because the negation of 'a is possible' is that 'a is 
not possible'; but if 'a is not possible' then we cannot logically maintain 
that 'a is actual'. 

In the context of a given 'a', the distinction between deducing 'a is possible' 
and 'a must be possible' is without a difference because the deduction derives 
from a logical 'must'.

So I really don't understand why Walter's comments below are correct:- as to 
claim the actuality of P would, on my view, be to necessarily claim the 
possibility of P and necessarily to claim that P "must be possible" where the 
"must" is one of logical deduction. That is, I don't get the distinction 
between P "is possible" and "must be possible" in any useful way here; and 
since Walter concedes the actuality of P entails P "must be possible", how can 
it be that P "must be possible" though it may not be the case that P "is 
possible"?
 
> -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
> OK, where were we?, oh yes:
> 
> To claim the actuality of P is not necessarily to claim the
> possibility of P.
> Although, as mentioned above, to claim the actuality of P
> is indeed to claim
> that P "must be possible." An honest pre-owned
> car dealer - yes, we know what
> he
> really is - may well aver: "Friend, don't even
> think about it. That heap will
> never run again." On the other hand, a somewhat less
> than fully candid and
> scrupulous dealer may well tell you: "Friend,
> she's a good lookin'
> machine, ain't she. A real Z-28. But I should tell you
> that it's possible, only
> possible, mind you, that she'll never run again."
> 
> Walter O
> MUN

Donal
Johnny's in the basement
Mixing up modalities




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