[lit-ideas] Re: (Was: Wittgenstein)

Eric writes that Tractatus 7, 'Whereof one cannot speak...' would seem to
violate 3.332 'No proposition can make a statement about itself, because a
propositional sign cannot be contained in itself (that is the whole of the
"theory of types").' 

One wonders whether Wittgenstein believes that no statement can make a statement
about itself ('This sentence is in English'), or whether he is simply claiming
that there was no more to Russell's theory of types (a proposed way out of
'Russell's Paradox') than this. It's clearer that he believed no statement could
_make a statement_ about itself (this is where we came in) than it is that he
believed no statement could be about itself. Suppose though he did not then
believe (as he later did believe) that propositions could be 'about' themselves.
Even so, 7 would not be an instance of a proposition's 'making a statement about
itself,' for it seems to be making a statement about the earlier, 'elucidatory'
propositions mentioned in 6.54. Certainly one can have a 'no self-reference'
rule about sentences or propositions and still use sentences and propositions to
refer to sentences and propositions. 'Here are five sentences that I'd like you
to translate into demotic Greek. They're not difficult. I just thought of 
them.' 

Interesting though: it suggests how, although referring to them, 7 does not
belong with the propositions of 6.54 (which isn't, as far as I can see,
self-referential either).

Robert Paul
The Reed Institute

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