[lit-ideas] Re: Understanding Why Newton Contributed To Human Knowledge With A False Theory

I hope you realize that I'm missing 'Mysteries of the Smithsonian,' on channel 49 to respond to this. I had said
If this means that people often use the word 'know,' and 'knowledge,' in various ways, ways which do not depend on any very strict conception of what it is to know something, this is certainly true.
...the very idea of knowing is that it is opposed to something, namely, believing, hoping, guessing, surmising, wondering, predicting, and so on. 


This is quite a leap. What has been accepted is that "knowing" _may be_
defined so that 'to know x' entails 'x is true' and, conversely, if 'x' is
false then no one can 'know x'. _Given this definition_ 'knowing' is
"opposed" to any epistemic state which does not entail the truth of 'x' e.g.
'I guess x' 'I believe x', 'I predict x' etc. 

So far, so good, although I'm not sure where a leap has occurred. Donal adds


What this means, however, is not that the "very idea of knowing..is opposed"
to guessing etc. [an essentialist claim as to the essential character of
knowledge] but that a _particular_ idea or definition of 'knowing' opposes
this epistemic state to any state where it is not necessary that 'x is true'.
It certainly does mean that, and it would mean that, that is, this minimal condition for knowing would obtain, as opposed to any epistemic state (guessing) in which it wasn't necessary. It isn't necessary that if 'B guesses that p,' p must be the case (although it might be). One would have thought that this was fairly uncontroversial.
If it's now claimed that no such condition as S obtains in the case of knowing, then apparently knowing is no different from guessing, pretending, hoping, wishing, or believing from an epistemological point of view. 


This does not amount to an argument in favour of that _particular_
definition; rather it is merely an assertion of that definition. It is an
assertion that mistakenly treats this _particular_ definition as if it is the
only possible one, as if this definition is part of the "very idea of
knowing" - and makes this assertion despite conceding that ordinary usage
does not uniformly adhere to such a stipulation.
First, S is not a definition. S sets forth a condition that must be met before it can be rightly said that someone knows something. It isn't the only condition that has to be met: in addition to p's being true (if A is to know it) A must believe that p. Otherwise it would follow that the only thing needed for A's knowing p is that p; and the fallacy here is plain. 

I had said
To say that someone knows something is to mark a distinction, a distinction that's been around at least since Plato struggled with it in Meno and Theatetus. 

Donal queries


But equally couldn't we insist that 'believe' must mark a distinction - must
be opposed to mere 'guessing'; and 'guessing' must mark a distinction - must
be opposed to 'predicting'. And so on.
One may certainly insist that 'believe' marks a distinction; must be opposed to mere guessing and the like. Go to it. 


This is a poor argument because it is
possible that whatever distinctions might be drawn [here e.g. we might
'guess' what happened in the past, but we do not 'predict' it; we might
'guess' that perhaps such-and-such happened but not 'believe' it] there is
overlap. In fact, if all knowledge is guesswork - the view I am defending -it
is pointless to oppose 'knowing' and 'guessing'.
Let me try to get this straight. To say that knowing marks an epistemic distinction between these other states is a 'poor argument' because, e.g. one cannot now predict that in 1701 a comet will appear in the sky in the Northern Hemisphere, we can guess that one did, commits one to saying that 'all knowledge is guesswork.' 


We should not tie the issue of whether 'x is true' to the concept of
'knowing' but take this issue as falling to be decided according to the
concept of 'truth'. Conversely, we should accept that we can 'know' what is
false - 'know' in the sense of believe it.
I don't want to talk about truth at all. Throughout this exchange I've tried to steer away from it. Truth is an awkward concept that seems to do no real work, in the sense that 'P' is true says no more than P.
[Here I invoke Aquinas' difficulties with God's knowledge of future contingents by way of giving S some historical respectability. One can ignore these asides. I'm in agreement with Donal about that.] 

Donal continues


At best this shows there are some philosophers who define 'knowing' so that
'to know "x"' entails that "x" is true. It does not show this is the only or
best definition.
It is not, despite what you say, a definition at all, any more than that having three sides is a definition of a triangle. A necessary condition for something's being x is not a definition of x. To be a Caucasian female requires that one be Caucasian; this is a necessary but not a sufficient condition
Leaving that aside though I wonder if you have anything to offer in the way of counterexamples to S. So far, all I've been able to find is the complaint that S is 'arbitrary' (but see now its historical pedigree); that there are (or may be) other definitions of 'knowing' and 'know' (S isn't a definition); and that ordinary, everyday talk often pays no attention to S.
Frequently ordinary people speaking the language of everyday, and also people who should know better, use 'infer' to mean 'imply,' and 'disinterested' to mean 'uninterested.' The latter distinction is almost lost now. 'He inferred I was deranged' if said of a therapist is different from the therapist's implying (without quite saying so) that I was; and one would hope that one were to be tried before a judge who was both interested and disinterested.
The stuff about Tarski could well be ignored. I was trying to suggest that S, like the Semantic Conception of Truth, made no epistemological claims and is indifferent as to how p is established, e.g. how it is established that the Earth orbits the sun (which is what has to be the case before anyone can know that it does) and how it is established (blind guess-work, divination, appeal to authority, a vote of the people) that snow is white. 


Should we therefore accept 'transubstans[t]iation' because that concept "is at
the heart of the distinction" Catholic theologians "draw between" the host as
the body and blood of Christ and the host as "some other" thing, like a mere
wafer?
Mike Geary is the expert on this sort of stuff, but in any event, there's no analogy here with anything I've said. 

Donal closes


There is more to be addressed, particularly the doubts Robert Paul expresses
as to whether 'all knowledge is fallible'. This issue is, I think, crucial to
the one on the table. Because if there is infallible knowledge then I would
concede that the S-condition might have some real bite in that we would then
have some claims where we could say not only do we believe them but they are
indubitably true, and therefore we can say not only do we believe them true
but we _know_ they are true. Conversely, if all knowledge is fallible (- and,
further, if we concede (a) there can be knowledge without a knowing subject,
or (b)false theories can be a much greater contribution to 'knowledge' than
some true ones -) the S-condition may be seen as beside the point and merely
the reflection of a historically prevalent but outdated way of looking at
'knowledge' and 'knowing' as a special kind of epistemic state.
I'd like to discuss this too. I'd hope for some examples of fallible knowledge and some support for the claim that 'all knowledge is fallible' that doesn't collapse to the Pyrrhic notion that nobody can know anything. 

Robert Paul
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