Robert, From yur post to Donal below, I believe I can safely assume that you are in good health and spirits. But if my conjuctive premise is false, and it's the latter conjunct that is the culprit, then you may feel free to ask after my restorative suggestions regarding spirits. Cheers, Walter Quoting Robert Paul <rpaul@xxxxxxxx>: > Donal disputes that (and here I'll tamper with the original example by > substituting 'p' for 'not-p') > > S. A knows p only if p. > > He asks > > > What is disputed here? > > > > It is not disputed that 'to know' can be defined in such a way that that > 'to > > know x' entails 'x (is true)'. But 'to know', and its offshoots - > including > > the term 'knowledge', can be deployed without this restriction. > > If this means that people often use the word 'know,' and 'knowledge,' in > various ways, ways which do not depend on any very strict conception of > what it is to know something, this is certainly true. 'I know I promised > I'd take you to the zoo, but something's come up, and I now I can't.' > 'Schrödinger said he had no knowledge of the cat's whereabouts. > > But the very idea of knowing is that it is opposed to something, namely, > believing, hoping, guessing, surmising, wondering, predicting, and so > on. To say that someone knows something is to mark a distinction, a > distinction that's been around at least since Plato struggled with it in > Meno and Theatetus. The conception of knowledge that underlies S also > underlies Aquinas' struggle with the problem of God's knowledge of > future contingents. If God knows everything, then what he knows must be > true, and if true, for any statement about some future condition you > care to mention, thus fated. If God knew everything right from the > start, he also knew that 'Adam will eat that damned apple,' was true. > The very fact of his knowing it makes it unavoidable. > > I mention Plato and Aquinas as examples of philosophers who want to > distinguish knowing from something else and, in Aquinas' case, to get > around somehow the standard conception of knowing, which is encapsulated > in S. The standard conception is not exhausted by S: S simply sets forth > a necessary condition for knowing. > > S is independent of whether knowledge is justified true belief; it > avoids disputes about Edmund Gettier, Eastern mystics, Bertrand Russell, > G. E. Moore?that whole crowd. Whatever conception of knowledge one has, > it must satisfy S. Just as Tarski's notion that 'P' is true, iff P, > leaves it to the truth-seeker to use his or her own favorite way of > determining whether P, so S leaves it open as to how 'p' is established. > I really should stop, but Donal's post suggests that I should go on for > a bit. > > Donal says > > > The definitional/conceptual question is, I suggest, only worth considering > > insofar as it reflects an underlying and substantive dispute as to how we > > should view 'knowledge' and 'knowing'. > > Let me repeat myself. Any view of knowledge or knowing which is not in > accord with S is a different conception of knowledge or knowing > entirely. S is not a mere definition. It is at the heart of the > distinction philosophers draw between knowing and some other epistemic > state. > > > First two points concern ordinary usage: (a) ordinary usage cannot be > > decisive of how 'to know etc' should be deployed _even if ordinary usage > is > > unequivocal in how the term is deployed_: this is because ordinary usage > may > > reflect or conceal a mistaken view of how knowledge works; (b) ordinary > usage > > is in any case equivocal. > > I'm not here appealing to ordinary usage, which is notoriously > polychrome, as a Harvard philosopher once sai. > > > There are examples we might point to where, as against the assertion 'I > know > > x', we might use the falsity of x to argue/insist that 'You might have > > thought it, believed it etc. - but you did not know it.' But there are > many > > examples where we deploy 'to know' without the implication as to truth. A > > witness in a murder trial testifies 'I know the accused was out of country > at > > the time of the murder'. When questioned, the basis for their 'knowing' is > > that the accused told them they were leaving the country, the witness left > > the accused to the airport/saw their plane ticket/ waved to them as they > > passed check-in etc. in the hours before the murder. As it turns out, the > > accused doubled-back having checked-in and was not on the scheduled plane. > > This is at best a case in which the witness would surely say something > alone the lines of (I don't want to coach the witness) 'I believed it at > the time, but now I see I was wrong.' In any event, this speaks to how > it is established that p, and is concerned with evidence and grounds. > Claims to knowlege, as here, do not defeat S; in fact, they seem to > depend on it. How else could the opposing side establish that the > witness didn't really know what he thought he knew? > > > But is the witness lying when the witness says 'I know the accused was out > of > > the country'? Surely not. Is the witness mistaken? Well, that depends on > how > > 'to know' is defined - but surely it is ordinary understanding to read the > > claim 'I know x' as here meaning 'I believed, on what seem to me > sufficient > > grounds to justify a knowledge claim, that x'. The witness may be mistaken > > 'that x' but, on this view, is neither dishonest nor mistaken in claiming > 'I > > know x'. > > What 'justifies' a knowledge claim (and the Gettier example would work > well here) does not establish in any particular case, whether the one > who claims to know, knows. Justification here is a slippery notion; I > might be justified in saying or doing something insofar as I believe I > have really good grounds for saying or doing it and yet, of course, be > mistaken. This isn't really news in everyday life or in philosophy. > > > If we accept that all knowledge is fallible, and insist that 'I know x' > > entails 'x', then all claims of the type 'I know x' are potentially > mistaken > > - since they are liable to be overturned by showing that 'x' is false. If > > this is so then on this definition should we always preface 'I know x' > with > > 'Of course, I may be mistaken but..'? But this seems self-defeating. > > I really don't follow this. You've yet to show that 'all knowledge is > fallible.' If I have a father, I'm pretty sure I had a grandfather. I > know this. It isn't likely to be overturned by anything short of science > fictionish objections. If this is too definition-like, then I know that > if trout are deprived of oxygen they will die; that square pegs don't > fit into round holes; and that no human being can lift a five-ton > (tonne?) weight unaided. What might falsify these things, I have no > idea, but the mere formula 'all knowledge is fallible' (itself somewhat > incoherent suggestion) is about as interesting as global scepticism: > we doubt for the same sorts of reasons that we believe, so one wants > more, in that case, than a claim, made in a vacuum, that 'nobody really > knows anything,' 'nothing is certain,' etc. (I'm trying to draw a > parallel between 'all knowledge is fallible' and global scepticism; I > don't want to say that Donal's formula was advanced in a vacuum. > > > The reality is that all we need to do is clearly distinguish 'knowledge' > from > > 'truth' and accept that all knowledge is conjectural. On this basis it is > > supposed truth of 'x' that may be overturned by showing 'x' is false. But > the > > historical fact that 'x' was believed with what were thought sufficient > > reasons, and in that sense 'x was known', is not overturned. > > It is conjectural that if I touch the tip of my nose with my forefinger > my elbow will be bent? Interesting. Again, I think you've conflated it's > being true that sugar is soluble with sugar's being soluble. The former > says no more than the latter although it had led philosophers into many > dark alleys in the belief that 'is true' somehow helps a sentence along. > You need to distinguish, I think, between > > B knows he has a baby brother (in 1951) > > and > > B knows there's he has a baby brother (in 1949) > > Just in case the brother was born in 1950, something that was or could > be known at one time wasn't and couldn't be known at another. > > Knowledge claims, and knowing is indexed to times and places. Nobody > knew at any time that phlogiston was necessary for combustion, although > apparently at one time some scientists believed it did and thought they > knew it did. And nobody knew at any time that the heavenly bodies were > embedded in celestial spheres. But somebody did know, at some time, that > the cat was on the mat and the pig in the poke. That we discover that > what we once thought we knew isn't, and wasn't the case, the point of > claiming that we knew it then, is unclear. 'It was once thought > (believed) that q,' is a perfectly good expression. > > > A question:- given that Newton's theories are false, must we conclude that > > anyone who claimed to 'know' that they were right did not 'know' this? > Must > > we further conclude that Newton's theories were no contribution to human > > knowledge because, by definition, no one ever 'knew' the theories to be > true? > > If they were a contribution to human knowledge, despite being false, in > what > > way are they knowledge? > > Not all of what you call Newton's 'theories' are false. With slight > tinkering, his laws are perfectly adequate for getting robots to Mars, > building bridges, and other mundane and spatial tasks. I don't really > though want to worry about Newton. > > > These questions may lead to others that bring into overall question > whether > > we should conceive knowledge in terms of justified true belief ['JTB'] > and/or > > assume that 'to know x' entails 'x is true'. > > I would hope they do and that they also bring in others to discuss them. > A final note. What you have above seems ill-formed in the following > way. In what you say is entailed by knowing x, x should now be in quote > marks,' to distinguish it as a statement which is said to be true. But > I've already said that to add 'is true' to p is otiose, unless one is > trying to assign truth values in propositional logic or answer > true-false questions on a quiz. > > Robert Paul > > ------------------------------------------------------------------ > To change your Lit-Ideas settings (subscribe/unsub, vacation on/off, > digest on/off), visit www.andreas.com/faq-lit-ideas.html > ------------------------------------------------------------------ To change your Lit-Ideas settings (subscribe/unsub, vacation on/off, digest on/off), visit www.andreas.com/faq-lit-ideas.html