[lit-ideas] Re: The meaning of life
- From: Donal McEvoy <donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Sun, 30 Nov 2008 13:35:15 +0000 (GMT)
----- Original Message ----
From: Omar Kusturica <omarkusto@xxxxxxxxx>
To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
Sent: Saturday, 29 November, 2008 19:26:52
Subject: [lit-ideas] Re: The meaning of life
--- On Fri, 11/28/08, Donal McEvoy <donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
DM: What is unclear here is what kind or "form of self-contradiction or
paradox" is involved here: it seems to me it is clearly not a logical
self-contradiction or paradox, for this would make the action a practical
impossibility.
*I am not sure that everything that seems to be a logical contradiction is a
practical impossibility. (We know that Metaphysics has long tried to explain
the world by using logic and the results are debatable to say the least.)
DM: I would suggest that a logical contradiction [e.g. 'both a and non-a are
true'] points to a logical impossibility [because they can't both be true] and
what is logically impossible cannot be possible in actual fact. Hence, a
logical contradiction is a practical impossibility, as well as a logical
impossibility. If I cannot both never hit John and hit John from a logical POV,
then it is practically impossible for me both to never hit and yet hit John.
And if 'ought' implies 'can', then the injunction 'Never hit but yet hit John'
cannot be a moral injunction.
DM: The central problem with 'both a and non-a' is that it rules nothing out:
and a proposition that rules nothing out, rules nothing in either - therefore
it lacks substantive content (I hesitate to say it is therefore meaningless).
>If so, what kind of non-logical self-contradiction or paradox is it?
*There is a discussion of paradox here:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paradox
DM: Thank you for this reference, which shows paradox is used in many senses.
The article does say:-
"In moral philosophy, paradox in a loose sense plays a role in ethics debates.
For instance, it may be considered that an ethical admonition to "love thy
neighbour" is not just in contrast with, but in contradiction to armed
neighbours actively trying to kill you: If they succeed, you will be dead and
thus unable to love them; but to attack, fight back, or restrain them is also
not usually considered loving. This might be better termed an ethical dilemma
rather than a paradox in the strict sense."
DM: Here the term used is "loose" and the suggestion is here we have not a
"paradox in the strict sense." This arguably invites the question - in what
sense then is it a paradox at all? O.K. writes:-
*"It seems to me that suicide is at the very least paradoxical in the sense
that it defies the ordinary assumptions or ideas about action,
intentionality, and agency. It's an action intended to destroy the agency,
thus preventing any further actions or intentions, and also making any of its
consequences further irrelevant to the agency itself."
DM: But is this paradoxical? Is it true suicide "defies ordinary assumptions or
ideas about action" etc.? After all, O.K himself has stressed that suicide
might be a carefully and rationally considered act. And surely the ability to
take our own life is consistent with "ordinary assumptions..about action,
intentionality..and agency" and certainly more so than the situation of those
who lack this ability - say, because they are paralysed?
>DM: That is, this notion of self-contradiction and paradox strikes me as
>needing (logical) clarification, without which the notion may simply ground
>what are quite obscure propositions.
* I am not sure that I have the exact definition, but see above. Presumably to
have a formal logical contradiction we would need to interpret suicide in the
form of propositions or statements.
DM: I think it is clear that no formal logical contradiction is involved in
suicide.
>DM: Be this as it may, it does not elucidate why suicide is a central or even
>very special moral problem. The magnitude of the consequences make it
>quantitively different to, say, self-harm - but do they make it qualitively
>different in a philosophical sense? This reply does not answer my question on
>this point.
*It's an important moral problem being (like homicide in this sense) an action
that destroys rational moral agency, yet we feel that it might in some cases be
permissible, perhaps more likely to be permissible than homicide which destroys
not one's own rational agency but that of another. Why it's an interesting
philosophical problem I hope that I have already shown.
DM: This is a small triumph of hope over logical adversity. It is unclear why
suicide is especially interesting as a _philosophical problem_. What is perhaps
interesting, but hardly needs the helping hand of a philosopher to pick over,
is why someone might commit suicide and whether the act might in certain
circumstances be thought justified and not in other circumstances. But this
kind of issue can be replicated across the board of moral dilemmas without
those dilemmas being thought to raise _sui generis_ philosophical problems.
Donal
Qualitatively correcting yesterday's spelling of this word
Sunny Salop
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