[lit-ideas] Re: The meaning of life





________________________________
From: Omar Kusturica <omarkusto@xxxxxxxxx>
To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
Sent: Friday, 28 November, 2008 19:50:56
Subject: [lit-ideas] Re: The meaning of life




--- On Fri, 11/28/08, Donal McEvoy <donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:

From: Donal McEvoy <donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx>
Subject: [lit-ideas] Re: The meaning of life
To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
Date: Friday, November 28, 2008, 10:33 AM







________________________________
From: Omar Kusturica <omarkusto@xxxxxxxxx>
To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
Sent: Thursday, 27 November, 2008 6:10:10
Subject: [lit-ideas] Re: The meaning of life






O.K. I believe that it is an interesting philosophical problem, regardless of 
whether we perceive it as a serious practical option. In the above discussion, 
the key term is 'practical contradiction,' i.e. it is not suggested that 
suicide is a practical impossibility obviously, but that it is morally 
impermissible because self-contradictory. I can see how there is a form of 
self-contradiction or 
paradox involved in an action which is meant to destroy its doer; to conclude 
from this that this renders it morally impermissible is perhaps to conclude too 
much. Homicide or destruction of property is not seemingly self-contradictory 
in the same way, yet this does not render it morally permissible.

DM: What is unclear here is what kind or "form of self-contradiction or 
paradox" is involved here: it seems to me it is clearly not a logical 
self-contradiction or paradox, for this would make the action a practical 
impossibility. If so, what kind of non-logical self-contradiction or paradox is 
it? 

DM: While I agree suicide and homicide are quite distinct categories morally, 
without clarification of what kind of self-contradiction etc. is involved, 
surely we might argue that homicide and property destruction are also 
self-contradictory/paradoxical - for example, because we are destroying persons 
and objects when our own life depends on the existence of persons and objects 
[arguably a mere step on from saying suicide is paradoxical because our own 
life depends on our living].

DM: That is, this notion of self-contradiction and paradox strikes me as 
needing (logical) clarification, without which the notion may simply ground 
what are quite obscure propositions.


 >Obviously this point is not intended as profound but as trying to take away 
the idea that there is something philosophically profound about the problem of 
suicide per se (as opposed to the problem of whether it is right to risks that 
might injure oneself or others [suicide often injurying >others 
psychologically]). 

O.K. I am not sure how this is different except that it rephrases the issue in 
more general or more inclusive terms. But to my mind, there is a clear 
difference between suicide and homicide, or other violent actions that are not 
directed towards the self. 

DM: Agreed, with the proviso that clearly a justifiable homicide can be no more 
immoral than a justifiable suicide.

2) Wittgenstein (who lost several siblings to suicide) said, afair, that he 
thought about suicide everyday. If so, what was he getting at? That he 
contemplated it as a course of action or as a central moral problem?

O.K. Perhaps both.

DM: Many in many moral traditions would suggest that if you see it as "a 
central moral problem" then your morality is deeply skewered: despite 
Wittgenstein's reported admiration for Tolstoy's 'Gospels', I don't think Jesus 
ever suggested suicide was anything like a central moral problem. 

>Actually, there's a 3) Many suicides are tragic affairs where if, as is shown 
>by those who survive an attempted suicide, the suicide had not occurred the 
>person would not look back with regret at a 'missed opportunity' but rather 
>see that - for whatever reason - they had temporarily come to seek a permanent 
>solution to what (in hindsight) was a temporary problem. There is nothing very 
>philosophical in this except perhaps that it calls on us to help others 
>through these dark periods if we can.

O.K. That's where the discussion strays in the direction of psychology or 
psychotherapy, which also have an interest in sucide but of a different kind. 
As the task of a psychotherapist is currently defined, she has a duty to 
prevent suicide if she can, not to make judgements on whether it is morally 
permissible or prudent. The evidence you allude to is not incontroversible; 
fist, we have only testimonies from those who survived suicide attempts, and 
second, quite a few of them repeat the attempt. Also, even though the article I 
referenced links suicide to clinical depression, there have been cases of 
persons who committed or attempted sucide after they started taking 
anti-depressants (not before). To commit suicide requires an active effort 
(it's not that easy to do it technically) and it seems that it is often 
accompanied by self-reflection and deliberation. 

DM: Be this as it may, it does not elucidate why suicide is a central or even 
very special moral problem. The magnitude of the consequences make it 
quantitively different to, say, self-harm - but do they make it qualitively 
different in a philosophical sense? This reply does not answer my question on 
this point.

Donal
Foggy Salop

PS: Of course I agree btw that suicide may be a product of careful reflection 
taken by a person who is (by 'normal' standards) psychologically balanced; in 
England the issue has been raised in court recently re the legality of 
assisting such persons to commit suicide, to which the courts have responded 
that legalising this must be a matter for Parliament [courts having no power to 
decide, as it were upon, a legal framework but only to 'yay' or 'nay' a 
specific question], and where decisions as to whether to prosecute in such 
cases have been understandably described by the DPP as "sensitive". But what 
percentage of cases fit this 'careful-rational reflection' model?

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