[lit-ideas] The Philosophy of Opinion
- From: Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx
- To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Sat, 28 Aug 2010 21:37:38 EDT
I have NOT been following the threads too closely, but L. Helm was
referring to 'opinion', thinking for oneself, and stuff. And McEvoy had
referred
to other things, etc. To which Helm wisely pointed out to the 'pragmatics' of
blogging, etc.
In any case, it would be good to consider the pragmatics of 'opinion'. I am
with Helm in that one is basically 'self-expressing'. Odd that I would say
so, when I'm, on record, a Griceian. The polemic between Grice/Chomsky: is
language (or lingo as I prefer) for 'expression' or 'communication'?
Then there's the 'implicature'. Usually, "I opine that p" has a further
implicatures. There have been recently some items on research on the
'pragmatics' of 'assertion', for example. The expression of a belief (an
opinion)
may have 'implicatures' which are 'boulomaic', rather than doxastic. They
may 'induce' some sort of action.
In theoretical philosophy, it's all different. But who ARE theoretical
philosophers? Most philosophers are or have been TEACHERS. And TEACHING
philosophy involves quite a bit of a volitive element. E.g. if you are
teaching
Locke's theory against innate ideas one is already in a position to having
made a CHOICE to include such an item in the curriculum or syllabus -- so
it's not just the expression of an opinion (Locke's), but the opinion, on the
part of the instructor (as professors are called in the USA today) that
Locke's opinion is worth being heard. And stuff.
And stuff.
Speranza -- Bordighera
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