[lit-ideas] The Philosophy of Opinion

I have NOT been following the threads too closely, but L. Helm was  
referring to 'opinion', thinking for oneself, and stuff. And McEvoy had 
referred  
to other things, etc. To which Helm wisely pointed out to the 'pragmatics' of 
 blogging, etc. 
 
In any case, it would be good to consider the pragmatics of 'opinion'. I am 
 with Helm in that one is basically 'self-expressing'. Odd that I would say 
so,  when I'm, on record, a Griceian. The polemic between Grice/Chomsky: is 
language  (or lingo as I prefer) for 'expression' or 'communication'? 
 
Then there's the 'implicature'. Usually, "I opine that p" has a further  
implicatures. There have been recently some items on research on the  
'pragmatics' of 'assertion', for example. The expression of a belief (an  
opinion) 
may have 'implicatures' which are 'boulomaic', rather than doxastic.  They 
may 'induce' some sort of action. 
 
In theoretical philosophy, it's all different. But who ARE theoretical  
philosophers? Most philosophers are or have been TEACHERS. And TEACHING  
philosophy involves quite a bit of a volitive element. E.g. if you are  
teaching 
Locke's theory against innate ideas one is already in a position to  having 
made a CHOICE to include such an item in the curriculum or syllabus -- so  
it's not just the expression of an opinion (Locke's), but the opinion, on the  
part of the instructor (as professors are called in the USA today) that 
Locke's  opinion is worth being heard. And stuff.
 
And stuff.
 
Speranza -- Bordighera

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  • » [lit-ideas] The Philosophy of Opinion - Jlsperanza