[lit-ideas] Re: The Philosopher's Show
- From: Donal McEvoy <donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- To: "lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx" <lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Mon, 2 Jul 2012 07:09:42 +0100 (BST)
The link brings up a "The requested page does not exist". No matter what the
url says nothing more is shown.
D
________________________________
From: "Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx" <Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx>
To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
Sent: Monday, 2 July 2012, 5:10
Subject: [lit-ideas] Re: The Philosopher's Show
This by Hacker at
http://info.sjc.ox.ac.uk/scr/hacker/docs/Was%20he%20trying%20to%20whistle%20
it.pdf
may shed some light on the say/show distinction as we may bring Grice's
"mean" into the bargain.
I follow Hacker in using:
'said by language'
and
'shown by language'
AND
'meant' by language.
The paper is rather a narrow or specific reply to Cora Diamond, but have
broader appeal.
Slightly commented below. Thanks to D. McEvoy for his further thoughts.
Hacker entitles his subsection:
"The Tractatus — trying to say what can only be shown"
Hacker writes: "Diamond and Conant, like Ramsey, argue (rightly) that if
you can’t say it, you can’t say it, and you can’t whistle it either. Unlike
Ramsey, they think that Wittgenstein was not trying to whistle it. On
their interpretation, there is nothing that the nonsensical
pseudo-propositions
of the Tractatus are trying to say, for one cannot mean something that
cannot be said."
"But is this what Wittgenstein thought?"
]
"Since Diamond and Conant allow reference to the ‘nonsensical’ remarks of
TLP 4.126 - 4.1272, 5.473 and 5.4733, it is presumably equally legitimate
to refer to related passages in the attempt to fathom Wittgenstein’s
intentions. If we do so, it is immediately
evident that he did think that one can mean something that cannot be said,
but rather expresses itself in a different way, viz. is shown by features
of our language."
ENTER Grice's "MEAN":
"Moreover, he insisted, we can apprehend, indeed, can see some things
which are thus meant but cannot be said."
"As noted, he asserted that what Russell’s axiom of infinity was meant to
say, would (if true) be shown by the existence of infinitely many names
with different meanings (TLP
5.535).'
"Similarly, what the solipsist means is quite correct; only it cannot be
said, but makes itself manifest (TLP 5.62)."
MODUS PONENS -- rules of inference:
"We cannot say that ‘q’ follows from ‘p’ and ‘p --> q’, for this is an
internal relation between propositions. But it is shown by the tautology ‘
(p --> q). (p):-->:(q)’ (TLP
6.1201)."
"We can recognize that a proposition of logic is true from the symbol
alone — indeed, that is a characteristic mark (hence an internal property) of
a
proposition of logic (TLP
6.113)."
"We can see that the truth of one proposition follows from the truth of
another, although that is an internal relation that cannot be described (TLP
6.1221)."
"In complicated cases it is difficult to see these internal relations,
hence we need a mechanical expedient to facilitate their recognition — viz. a
proof (TLP 6.1262), which enables us to recognize something that cannot be
said. In the T/F notation of the Tractatus, we can recognize such formal
properties of propositions as being tautologous by mere inspection of the
propositions themselves (TLP 6.122)."
"So there are, according to the author of the Tractatus, ineffable truths
that can be apprehended. Indeed, in some cases, they can literally be
perceived — for one can see that dark blue is darker than light blue, even
though, being an internal relation
between colours, this cannot be said."
Hacker goes on to quote from the EARLIEST Witters and how he was already
obsessed with the show/say/whistle distinction from his days in the
trenches. Hacker comments that while TLP would regard "x is an object" as
nonsense,
it would come out as a "rule" in PI, so what Hacker writes may relate to
the idea by McEvoy that the 'key tenet' holds for TLP and PI -- if broadly
understood rather than with the details, I suppose.
And so on.
Cheers,
Speranza
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