[lit-ideas] Re: The Philosopher's Show
- From: Donal McEvoy <donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- To: "lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx" <lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Sun, 1 Jul 2012 20:01:45 +0100 (BST)
________________________________
From: "Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx" <Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx>
> The implicature in Witters's 'key tenet' (as supplied by
D. McEvoy) is that showing is, regardless of whether I have properly
understood McEvoy's intentions in supplying it), somewhat _poorer_ than
'saying'.>
There is no such implicature: as the sense of 'what is said' is dependent on
what may only be shown, that is reason enough that 'what may be shown' is of no
"poorer" status than 'what is said'.
However, there is perhaps a difference between W's view in TLP and PI: in TLP,
what is not contained in the TLP [i.e. what is shown by what is said there] is
more fundamental than what is contained there [i.e. 'what is said' there]. This
is not obviously W's view in PI, where it might be said that 'what may be shown
but not said' and the sense of 'what is said' are inextricably linked but not
in way where one is the poor relation of the other.
In TLP, the "limits of language" mean we cannot speak with sense of matters
that lie beyond the limits of natural science: beyond the limits of natural
science all we might do is show what the TLP shows. In PI, the "limits of
language" also work as a check or restraint on philosophical talk and again as
in TLP because philosophical talk misunderstands the logic of our language: so
that there is a continuity here - so that, for example, the following claims
are almost interchangeable: ‘[m]ost of the propositions and questions of
philosophers arise from our failure to understand the logic of our language’
(TLP 4.003) and the problems that confront us in philosophy are rooted in ‘a
misunderstanding of the logic of our language’ (PI 93). And yet, and
yet...there are arguably great differences and W's view of saying and showing
may be one of them.
[The Euro Final has started, however, and I must go....in fact, there's just
been a goal]
Donal
We may need an elaboration on the semantics of 'show' -- or more, the
semantics of _show_: the phenomenon of showing. What semantics does it carry?
Why is it that some item that cannot be said can however be successfully
shown? What is the HISTORY behind Witters's 'key tenet'. Some relate it to
Budda and the ineffable, but I wouldn't know. I'm not so much interested in
Witters's view on the limitations of language, but rather in his epiphany, if
that's the word, of 'show'. Etc.
Cheers,
Speranza
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