[lit-ideas] The Ebro Treaty and how not to embrace peace

One of the things historians of Rome debate is the Ebro Treaty.   

 

After the first Punic war, in 231 BC, Hamilcar moved invaded Spain to extend
the Carthaginian empire.  The Romans sent ambassadors to find out what
Hamilcar was up to and he said he needed to conquer this region in order to
get the money to "pay the war indemnity to Rome.  Faced with such a reply,
and since Rome had no interest in Spain, they had no cause of complaint and
went home."*

 

After Hamilcar was killed in 229 BC, his son-in-law Hasdrubal "swiftly set
out on a campaign to punish the tribe that had killed Hamilcar.  By a
combination of marriage to an Iberian princess, diplomatic skill and a
powerfully increased army, he greatly expanded the Carthaginian Empire in
Spain.  He founded the city of New Carthage (Cartagena), an excellent port
and close to valuable silver mines, and from there he regally governed and
extend the boundaries of his province."**

 

So in 226 BC the Romans sent some more Ambassadors to Carthaginian Spain and
the result was the Ebro Treaty.  Rome told the Carthaginians that as long as
they stayed on the other side of the Ebro they would have no trouble from
Rome.   At first glance this sounds like an "order delivered, de haute en
bas," as Kagan says, but if one looks at where the Carthaginians were at the
time and where the Ebro was, one sees that there is a considerable distance
between the two.   Rome was conceding that Carthage could extend its empire,
even to the conquering of a city belonging to one of Rome's allies.  Why
would Rome make such a concession?  

 

Kagan tells us that Rome was much more worried about the Celts than the
Carthaginians in 226.  The Celts had invaded Rome once before and it was
only with the greatest difficulty that they had defeated them.  Unlike the
Germans in their two world wars, the Romans were serious about not fighting
a two-front war.  So they appeased the Carthaginians; which caused Kagan to
conclude:

 

"The form of the treaty salvaged their pride, since it had the appearance
not of a concession but of an order delivered, de haute en bas.  The
temporary expedient; nonetheless, as Polybius makes clear, it was an attempt
at appeasement in a moment of weakness and fear.  Appeasement is a perfectly
respectable and often useful instrument of policy.  It can be effective when
applied from a position of strength, when it is freely taken action meant to
allay a grievance and create good will.  It is an unsatisfactory and
dangerous device when it is resorted to out of fear and necessity, for then
it does not reduce resentment but shows weakness and induces contempt.  The
Romans' attempt through the Ebro treaty was still a worse kind of
appeasement, for even as its content displayed weakness, its form was
insulting.  Its effect was to neither soothe nor deter but to inflame and
encourage the Carthaginians.  Even after the Celtic emergency had passed,
the Romans took no military measures to guard against the Carthaginians in
Spain, nor did they work to conciliate them."***

 

.         On The Origins of War and the Preservation of Peace, Donald Kagan,
p. 257

**   Ibid, p. 258

***  Ibid, p. 260

 

Comment:   I keep in mind the bumper-sticker outcries of Geary and don't
wonder that he has no practical advice for the Romans or the Greeks, or even
the Europeans who engaged in actual wars.  What practical steps does he
advise?  Actually, as he implies, he isn't into practical steps.  He wants
to spread his arms, opening his hands for the stigmata, and embrace peace -
I read about such acts in William James' Varieties of Religious Experience;
which is fine, but it doesn't help a real government with a real problem.  

 

Kagan is offering advice, it seems to me, about real problems with the
possibility that his advice might actually be capable of being applied.  He
says here something very interesting about appeasement.  It is very easy, he
suggests to get this wrong.  The Romans got it wrong with the Ebro Treaty,
and we know the British got it wrong with Hitler prior to WWII.  And in
effect we Americans got it wrong prior to 9/11.   We were attacked many
times prior to 9/11 and until then chose to take no serious action against
the attackers.  The attackers, like the Carthaginians concluded that the
appeasers displayed weakness.  The wording of the Ebro treaty insulted the
Carthaginians.  Our ignoring the attacks of the Islamic radicals inflamed
their righteous indignation.   The Romans had their rationale for the Ebro
Treaty and we had ours for ignoring the pin-pricks of the Islamic radicals
but

 

Peace is not unilateral.   Peace cannot be imposed.  Whatever our
perception, we must consider the perception of "the other."   Perhaps we
will think it expedient to impose it anyway - as the Romans did, but perhaps
we should do it better, differently or not at all.  Bumper stickers are not
the answer.  The answer is complicated.  Even long afterword, as is true of
the Ebro Treaty, there may be no clear answer.

 

Lawrence Helm

San Jacinto

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