[lit-ideas] Re: See SAW
- From: "Lawrence Helm" <lawrencehelm@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
- To: <lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Fri, 5 May 2006 08:48:35 -0700
Andreas wrote, "Lawrence made the same mistake this evening when he sneered
at the Iranian military." Let's keep the original nuance, Andreas. What
Lawrence was sneering at was the Iranian Army Chief of Joint Staff General
Abdorrahim Musavi as he sneered at the American military. I'll bet he
wished he could promise America the Mother of all Battles if it dared to
attack Iran. What he did promise - actually not even a promise but sort of
wish was "We want to put America in its place."
As to what the U.S. can do and not do, we cannot defeat a guerilla force
that can fade back into a supporting population. I discussed this after
reading the Military Historian Bevin Alexander's The Future of Warfare which
he wrote in 1995, but this fact has been generally known since the Boer War.
The Boers were able to engage in guerilla tactics, fight against smaller
British units and when the main British forces came to their rescue fade
back into the countryside, and return to their farms. [seeThe Boer War by
Thomas Pakenham]. Thus, while we could defeat the Iranian Army, Air Force
(and Navy) quite handily I imagine, we couldn't occupy the country unless
the Iranians wanted us to.
And that is not the situation in Iraq. The Shiites and Kurds wanted our
help in Iraq. It is the defeated Baathist Sunnis who do not. These
Baathists helped by Islamists are fighting against the Iraqi government,
against Sunnis who support the Iraqi government, against Shiites, and
British and American forces. These insurgents, at least the Baathist
insurgents do have some support in the Sunni triangle. I gather that the
non Iraqi-Islamists aren't getting the same support there. But the Sunnis
in the triangle aren't like the Boers were in their war. Many if not most
realize that they need to support the government if the nation is to survive
as it was conceived by the wise British and French after WWI. There is oil
in the Kurdish North and in the Shiite South, but I don't think there is
much in the Sunni Triangle, nor does it butt up against Syria so as to gain
comfort from a former ally:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:Sunni_triangle.jpg
Guerillas can be defeated. Lord Kitchener devised a very effective solution
to the Boer Guerillas being able to return to their farms. He rounded up
all their wives and children and put them in concentration camps. But Emily
Hobhouse, a dumpy, forty-one-year-old spinster from Cornwall had seen the
concentration camps and returned to England full of righteous indignation.
Kitchener had enormous influence but he was no match for Miss Hobhouse. The
camps were eliminated but not before epidemics swept them and killed an
enormous number of civilians. The camp solution while entirely workable
from a practical standpoint was unacceptable to the Liberal sensibility.
Thus, if we are not willing to use the only tactic shown to be effective
against guerillas, then we had better not try to occupy a country where we
are likely to be opposed by them.
While this fact is well known by historians, it may not be equally well
known by every politician that inhabits the White House. I've read a bit
more of Ralph Peters New Glory and learned he doesn't like Donald Rumsfeld.
I've heard from Rumsfeld's detractors and his supporters. They both have
good arguments. But if Peters is right, Rumsfeld could (if the decision was
made to destroy Iran's nuclear capability) attempt to occupy Iran in the
same way we have occupied Iraq. We do have enormous support in Iraq -
something above 70% of Iraqis support the Iraqi government. Would we want
to occupy Iran if we thought we could get that same level of support there?
What we don't hear much about in the news are the campaigns of Iranian
groups who fled Iran after Khomeini took over. They want to go back and
they all have plans and advice about how that can be accomplished. There
are millions of expatriated Iranians in the U.S. Some of them may be
whispering in the ears of Rumsfeld and has advisors. I tend to think we
would have more trouble effecting a regime change in Iran than we did in
Iraq, even if there are groups that could be counted on. Iran is only 51%
Persian. The rest are Azeri 24%, Gilaki and Mazandarani 8%, Kurd 7%, Arab
3%, Lur 2%, Baloch 2%, Turkmen 2%, other 1%. I have read that Iran has been
especially concerned about the Azeri because of the possibility of their
wanting to join up with Azerbaijan to north, but Iran has relocated most of
the Azeri away from the Azerbaijan border. Some of these groups may be
disgruntled. We know that many of the young Persians are disgruntled, but
even so, do we really want to tackle that problem? I don't think so.
If we decide that Iran is about to get nuclear weapons and we are resolved
to prevent that, I think we should take that as the limit of our ambitions.
We would probably have to knock out their Air Force & Navy in the process,
but despite the confidence of Andreas Ramos and Iranian Army Chief of Joint
Staff General Abdorrahim Musavi I don't think that would be an
insurmountable problem.
Lawrence
-----Original Message-----
From: lit-ideas-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx [mailto:lit-ideas-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx]
On Behalf Of Andreas Ramos
Sent: Thursday, May 04, 2006 11:42 PM
To: Lit-Ideas
Subject: [lit-ideas] Re: See SAW
> What probably didn't get much press in the Arab world is that Zarqawi and
his friends were
> klutzy in handling the weapon. Probably too much for him and for them.
yeah, what a klutz.
that's probably why he only has 130,000 US soliders tied down.
Eric, you're making the same mistake that Bush made. Lawrence made the same
mistake this
evening when he sneered at the Iranian military.
it's a collosal mistake.
an army doesn't need advanced weapons to defeat another army. or, put
another way, advanced
weapons in themselves don't win battles.
the USA has the most sophisticated weapons systems in the world, and yet it
is bogged down
in Iraq, unable to win or do much of anything except survive day by day in
its
heavily-fortified camps.
a highly determined army, with ingenuity and resourcefulness, can defeat a
much larger,
well-equiped army that has lost its will. over and over, this has happened
in history.
al-Qaeda is probably no more than 50 men holed up in a cave with just a
handful of supplies,
and yet they can cause tremendous havoc. with nothing more than a few
50-cent boxcutters,
they devastated NYC.
yrs,
andreas
www.andreas.com
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