We are discussing Russell's Theory of Relations. R. Paul quotes from an acquaintance of Russell's: Witters, freely rendering from "Philosophical Investigations §216." A preface may be in order. In strict adherence to the facts, the theory is Whitehead's and Russell's. They symbolise a "relation" by "R". "A relation," they hold, "holds between two components, which we'll call 'the relata'" and which they go on to symbolise as "R (x, y)" -- The first issue they consider is the axiom freely rendered by R. Paul: > 'a thing is identical with itself,' Whitehead and Russell go on to define a special 'relation' for that, which they symbolise, drawing from Leibnitz, as "=". = (x, x) or x = x Russell and Whitehead hold that "identity' qua relation is symmetrical and transitive. In a message dated 8/7/2012 2:50:03 P.M. Eastern Daylight Time, rpaul@xxxxxxxx brings in another example: RELATION (Paul, St. Paul). Paul's gloss: -- Paul is trying to check if Whitehead's and Russell's use of 'relation' is a *stretch*: "If I say, having been asked, whether the former Saul of Tarsus was any relation [in Whitehead's and Russell's sense] of mine, that he wasn't, I don't mean to deny that it would be 'logically possible,' for a clever [Wittgensteinian] to come up with some relation [call it "R"] which metaphysically (so to speak) or biologically linked us -- e.g. that we share the same blood type, and are 'related' by being members of the set of humans with O-positive blood." In other words, R. Paul is submitting that 'relation' has _looser_ uses than Whitehead and Russell admit. R. Paul, however, grants: "Yet the sense in which all the students of Mutton College are related in virtue of their being students of Mutton College is not the sense in which some of them might be related as cousins." Russell and Whitehead refer to the 'subscript' here: R1, R2. Suppose two students at Mutton College are called (as they may): Jack Jill. Indeed, for any x and y, Whitehead and Russell write, it is possible to assume that there is a relation R1 such that R(x, y). --- E.g. "Jack and Jill are related in virtue of (both) being current students at Mutton." This, to keep using Paul's example, is different from R2, where "R2" is read as "they are cousin": COUSIN (Jack, Jill). -- 'cousin', incidentally, unlike 'mother' is SYMMETRICAL. R. Paul is suggesting that the _looser_ use of 'relation' has to do with 'kinship' (as when David Ritchie says that he has 'no relation' with Major Ritchie). R. Paul goes on: "While ['everything bears some relation with anything else' -- in Whitehead's & Russell's symbolism: COROLLARY to Theorem 5*6: "for any x, and any y, R(x,y) is an axiom"] may sound like an important notion, it strikes me as second only to 'a thing is identical with itself,' as being a sentence than which none more useless can be imagined.* (*Philosophical Investigations §216, freely rendered) which was our starting point. When Witters brings in 'imagination' he is working with the slogan, as per a graffito: meaning = use -- where we can go on to symbolise 'meaning' with "M" and 'use' with "U" and contradict a relation (of identity). The fact that these hold: "A thing is identical with itself" -- FIRST otiosity "Everything bears some relationship with anything else" -- SECOND otiosity would be, for Russell, and Whitehead, a proof that "Principia Mathematica" holds and that it's principles (in their presentation as conceptual axioms of the structure of our thought, rather than otiosities) that the philosopher (or The Philosopher) is interested in (*pace* Paul). Cheers, Speranza ------------------------------------------------------------------ To change your Lit-Ideas settings (subscribe/unsub, vacation on/off, digest on/off), visit www.andreas.com/faq-lit-ideas.html