[lit-ideas] Preventing World War One

Robert Kagan is no mystic and so never considers the possibility of
addressing  the Geary-Platonic form,"War," but he does discuss the matters
leading up to that World War One and considers whether it could have been
prevented.  A lot has been written and he discusses various theories placing
blame.   The one I was most familiar with was Grey's ambivalence.  But
Kagan says the Schlieffen plan took the possibility of British involvement
into consideration.  So even if Grey had been clear, the Germans wouldn't
have been deterred.

p. 212 of On the Origins of War: 

"The Germans had long known the significance of Britain's military
impotence.  They knew that the British Army was a small volunteer force
meant to serve as a colonial constabulary and not intended for Continental
service.  The fact that the British had no conscription also meant that they
had no trained reserve that could be brought to bear quickly on the Western
front.   Schlieffen himself assumed that the British would intervene in a
Continental war, but he was not troubled by the prospect.  In an appendix to
his plan prepared in 1906 he discussed the possibility of a British
expeditionary force of 100,000 men, which he thought would probably land at
Antwerp.  There, he said, 'They will be shut up. . . . together with the
Belgians.'  Schlieffen, therefore, thought it safe to ignore Britain's army
in his strategic calculations, and his successors did the same.  That is
what explains Germany's willingness to go forward even after it was clear
that Britain would fight."

According to this it would have made no difference if Lord Grey had been
clearer in his willingness to go to the support of France and Belgium.  The
German General Staff just didn't care.  Was there nothing Britain could have
done to prevent the war?  Kagan says that there was:

P. 213-4:  ". . . Like Pericles and the Athenians, therefore, Grey and the
British pursued policies that overemphasized the importance of the Navy and
undervalued the significance of the Army.

"Suppose, however, that the British had looked at their predicament clearly,
honestly, and courageously in the years between 1898 and 1914.  Suppose they
had faced the fact that only the assurance of a large, well-trained British
army that could quickly come to France's aid in case of attack could make a
German victory in the West impossible and obviously so.  Suppose they had
swallowed the bitter pill of introducing conscription, and in a time of
peace, at that.  It would have meant going against an honored and
comfortable tradition; it would have been costly and would have strained the
British economy at a time when there was great pressure for domestic
spending; it would have been at odds with the great libertarian ethic
central to the British character - but the result would have been the
presence of a standing army and a large trained reserve in 1914.  That would
have made the Schlieffen plan or any conceivable German plan of war
obviously absurd and certain to fail.  Whatever Germany's ambitions and
frustrations, such a course of action could have forced Germany to abandon
its reckless and unnecessary challenge to the stability of Europe with
untold benefit to itself and the world.  However painful such sacrifices
might be, they could have spared Britain and Europe more than four terrible
years of war, horrendous casualties, and the rapid loss of their place in
the world.

"Unlike the Athenians, the British had the capacity to take all the measures
needed to keep the peace through deterrence, though at great cost in money
and to their traditional way of life.  To achieve that purpose, however,
required an action they were unwilling to take, even to contemplate and
confront.  Their refusal to adjust their strategic capacity to their policy
undermined their ability to conduct that policy.  The unacknowledged,
perhaps unconscious, understanding of the gap between their goals and their
capacity to achieve them led Grey and the British to pursue an indecisive
middle course that made it even harder to keep the peace."

Comment:  Three things came to mind while reading this.  The first is that
Ahmadinejad has with justification scoffed at the idea that the U.S. might
invade Iran.  The U.S. is overextended in Iraq.  It hasn't the capacity to
invade Iran.  This is not only true, it may be emboldening Ahmadinejad to
more reckless gambles than he might otherwise be willing to take.  

Second, I have a prejudice against conscription because that means putting
men under arms that don't want to be there.  I'm convinced that the Marine
Corps approach, accepting only volunteers, is the best one.  However getting
a large force trained "just in case" makes sense.    I was in the Marine
Corps for three years active service and five years inactive reserve.  That
meant that for my four years in college and first year at Douglas Aircraft
company I could have been called back to the Marine Corps.   Something like
that could be used for conscription.  Even six months active duty with a
number of years "inactive reserve" would provide a military reserve that
could be somewhat rapidly deployed and comprise a deterrence against
military gamblers.

Third, the U.S. military is not like a military force during World War One.
We are more like the Spartan hoplites going up against farmers.   Are forces
are better trained and more potent than any enemy we might reasonably be
expected to face; so we don't need (the theory went) as many soldiers under
arms.   Our military planners intended this sort of force, but we now see
its limitations.  We are over extended in Iraq.   If we need to go into
Iran, we may be in trouble.   Let us hope that we don't have to.  But is
there anyone in government learning the lesson from our present
circumstance?   Shouldn't someone be advocating a substantial enlargement of
our ground forces?  

Lawrence Helm
San Jacinto

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