[lit-ideas] On Copenhagening the German Fleet

While German Generals worried about a two-front war, Wilhelm's favorite
advisor, Tirpitz worried about Britain.  Back in August of 2003 I read
Dreadnought, Britain, Germany, and the Coming of the Great War by Robert
Massie.  For reasons not entirely practical, Wilhelm II wanted a navy as
large as that of his uncle, Edward VII of England.   Tirpiz, the German sea
lord wanted the same thing Wilhelm wanted.  Here is Kagan (op cit., p. 140):

"The British fleet, of course, was larger even than the one publicly planned
by Tirpitz.   How could the Germans hope to frighten the British with an
inferior fleet?  The answer was the 'risk theory' that assumed that the
British could not afford or be able to man a fleet larger than ninety
battleships.  Since the common belief was that an attacking fleet needed at
least a three-to-two advantage to win, Tirpitz calculated that the Germans
would have a good chance to win, especially since he believed Germany to
have better ships, better training, and a better command structure.  But the
British fleet, with its need to protect the Mediterranean and its imperial
responsibilities all over the globe in any event would not be able to
concentrate its forces against Germany.  Even a British victory in such a
decisive battle, however, would be very costly, leaving the British
vulnerable to their other naval enemies, France and Russia.  In the face of
such a prospect they were bound to seek an accommodation with Germany or at
least stand out of the way of its Weltpolitik.

"If this really was Tirpitz's plan it was full of assumptions whose
falseness would become obvious soon.  In case of war a British fleet need
not take the offensive; Britain's geographical position allowed it to
blockade Germany at a distance and keep the German fleet bottle dup without
risking an attack.  For the Germans to get any use out of their fleet it was
they who must attack and who would, therefore, need a numerically superior
force.  Britain, moreover, was richer than Germany and better able to
sustain an arms race at sea, especially since, as islanders, they managed
with only a tiny army while Germany's much larger one competed for limited
resources.  The plan also assumed stability in the international situation,
but why should Britain use its ships to defend far-off colonies instead of
bringing them home when threatened by a dagger aimed at her vitals?  And why
should Britain not abandon some of her enmities and make new alliances when
confronting such a danger?

"Tirpitz himself saw one possible flaw that worried him greatly.  In the
years when the fleet was under construction but not yet strong enough to
withstand an attack, wouldn't the British be tempted to launch a preventive
attack and destroy it in port?  That fear focused on a historical precedent.
In 1807, in time of peace during a lull in the Napoleonic wars, a British
admiral seized the neutral Danish fleet in Copenhagen harbor to prevent its
falling into French hands when the war resumed.  Tirpitz and many Germans
lived in constant terror of such an attack during the 'period of greatest
danger,' before the German fleet was complete.  In 1904, in fact, Sir John
Fisher, Britain's First Sea Lord, suggested to King Edward VII that they
'Copenhagen' the German fleet before it got too strong.  'My God, Fisher,'
the King responded, 'you must be mad!'  and there never was a plan to take
such action, yet 'the belief that 'Fisher was coming' actually caused a
panic at Kiel in 1907, and cautious parents kept their children home from
school for two days.'

"Most of the other flaws in the risk theory and in Tirpitz's stated plans
seem obvious enough as to raise the question of whether he failed to see
them.  If not, he and those who supported his plan must seem not only
dangerously fanatical but also foolish.  The alternative is to believe that
his true intention was different, and there is persuasive, though not
conclusive evidence to support the view that Tirpitz planned ultimately to
build a fleet large enough to defeat the Royal Navy in a decisive battle in
the North Sea.  Both the Kaiser's mother and Holstein reported that it was
William II's lifetime determination to have a navy larger and stronger than
the British, and others heard Tirpitz proclaim the same goal.  'When it
reached the size which Tirpitz and the Kaiser ideally desired for it, this
fleet would be used to sweep British naval control form the seas.'"

Comment:  The guilty flee where no one pursueth.  Were Tirpitz in Fisher's
position, he would have recommended the same  thing, a preemptive attack,
and if Wilhelm were in Edward's position he probably would have agreed to
it, but Edward said, "My God, Fisher, you must be mad."  

Employing one of Niall Ferguson's "counterfactuals" here, what would have
happened if Fisher were allowed to "Copenhagen" the German navy in 1907?
It seems unlikely that Germany would have been inclined to go to the expense
of building a new navy.  There would have been hard feelings, but there were
anyway - as a result of the war that followed in 1914.  Also, had Britain
taken that preemptive approach, it seems unlikely that the U.S. would have
been interested in supporting Britain later in.  The destruction of the
German navy wouldn't have affected its Army and it could have gone ahead
with its two front war just as it eventually did - or would Britain's
preemption have put a damper on that as well.   Then Germany would risk a
three front war with Britain blockading German ports while Germany was
attacked by France from the West and Russia from the East.   World War One
may not have begun if Britain were a wee bit more bellicose.    

On the other hand, if Britain had destroyed the German fleet and World War
One had not occurred, Germany could have been seen as a victim of British
aggression.  Some politicians and newsmen say everything that can be said,
so some would be sure to say that.   How would that have affected Britain's
future, and what would that have done to German ambitions?  

What did occur was that in a long war from 1914 to 1945, about as long as
the Peloponnesian War and with a "peace" in the middle like the Peace of
Nicias, the participants exhausted themselves against each other.  After the
Peloponnesian War the barbarian Macedonians easily dominated the region and
much besides.  After the World War (1&2 together) the Barbarians with the
abbreviations (U.S. & U.S.S.R.) dominated the region and much besides.

Rather than trot out the trite maxim "wars never solve anything," the
participants, if some European Cassandras were persuasive enough, could have
anticipated that an exhausting general European war would inevitably end
Europe as the dominate world power.  They could, with Cassandra's help have
counted the cost, held back and remained as they were.  Maybe Dmytryk could
have taught Mitchum to say something like that. . . [just kidding].

Lawrence Helm
San Jacinto

Ps:  Before posting this I took a look at my inbox and found a posting from
Geary.  He left the title "Problem solving and war," and then wrote on
something entirely different - something he'd rather talk about than the
subject.  Can he relate it back to Mitchum's speech at the end of Anzio?
No, of course not.    

I have a problem I need to solve, Geary says.  I lost my knowledge about
wars and why we fight them. 

Where did you lose it?  

Over there by those bunkers and trenches.  

Then why are you looking here in the list of amusing Memphian sayings?

"Because the light is better."

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