[lit-ideas] Re: (No References: <8659f5a00804251733t5680f057j1eb722a0b748ef56@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>

An intriguing distinction between conceptual meaning and justification. But
permit me to be unabashedly argumentative for a change: I believe the
distinction is a false one. At least as I read John W drawing it. 

Examinations of the meaning of a concept comprise inquiries into the
inferential
relations operative between that concept and other concepts and claims that
both
identify and elaborate upon the meaning of the original concept. (And the
converse also holds.) To understand concept X is to recognize its entailments
to concepts Y and Z and judgements P and Q. It is also to identify other
possible conceptual and epistemic relations that may not be strictly "entailed"
by the original concept, but have come to possess associative/connotative
cultural currrency. ("It's not going to happen, Dad," in response to a parent's
directive, is not only an empirical prediction on the teenager's part.) 

I hope the above provides sufficient premises to soundly conclude that there is
no conceptual meaning independent of the structures of argumentation (providing
and/or identifying premises for conclusions.) To have a concept is to have a
bunch of propositions which relate to other concepts and other propositions via
entailments or associations of inference. (There is a really fine article on
this but I forget the author and the title. I'm vaguely recalling the name
"William Dray" and an article in response to another philosopher writing on
some problem in the philosophy of histiorical explanation. Collingwood is in
there somewhere, I think. It may come to me, yet.)

Example: "I know what a mammal is, and they don't give live birth."  That
expresses a conceptual mistake that is also an error in inference.
Actually, if my argument above is cogent, I should be able to make the stronger
claim that the speaker is engaged in a conceptual mistake IN THAT she is making
an inferential mistake. The former error is made precisely in virtue of
committing the latter error.

"Freedom's just another word for nothin' left to lose ..."

Walter O.
MUN

Quoting John Wager <john.wager1@xxxxxxxxxxx>:

> wokshevs@xxxxxx wrote:
> > Philosophy embraces, rather , "argument" as  - to offer my highly
> technical
> > definition - a bunch of statements some of which function as premises
> (reasons)
> > and one of which functions as a conclusion. (There is also an inference,
> but we
> > need not bog ourselves down in details.) Reasons are called premises
> because
> > they are the "grounds" upon which our beliefs and actions rest for
> > justification. Isn't that an interesting etymological connection? (You are
> now
> > supposed to go "Oooooh!" in unison.) This requires "rational spontaneity" -
> a
> > condition which .... never mind, I must prepare for the game tonight.
> >
> >
> > My point, lest I forget it, is that argumentation is a matter of
> justification
> > and has nothing to do in its epistemic function with violence. . . .
> 
> I teach a lot of introductory level philosophy classes. (An AWFUL LOT of 
> intro classes!) I used to try to get
> students to examine readings for an "argument" in the good sense above, 
> and to present arguments of their own
> about those readings. But after a while, I saw that the students didn't 
> know how to read or present arguments
> because they didn't appreciate the "concepts" being used in those 
> arguments; there was a step missing, the step
> of thinking about a concept, rolling it around in one's mind, playing 
> with it to see where it goes, finding out  what
> it is and what it isn't, appreciating how powerful or how insignificant 
> it might be, and only THEN trying to see
> how one could use it in an "argument."  This required more than just 
> defining terms, it required exploring the
> terms, seeing them in action, contemplating them.  So now my class is 
> half about concepts and half about how
> those concepts can be defended, expanded, justified, or cross-examined 
> through argument.
> 
> 
> ------------------------------------------------------------------
> To change your Lit-Ideas settings (subscribe/unsub, vacation on/off,
> digest on/off), visit www.andreas.com/faq-lit-ideas.html
> 



------------------------------------------------------------------
To change your Lit-Ideas settings (subscribe/unsub, vacation on/off,
digest on/off), visit www.andreas.com/faq-lit-ideas.html

Other related posts: