[lit-ideas] Re: Morc Huck Pump
- From: wokshevs@xxxxxx
- To: wokshevs@xxxxxx
- Date: Sun, 16 Mar 2008 17:11:42 -0230
This posting came back to me for some odd reason. Our spam filter here at the
university may be unduly sensitive. Plse. disregard if already received.
Walter O.
MUN
Quoting wokshevs@xxxxxx:
> Some replies to Phil on morality, maxims, Kant, Habermas, sex and more!
>
>
> Quoting Phil Enns <phil.enns@xxxxxxxxxxx>:
>
> > Walter wrote:
> >
> > "All ethical maxims are open to moral assessment."
>
> PE:
> > True, but not all ethical maxims will, upon moral assessment, result
> > in moral maxims. The standard, given by Kant and Habermas, for moral
> > assessment arriving at moral maxims is very demanding and so most
> > often there can be no moral maxim. Returning to the example I gave
> > earlier, walking to work might be a good thing but this goodness does
> > not rise to the level of 'oughtness'. The vast majority of our
> > ethical activities are of this kind.
>
> WO: I hope I'm not losing the thread of the discussion, but all I have to
> say
> here is that all maxims and actions are open to moral assessment.
> Prudential,
> technical, etc. maxims are not moral maxims in a formal sense of "moral" -
> but
> the actions of, say, a physician, remain open to moral assessment of their
> permissibility or impermissibility regardless of the kind of maxim he is
> acting
> on. Rearding Phil's first sentence above, I agree: some ethical maxims are
> immoral (i.e. Nazi policies).
>
>
> > Walter continues:
> >
> > "Moreover, and I don't think H. would disagree with me or Kant on
> > this, 'oughtness' adheres to all our actions, willings and judgments
> > in the sense that one of the following categories applies
> > transcendentally to all of them: morally permissible, or impermissible
> > (entailing an obligation to refrain from acting on such maxims.)."
> >
> > This is simply not the case. Kant explicitly distinguishes between
> > public and private reason where private reason does not rise to the
> > level of 'oughtness'. According to Kant, private reason draws on an
> > authority other than reason itself. On this account, the vast
> > majority of our actions, willings and judgments could not be open to
> > the application of moral categories.
>
> WO: Phil now appeals to Kant's political writings, written after his work on
> moral theory. But if Kant does say what Phil says he says regarding the
> distinction between private and public reason, even in his political
> writings,
> I would appreciate a bibliographic reference. I would think that in order to
> be
> consistent with his moral theory Kant would maintain that, for example, a
> priest
> speaking "privately" to his flock may be engaged in morally permissible/
> morally
> impermissible deeds.
>
>
>
> PE:
> > Think how often we do things
> > because they are useful, helpful, healthy, pleasurable, desirable,
> > usw. Habermas' criteria are even more demanding requiring both
> > participation of those involved as well as the appropriate means of
> > application.
>
> WO: Such aretaic predicates, alwyas referenced in meaning to some conception
> of
> the good life, possess in themselves no necessary moral status. (Such
> conceptions themselves remain opne to moral assessment.) That is to say, the
> helpful act may be morally wrong. Both Kant's and Habermas's deontic
> conception
> of morality - one that privileges the universality of moral law over
> particular
> ethical conceptions of happiness/flourishing - recognize this. In H's case:
> the
> establishment of a generalizable interest as an outcome of discourse is not
> possible if the only criteria of assessment were the aretaic ones Phil
> identifies.
>
> PE:
> > I would be curious to know how the category morally permissible, or
> > impermissible, applies transcendentally to the act of walking to work
> > resulting in a moral maxim.
>
> WO: You choose to walk to work instead of employing the quicker means of
> driving
> your Volvo in to work, even though you realize that your Dean's life depends
> upon your swift arrival and assistance. (Maybe that isn't a good example.)
>
>
> PE:
> > Walter continues:
> >
> > "'Moral rightness' is a 'justification-immanent' concept for H. What
> > 'moral wrongness' means for H is the 'fact' that the maxim under
> > consideration does not meet approval under epistemic conditions of
> > symmetry and reciprocity."
>
> PE:
> > I assume then that you would distinguish between 'morally
> > impermissible', a judgment arrived at through the satisfaction of the
> > above epistemic conditions, and 'moral wrongness', a judgment that
> > covers every act that does not satisfy the above epistemic conditions.
>
> WO: "Moral impermissibility" I take to be equivalent to "moral wrongness." I
> believe so do K and H.
>
> PE:
> > However, the logic of determining all acts failing to rise to the
> > level of moral determination as themselves having a moral quality,
> > i.e. moral wrongness, strikes me as being a bit wobbly. The set of
> > acts not morally justified includes actions like my walking to work,
> > using a pencil instead of a pen for writing my notes and murder. The
> > first two examples strike me as being morally neutral while the third
> > would come under your category of 'morally impermissible'. The
> > actions not included under the category of 'ought' strike me as being
> > too numerous and too diverse to be meaningfully described under any
> > single category apart from the less-than-helpful name of 'not-ought'.
>
>
> WO: Any action, however insignificant it may at first appear, is intertwined
> with the actual and possible actions of others. Thus all actions have a
> "place"
> on question of whether they violate the autonomy and dignity of persons.
> Tonight, I will watch either film A or film B. As a rationally autonomous
> agent, I am free to choose as I wish because I see that the viewing of
> neither
> film is morally wrong (given the circumstances).
>
> PE:
> > Walter again:
> >
> > "What is the difference between being 'offended' and feeling
> > 'resentment' at an other's disregard for the autonomy and dignity of
> > an individual?"
> >
> > The difference is fundamental. To be offended is to passionately
> > acknowledge that a standard or law has been violated while to be
> > resentful is to feel that oneself has been injured or harmed.
>
> WO: A good attempt. Though the two may be closer in shade if we recognize
> that
> the latter is not possible independent of the former.
>
> PE:
> > Walter once more:
> >
> > "The "material" for practical reason appears for rational deliberation
> > under the conditions of universalization (Kant) or the epistemic
> > conditions of discourse (Habermas.)"
> >
> > I am not sure how you are disagreeing with me. On your account here,
> > the 'material' is distinct from the process of practical reason.
>
> WO: I'm not either. I think I was attempting to differentiate between
> discursive
> interlocutors examining a "material" maxim for generalizability and the
> epistemic conditions of symmetry and reciprocity under/through which the
> former
> examination/deliberation proceeds. The cogency of this distinction would be
> recognized by Habermas and Kant I believe.
>
> PE:
>
> > I
> > described this as non-rational. In order to account for the fact that
> > there is an appropriateness between this 'material' and the process of
> > practical reason, I described the 'material' as moral intuition.
>
>
> WO: Yes, intuitions, along with desires, interests are all legitimate
> factors
> within discourse. They are never in themselves morally decisive however.
> Some
> of them may well be ultimately irrational. But even those intuitions which
> are
> rational - i.e., I feel indignant because of the injustice perpetrated
> against
> me, and I'm justified in believing an injustice has been committed against me
> -
> may not prove decisive within discursive deliberation (need- and interest-
> interpretation).
>
> PE:
>
> > Perhaps the word 'intuition' carries with it all sorts of baggage
> > within moral philosophy, but I think it is a good word in this case.
> > Again, my point is that the formal machinery of practical reason
> > requires the grist of moral intuitions harvested from our experience
> > of being offended.
>
> WO: No, the formal features of morality and moral justification bear no
> necessary reference to empirically acquired intuitions, interests, desires
> etc.
> Both H and K are clear on this. One possible mode of access to the domain of
> morality/immorality is through our feelings, intuitions, etc.. But this is
> only
> possible (for K) under the "fact of reason" or (for H) in light of epistemic
> conditions of symmetry and reciprocity. In other words, I can take no moral
> offense, much less justifiable offense, towards an action or judgment unless
> I
> respect the moral law /recognize the constitutive status of discursive
> conditions of justification for the moral rightness of moral validity
> claims.
>
> PE:
> >Habermas explicitly describes how moral discourse
> > requires the input of insights from the lifeworld
>
> WO: True, but such input is material for discursive deliberation. In itself
> it
> possesses no privileged authority in the quest for a generalizable interest.
>
> PE:
>
> > and Kant implies as
> > much.
>
> WO: Also true. But that only means that moral assessment requires subjective
> maxims, maxims to be examined for their universalizability, or not. H
> follows
> his original mentor in his claim that ethical worldviews, cultural horizons
> should not be excluded from deliberation (pace Rawls's "original position").
>
>
> PE:
> > The autonomy you refer to does not apply to, what I refer to
> > as, moral intuitions but rather the procedure by which those
> > intuitions are transformed into norms.
>
> WO: The autonomous agent's intuitions are structured by moral law/discourse.
> In
> the *2nd Critique*, Kant goes on and on about how the moral law is
> efficacious
> in forming /informing desires, inclinations and interests. That is precisely
> why the moral law is not motivationally inert (pace Hume and Smith.)
>
>
> PE:
> > Practical reason is a formal procedure that has to engage the world of
> > experience both in the material for consideration and in its
> > application. Both Kant and Habermas acknowledge that this engagement
> > with the world occurs at those places were we intuit, again my word,
> > transgressions against the moral law. Without these relationships,
> > practical reason would not be practical and therefore betray itself.
>
> WO: The last sentence is a lovely one, and I recommend Phil to use it in his
> next scholarly publication. I would only emphasize that such intuitions are
> only possible under the "fact of reason". All intuitions of a transgression
> against moral law presuppose (transcendentally) the understanding and
> respect
> for moral law. (NB: "reverence" as an intuiton or feeling presupposes, for
> Kant, the "givenness" of moral law within reason itself.)
>
> Thanks to Phil for his excellent, thought-provoking replies. In the
> encounter
> with his views, I am often compelled to rethink matters I previously
> believed
> myself to have satisfactorily put to bed. (Not all his views, of course :)
>
>
> Walter O.
> MUN
>
> P.S. Yes, I told a noble lie about the sex part, just to get you all to keep
> reading. Shameless, I know.
>
> >
> > Sincerely,
> >
> > Phil Enns
> > Yogyakarta, Indonesia
> > ------------------------------------------------------------------
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>
>
>
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