[lit-ideas] Re: Morc Huck Pump
- From: "Phil Enns" <phil.enns@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- To: "Lit-Ideas@Freelists. Org" <lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Sat, 8 Mar 2008 08:57:38 +0700
Walter wrote:
"All ethical maxims are open to moral assessment."
True, but not all ethical maxims will, upon moral assessment, result
in moral maxims. The standard, given by Kant and Habermas, for moral
assessment arriving at moral maxims is very demanding and so most
often there can be no moral maxim. Returning to the example I gave
earlier, walking to work might be a good thing but this goodness does
not rise to the level of 'oughtness'. The vast majority of our
ethical activities are of this kind.
Walter continues:
"Moreover, and I don't think H. would disagree with me or Kant on
this, 'oughtness' adheres to all our actions, willings and judgments
in the sense that one of the following categories applies
transcendentally to all of them: morally permissible, or impermissible
(entailing an obligation to refrain from acting on such maxims.)."
This is simply not the case. Kant explicitly distinguishes between
public and private reason where private reason does not rise to the
level of 'oughtness'. According to Kant, private reason draws on an
authority other than reason itself. On this account, the vast
majority of our actions, willings and judgments could not be open to
the application of moral categories. Think how often we do things
because they are useful, helpful, healthy, pleasurable, desirable,
usw. Habermas' criteria are even more demanding requiring both
participation of those involved as well as the appropriate means of
application.
I would be curious to know how the category morally permissible, or
impermissible, applies transcendentally to the act of walking to work
resulting in a moral maxim.
Walter continues:
"'Moral rightness' is a 'justification-immanent' concept for H. What
'moral wrongness' means for H is the 'fact' that the maxim under
consideration does not meet approval under epistemic conditions of
symmetry and reciprocity."
I assume then that you would distinguish between 'morally
impermissible', a judgment arrived at through the satisfaction of the
above epistemic conditions, and 'moral wrongness', a judgment that
covers every act that does not satisfy the above epistemic conditions.
However, the logic of determining all acts failing to rise to the
level of moral determination as themselves having a moral quality,
i.e. moral wrongness, strikes me as being a bit wobbly. The set of
acts not morally justified includes actions like my walking to work,
using a pencil instead of a pen for writing my notes and murder. The
first two examples strike me as being morally neutral while the third
would come under your category of 'morally impermissible'. The
actions not included under the category of 'ought' strike me as being
too numerous and too diverse to be meaningfully described under any
single category apart from the less-than-helpful name of 'not-ought'.
Walter again:
"What is the difference between being 'offended' and feeling
'resentment' at an other's disregard for the autonomy and dignity of
an individual?"
The difference is fundamental. To be offended is to passionately
acknowledge that a standard or law has been violated while to be
resentful is to feel that oneself has been injured or harmed.
Walter once more:
"The "material" for practical reason appears for rational deliberation
under the conditions of universalization (Kant) or the epistemic
conditions of discourse (Habermas.)"
I am not sure how you are disagreeing with me. On your account here,
the 'material' is distinct from the process of practical reason. I
described this as non-rational. In order to account for the fact that
there is an appropriateness between this 'material' and the process of
practical reason, I described the 'material' as moral intuition.
Perhaps the word 'intuition' carries with it all sorts of baggage
within moral philosophy, but I think it is a good word in this case.
Again, my point is that the formal machinery of practical reason
requires the grist of moral intuitions harvested from our experience
of being offended. Habermas explicitly describes how moral discourse
requires the input of insights from the lifeworld and Kant implies as
much. The autonomy you refer to does not apply to, what I refer to
as, moral intuitions but rather the procedure by which those
intuitions are transformed into norms.
Practical reason is a formal procedure that has to engage the world of
experience both in the material for consideration and in its
application. Both Kant and Habermas acknowledge that this engagement
with the world occurs at those places were we intuit, again my word,
transgressions against the moral law. Without these relationships,
practical reason would not be practical and therefore betray itself.
Sincerely,
Phil Enns
Yogyakarta, Indonesia
------------------------------------------------------------------
To change your Lit-Ideas settings (subscribe/unsub, vacation on/off,
digest on/off), visit www.andreas.com/faq-lit-ideas.html
Other related posts:
