My point is a philosophical one - which is to say, a transcendental one. I'm saying that what we justifiably take to be a morally permissible or morally impermissible maxim is established with reference to whether a generalizable (universalizable) interest is identified in the maxim arrived at through discourse. The justifiedness of moral maxims or judgements is here a matter of satisfaction of the counterfactual conditional: "Were this maxim subjected to discursive procedures of symmetry and reciprocity, it would emerge as a morally justified maxim (decision, policy, etc.) Perhaps in simpler terms, if what you're doing is wrong, the "wrongness" of your action (and will) consists in the fact that interlocutors engaged in discourse, under the epistemic conditions identified by Habermas, could not find your action justifiable. (Scanlon, in his *What we owe each other* has a similar Kantian transcendental claim.) Cheers, Walter Quoting Eric Yost <mr.eric.yost@xxxxxxxxx>: > WO: There are no "generalizable interests" that exist independent of the > outcomes of discourse. Such is the condition of a multiculturally > pluralist democracy. > > > How about basic creature needs? > > If I have a machine that will convert all the water on the surface of > the earth into sand, isn't it morally wrong for me to use it? Would we > have to engage "discourse" as to the morality of its use? > > Even if I only possessed a machine that would turn all humans' dreams > into sweaty, screaming nightmares forever -- would discourse be required > to determine the morality of my pushing the "ON" button? > > > Back to basics, > EY > > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------ > To change your Lit-Ideas settings (subscribe/unsub, vacation on/off, > digest on/off), visit www.andreas.com/faq-lit-ideas.html > ------------------------------------------------------------------ To change your Lit-Ideas settings (subscribe/unsub, vacation on/off, digest on/off), visit www.andreas.com/faq-lit-ideas.html