[lit-ideas] Re: Language, Justice and Social Practices (long)

Walter Okshevsky wrote:

"I'm not sure what Phil's example adds to the claim I am defending that
a concept needs a name in some symbolic form or other. I understand Phil
to be agreeing with my claim."

Correct.  I am agreeing with your claim.

---------------------

In another post in this thread, Walter wrote:

"The name 'pawn' refers to its constituive rules of play. Or its
inferential relations, as I have been putting it. )I.e.: the pawn can't
capture the piece directly in front of it, because of the rule of
capturing governing its play on the board. We can certainly make changes
to the game, but then it wouldn't be chess as we understand it. The
rules of chess are constitutive of the game, not regulative."

I agree that the rules of chess are constitutive of the game, but that
does not mean that any particular rule is constitutive.  As David
Ritchie helpfully noted, the game of chess has gone through many
different changes to arrive at the game we recognize today.  I also
provided the example of the forward pass in American football and how
this was introduced at a later date.  It is true that according to the
rules now generally played with, the pawn cannot capture the piece
directly in front of it, but surely one can imagine that that particular
rule could change and one would still be playing chess.  The rule
regarding how a pawn captures a piece is not constitutive of chess.  For
example, imagine a different game where there is also a piece called a
pawn and it can't capture the piece in front of it.  That game would not
be chess by virtue of having that particular rule.


Walter continues:

"Phil's position here is somewhat confusing in that on the one hand, he
grants that something being part of the game may be distinct from
actually playing the game, but on the other hand he fudges the
distinction with the expression "part of the playing of the game." The
latter distinction conflates the valid distinction between the
constitutive rules of chess and the contingently acquired, adventitious
associations people and groups bring to the game."

The NHL recently decided to do away with the red line, allowing for two
line passes.  The rules of the game of hockey changed because the NHL's
competition committee made a decision regarding how the NHL game would
be played.  Now how does one understand this change?  Walter and Eric's
synchronic approach to rules makes no allowance for changes in rules.
Clearly the decision-making process of the committee is not an example
of playing the game of hockey.  Yet, that process is part of the game
since it both initiates and authorizes the rules.  FIFA changes the
rules regarding when a keeper may handle the ball.  This change alters
the game but is not a case of playing the game.  There is, then, a way
of being part of the playing of the game (i.e. making decisions about
the rules of the game) without actually playing the game.

The problem with the approach adopted by Walter and Eric is that it
cannot account for the history of a game since it is purely synchronic.
The reality is that rules are constantly in flux as a variety of forces
impinge on the relevant games.  Abstracted from these forces, one can
talk about just the rules but what is lost is the ability to account for
the variety in rules and the history of those rules.  While rules are
constitutive, no particular rule is and so rules can change without one
playing a different game.  In fact, one can imagine that in thousands of
years people will play a game called 'chess' that bears no resemblance
to the game we play today by virtue of the fact that small changes in
the game continue to be made.

-------------------------

I am going to include comments from another post by Walter in this same
thread since it relates to what I have written above.

Walter wrote:

"Where [Phil and I] seem to disagree is on the relevance of empirical
'variations' to the practice of giving reasons to the concept or
practice of giving reasons itself. I don't see any necessary relation
there."

My comments above have gone some way to addressing this issue but let me
add a few more remarks.  It seems to me that a game is a good analogy
for a concept.  As the game is comprised of a variety of rules, so also
is any particular concept.  The concept of pain is constituted by a
variety of rules regarding feelings, causes, and expressions.  While
these rules constitute the concept, no particular rule is constitutive.
For example, my niece seems to be impervious to pain.  She can hit her
head so hard my head hurts, but she gives it a rub and then keeps on
going.  I know she felt pain but there is something different about her
from me.  That is, while the rules of pain apply to my niece, it seems
that not all of them apply.  Given that no particular rule is
constitutive and the variations in the application of the rules, it
makes no sense to claim that the concept of pain is constituted by these
particular rules such that the absence or addition of any particular
rule necessarily involves a different concept.  Rather, it seems that
concepts are a loose connection of rules, which may or may not come into
play in any particular instance of the concept.

If this is the case, it no longer makes sense to claim that one begins
with a concept and then applies a name to it.  Nor is it the case that
one begins with instances of the name and from them builds up the
definition, or set of rules, of the concept.  Instead, one learns the
concept and the name by trying out each in different situations till one
knows the concept, that is, one can successfully use the concept in
novel situations.  The child learning the word 'red' must learn both the
concept of colour as well as the particular colour that is red.
Learning the word, the child will on occasion be wrong about what is a
colour as well as which colour is red.  The child has learnt the word
'red' when the child is almost always successful in using the word.  If
this is accurate, then it makes no sense to suggest that there is a
concept out there of the colour red to which the child learns to apply
the word 'red' since what the child has learnt is the use of the word
and concept 'red'.  Furthermore, what the child has learnt is not _the_
set of rules for the concept of red but rather the ability to apply
rules of the concept of red.  This ability will include discerning when
certain rules do or do not apply as well as how to incorporate new rules
and discard others.  In summary, empirical 'variations' to the practice
of giving reasons are integral to the concept or practice of giving
reasons itself since without those 'variations' there could be no
concept or practice.


Sincerely,

Phil Enns
Toronto, ON


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