Mike Geary wrote: "My position is, I think, that something is a fact only because we interpret it as a fact." The problem here is that it isn't at all clear what Mike means by interpreting. We interpret a look, a piece of music, a sentence in another language, etc. In each case, one could substitute one interpretation with another. But imagine someone who claimed that a particular interpretation of a sonnet was a fact. What sense could one make of that claim? One could sensibly claim that a particular interpretation was better than another, and one might even resort to facts in order to justify such a claim. But wouldn't it be odd to claim that in a sonnet, it was a fact that Shakespeare was referring to a male lover? Wouldn't one mean by this that no other interpretations could reasonably apply? It is a fact that water boils at 100 degrees Celsius at sea level and it is a fact that Shakespeare is writing to his male lover. But wouldn't the fact that one could reasonably interpret the sonnet otherwise suggest that to talk of an interpretation being a fact is in some way nonsensical? What would it look like to object that water does not boil under these conditions and that Shakespeare was not writing to this individual? Aren't these two different kinds of objections? And aren't they different because in the first case one is dealing with facts and in the second with interpretations? One can substitute interpretations but one can't substitute facts. Either Nietzsche did or did not write what Mike says he wrote. If Nietzsche wrote what Mike says he wrote, whether Nietzsche means what Mike takes him to mean is open to interpretation. Sincerely, Phil Enns Toronto, ON p.s. For whatever it is worth, I think that Mike is mis-reading Nietzsche. ------------------------------------------------------------------ To change your Lit-Ideas settings (subscribe/unsub, vacation on/off, digest on/off), visit www.andreas.com/faq-lit-ideas.html