(4) "North Africa became another theater of Iranian activity. Tehran took advantage of Saddam Hussein's defeat in the Gulf War to tighten its military and political ties to one of Baghdad's principal allies: Sudan. In December 1991 meetings with his Sudanese counterpart, Hassan al-Bashit, Iranian President Rafsanjani committed the Pasdaran to hosting a range of violent Islamist groups at camps located in the North African state. The two countries also hammered out a deal under which Sudan would train a 'nucleus for Islamic action in Europe' at a specific terror training camp outside Khartoum. In the years that followed, Sudan became a haven and training center for various Iran-linked terrorist outfits, including the Abu Nidal Organization, the Algerian Armed Islamic Group (GIA) and Egypt's Gama'a Islamiyya. "A similar effort took place in Algeria, where Iranian financing helped propel the radical Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) to a sweeping victory in preliminary parliamentary elections in 1991 - a development that led to a hostile regime takeover by the country's military just a month later. That Iran had a hand in Algeria's turmoil is an understatement; not only did the Revolutionary Guards take an active role in the country's resulting civil war, they are even suspected of assassinating the country's interim president, Mohammed Boudiaf, in June 1992. "In Egypt, Iranian support for two Sunni terrorist groups, the Islamic Jihad and Gama'a Islamiyyai, underwrote a wave of terror against the regime of President Hosni Mubarak in the early 1990s. Iran's activism led Mubarak, in a 1993 interview with Time magazine, to charge that the Islamic Republic was attempting to institute regime change in Cairo. 'The Iranians have said that if they could change the Egyptian regime, they would control the whole area,' he explained. Iran didn't succeed, but it was not for a lack of trying; Iranian elements were subsequently implicated in the June 1995 assassination attempt on Mubarak while the Egyptian President was visiting Ethiopia. (5) Tehran's destabilizing influence also extended further south. In 1994, meeting with Tanzanian premier John Malecela, Rafsanjani made clear that his government was committed to helping eradicate 'traces of colonialism and underdevelopment' in Africa. Rafsanjani was as good as his word. In the fall of 1996, he launched a six-country diplomatic tour, visiting South Africa, Zimbabwe, Tanzania, Sudan, Uganda, and Kenya over the span of two weeks to further a radical agenda aimed at convincing the continent's Muslim population to embrace the principles of the Islamic Revolution. As part of this diplomatic offensive, Iranian intelligence officials succeeded in hammering out a cooperation pact with the radical Capetown-based People Against Gangsterism and Drugs (PAGAD), making if the 'eyes and ears' of the Iranian regime in Africa in exchange for money, training, and arms. In the wake of the deal, elements of Iranian intelligence and the Pasdaran wasted no time organizing terrorist training and mobilization for a number of the indigenous Islamic movements through a variety of front groups, and helping Iranian-sponsored and supported organizations such as Hamas and Hezbollah broaden their local influence." (6) Iran's most insidious role, however, was in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Tehran's direct involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian arena, although minimal during the mid- to late 1980s, expanded in earnest following the Gulf War. "In 1991, it hosted a major international conference to generate solidarity for the Palestinian cause in a radical counterpoint to the Madrid Peace Conference. In its aftermath, Iran institutionalized its relationship with two terror groups. The first, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), had become a wholly owned subsidiary of the Islamic Republic in the Palestinian territories during the first Palestinian intifada in the late 1980s - similar in both structure and ideology to Tehran's principal proxy, Hezbollah. The second, the Palestinian Hamas organization, had received early pledges of funding and training - promise that were codified in late 1992 under a formal agreement establishing Iranian financial and political funding for the group. These relationships were only strengthened in the years that followed The Islamic Republic became the principal financier of the PIJ, funneling some $2 million annually to the group to bankroll its anti-Israeli activities. Iran also made good on its pledges of financial support to Hamas, and began picking up some 10 percent of the group's total operational budget. It also encouraged both terror outfits to develop a symbiosis with Hezbollah, helping to forge transnational partnerships that allowed them to establish military ties with and receive military training from - the Lebanese terrorist powerhouse." Lawrence