A.A. If there was any substance to it, would the Rabid Right not be exploiting it? What's missing here? EY: You are missing the fact that it actually happened. Perhaps you will find this account more credible, since it comes from an academic arms control group. You can read the full account to discover how Motorola/Clinton pushed the MIRV sale through the Commerce Department to bypass Defense Department and national security objections. People think we only helped arm Saddam. We help arm almost all of our potential foes. http://www.wisconsinproject.org/pubs/testimonies/2002/china-us-comm.htm Testimony of Gary Milhollin Professor Emeritus, University of Wisconsin Law School and Director, Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control Before the U.S.-China Security Review Commission January 17, 2002 I am pleased to appear today before the U.S.-China Security Review Commission. The Commission has asked me to comment on China's efforts to obtain sensitive technology from the United States, and on the effectiveness of export controls to protect U.S. national security. I would like to begin with a few remarks about China's current and projected strategic posture. In a report released earlier this month, the CIA observed that China has a long-running modernization program to develop mobile, solid-propellant ICBMs and that the intelligence community projects that by 2015, most of China's strategic missile force will be mobile. The CIA also pointed out that China has had the ability to develop and deploy a multiple reentry vehicle system for many years, including a MIRV system. The CIA assessed that China could develop a multiple reentry vehicle system for its CSS-4 ICBM in a few years, although its pursuit of a multiple RV capability for its mobile ICBMs and SLBMs would encounter significant technical hurdles and would be very costly. The intelligence community projects that the overall size of China's strategic ballistic missile forces, over the next 15 years, will range from about 75 to 100 warheads deployed primarily against the United States. U.S. intelligence predicts that China will have about two dozen shorter range DF-31 and CSS-3 ICBMs that could reach parts of the United States, and an SRBM force of several hundred missiles by 2005. Imports of high technology from the United States, such as high-performance computers, will undoubtedly help China reach these strategic goals. I would like to direct the Commission's attention to a report on sensitive - that is, strategically important - U.S. exports to China that my organization published in April 1999. The report covered the period from 1988 to 1998. The report found that the U.S. Commerce Department approved more than $15 billion worth of strategically sensitive U.S. exports to the People's Republic of China. The exports included equipment that can be used to design nuclear weapons, machine nuclear weapon components, improve missile designs and build missile components. Some of this "dual-use" equipment went directly to China's leading nuclear, missile and military sites - the main vertebrae in China's strategic backbone. And several of these Chinese buyers later supplied nuclear, missile and military equipment to Iran and Pakistan. It seems clear that China received American exports of great military and strategic value with the blessing of the U.S. government. Consider the following: The China National Nuclear Corporation was allowed to buy equipment useful for uranium prospecting. China National Nuclear then helped Iran prospect for uranium that U.S. intelligence believes will be used to make nuclear weapons. The China Precision Machinery Import-Export Corporation was allowed to buy equipment useful for building China's new C-801 and C-802 anti-ship cruise missiles. China Precision then exported the missiles to Iran where, according to the U.S. naval commander in the Persian Gulf, they threaten U.S. ships and personnel. The Chinese Academy of Sciences was allowed to receive equipment to process data from a nuclear fusion research reactor. The Academy then exported the reactor to Iran, where it is used for training scientists believed to be working on nuclear weapons. American equipment was also approved for the National University of Defense Technology, which helps the People's Liberation Army design advanced weapons, for the University of Electronic Science and Technology, which helps develop stealth aircraft and advanced military radar, for the Beijing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, which helps develop missiles and specializes in guidance, navigation, and flight dynamics. The licensing records do not reveal whether all the items approved were actually shipped, but it is safe to assume that virtually all of them were, otherwise it would not have been appropriate to apply for a license. ------------------------------------------------------------------ To change your Lit-Ideas settings (subscribe/unsub, vacation on/off, digest on/off), visit www.andreas.com/faq-lit-ideas.html