It seems to me that the people who voted for "dictatorship" would in effect be voting for authoritarian government. The concept of dictatorship entails ruling without the consent of the people, which means that the people cannot logically give consent to being ruled without their consent. Similarly, I can empower another person to act on my behalf (e.g. Power of Attorney) but I cannot logically agree to something being done against my will. It is, of course, possible to imagine such a vote taking place, but the result would not be what was intended, i.e. the elected "dictator" would in fact not, at that point in time, be a dictator. He would only become a dictator when and if the consent ceased to exist. O.K. --- On Sun, 12/5/10, Donal McEvoy <donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: From: Donal McEvoy <donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx> Subject: [lit-ideas] Re: Giving Thanksgiving/Adorno and TAP To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx Date: Sunday, December 5, 2010, 6:53 PM > Quoting Omar Kusturica <omarkusto@xxxxxxxxx>: > > > Is it even possible to "vote for dictatorship" ? Many years ago, I wrote to Popper giving an overlong argument to show that P's 'paradox of democracy' is not a logical paradox. By implication, I suggested, it is logically possible to "vote for dictatorship". He politely described my argument as "perhaps a little too sophisticated" -others might have described it as over-involved. As to whether his 'paradox of democracy' is a logical paradox, Popper answered that his paradox of democracy was essentially "a practical affair". Athough Hitler did not attain 50% of the vote, it was possible that he could have attained 50% of the vote - it is possible for a democracy to commit suicide. There are, he added parenthetically, "still some suicidal tendencies in Germany". I think his reply is correct: just as it is possible to commit suicide, it is possible to vote for dictatorship. The 'paradox of democracy' is not a logical paradox but a practical affair. Voting for a dictatorship is not a contradiction in terms either: it is not a contradiction to take an action that removes the further power to take that action. Suicide is an example. So is the action of a body that votes to permanently dissolve itself or hand its powers over to another body. So is making a gift to another. But should a democrat ever vote 'suicidally' - for a dictatorship? Never, in Popper's view, because such an action is in conflict with democratic principles. It is in this "practical" sense that such a suicidal action is a paradox - though it is not a paradox or contradiction in terms in any strict logical sense. There is a deeper issue here. Popper is against the widespread 'majoritarian' theory of democracy and wishes to replace it with a theory of democracy that sees democracy not as 'majority rules' but as the ability to vote out the government. It is the majoritarian or 'majority rules' theory of democracy that gives rise to the paradox: for, in a state where over 50% have voted for dictatorship, a 'majoritarian' democrat would seem bound by their theory of democracy to accept the dictatorship. For those democrats who see democracy as the ability to vote out the government, their theory of democracy does not require them to accept the dictatorship. In fact, just as bloodshed is justified to overthrow a dictatorship, it is seemingly justified on Popper's view to resist or overthrow a dictatorship* - even one elected by the majority. If this seems 'paradoxical', it is only paradoxical given a 'majority rules' theory of democracy. It is unparadoxical and indeed self-consistent within a theory of democracy that sees it as constituted by the ability to get rid of the government without bloodshed but where violence is justified in defence of this. That democracy is based on 'revocable consent', as opposed to 'irrevocable consent', is linked to the fallibilism. Just as fallibilism in the field of knowledge leads us to search out possible errors in our theories in order to correct them, in the field of politics it leads us not to commit irrevocacbly to what may be mistaken as we therefore diminish our ability to correct our mistakes. --- On Sun, 5/12/10, Walter C. Okshevsky <wokshevs@xxxxxx> wrote: > > More like a self-referential paradox. Not in a strictly logical sense. Again it is no more a self-referential paradox than suicide [which might be described as depending on life so as to end life]. Donal *Library took back volume 1 of OS, so cannot now check this ------------------------------------------------------------------ To change your Lit-Ideas settings (subscribe/unsub, vacation on/off, digest on/off), visit www.andreas.com/faq-lit-ideas.html