Nicht so wahr. The question S addresses is whether piety is a genuine virtue because the gods love piety or whether the gods love piety because it is a genuine virtue regardless of who loves it (inc. the gods, of course). If the latter, then we humans are alone, terribly alone, in determining what is right, moral, just and true. The only epistemic and moral resources available to us, in that case, come to be encapsulated in the notion of "giving an account." Based on this idea that only reasons can set us free, we got the ideas of rationality, democracy, deontological morality, "education" in differentiation from socialization and indoctrination, and, in Canda, the Charter of Rights and Freedoms (the notwithstanding clause notwithstanding, of course.) But I must return to a time-sensitive paper that is still going nowhere big time. Looking forward to a close reading of the dialogue, but not sure I can participate very much in decoding its twists and turns. Friedlander is a fine secondary source to read, btw. Walter C. Okshevsky MUN Quoting Eric Yost <eyost1132@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>: > <We might do a slow reading of the Euthyphro. > > That's where Socrates demolishes the notion that "good" is > fundamentally based in God (or the gods), nicht wahr? > > ------------------------------------------------------------------ > To change your Lit-Ideas settings (subscribe/unsub, vacation on/off, > digest on/off), visit www.andreas.com/faq-lit-ideas.html > ------------------------------------------------------------------ To change your Lit-Ideas settings (subscribe/unsub, vacation on/off, digest on/off), visit www.andreas.com/faq-lit-ideas.html