Thank you, Robert. The account I found by Googling was of the Greek concept, but not specifically about Aristotle. My problem with arete's being a mean stemmed from the (false) definition I found. >>Virtue is the intermediate condition >> between excess and > >deficiency with respect to a person's feelings and >> actions. I think I still have a problem with this but can't think it through at the moment! Judy Evans, Cardiff --- Robert Paul <robert.paul@xxxxxxxx> wrote: > Judy wrote: > > > Robert, I thought arete was the fulfilment of > one's > > capabilities (I take that from Googling it > yesterday, > > also from discussions some while ago). > > This sounds a bit like Kant's inunction to maximize > one's talents. A > 'virtue' in Aristotle's sense is an 'excellence,' in > a person, such that > by having it she's a better person (although of > course Aristotle would > have used a different pronoun). It's what makes a > thing good of kind; in > order to know that, one has to know what a good > thing of that kind would > be. Nietzsche derided the Christian virtues > (meekness, humility, etc.) > because they seemed to diminish, rather than lead to > human excellence. > > > Yes -- I'm finding it difficult to describe the > > extremes between which arete lies unless it is, > > simply, a mean between any (and all) extremes. > > http://www.interlog.com/~girbe/ethics2.html > > Translators: TI = Terrence Irwin; DR = David Ross; > JT = J. A. T. Thompson > > [TI] Virtue is concerned with feelings and actions, > in which excess and > deficiency are in error and incur blame, while the > intermediate > condition is correct and wins praise, which are both > proper features of > virtue. Virtue, then, is a mean, in so far as it > aims at what is > intermediate. Virtue is the intermediate condition > between excess and > deficiency with respect to a person's feelings and > actions. > > [DR, TI] Excess and defect are characteristic of > vice, and the mean of > virtue; 'For men are good but in one way, but bad in > many.' Virtue, > then, is a state of character concerned with choice, > lying in the mean > which is defined by reference to reason. It is a > mean between two vices, > one of excess and one of deficiency; and again, it > is a mean because the > vices respectively fall short or exceed what is > right in both passions > and actions, while virtue both finds and chooses > that which is > intermediate. Hence, as far as its substance and the > account stating its > essence are concerned, virtue is a mean; but as far > as the best > condition and the good result are concerned, it is > an extremity. A > person with a virtuous character uses his reason to > choose the mean > between the vices of the extremes, i.e. excess and > deficiency, in his > desires and his actions. And although the practice > of virtue calls for > choosing the intermediate, the results so attained > are by no means > average but are exceptionally good. > > [JT] But not every action or feeling admits of a > mean; because some have > names that directly connote depravity, such as > malice, shamelessness and > envy, and among actions adultery, theft and murder. > All these, and more > like them, are so called as being evil in > themselves; it is not the > excess or deficiency of them that is evil. In their > case, then, it is > impossible to act rightly; one is always wrong. > > [An easy-to-follow summary appears in the right hand > column from the > translations.] > > I'm talking about 'Aristotelian' aretai, in response > to Judy, not about > Platonic aretai, or aretai in general, whatever that > might mean. > ___________________________________________________________ Yahoo! Messenger - NEW crystal clear PC to PC calling worldwide with voicemail http://uk.messenger.yahoo.com ------------------------------------------------------------------ To change your Lit-Ideas settings (subscribe/unsub, vacation on/off, digest on/off), visit www.andreas.com/faq-lit-ideas.html