Walter O. wrote:
"I believe that philosophy is a discipline in (of the) pursuit of
transcendental truth - be such truth of any "service" to anyone or be
it of any relevance to one's own or others' personal lives. If we
don't psychologize the arguments of scientists, why do it to
philosophers?"
While I agree that philosophy is a discipline, I am much less
confident than Walter as to its end. In part, my lack of confidence
follows from the sectarian nature of the discipline. Philosophers are
often identified as Aristotelian, Kantian, in the analytic or
continental traditions, etc. Searle launched a very public attack on
Derrida's appointment to Yale(?), claiming that Derrida was not a
philosopher because Derrida didn't do the sorts of things philosophers
are supposed to do. I always thought that, apart from certain
self-indulgences, Derrida was doing rather straightforward Kantian
transcendentalism. Perhaps Searle thought that Derrida was pursuing a
different end? Not analytic enough? While I know philosophy when I
see it, and I know that many activities are not philosophical, I think
there is a great deal of grey area, which would lead me to wonder how
Searle could be so confident. This, in turn, leads me to wonder
whether this opposition to Derrida had less to do with defending the
integrity of the philosophical discipline, and more to do with some
psychologizing, some opposition to the intentions and desires imputed
to Derrida.
Which brings me to the arguments of scientists. I am blissfully
ignorant of much of the goings on in the scientific world. From the
little I do know, there certainly are occasions where the arguments of
scientists are psychologized. I remember reading an article on Dyson
and being struck by the nature of the disagreements he had with other
scientists. I suppose, though, that it would be helpful at this point
to note Robert's comment that whatever philosophy is, it isn't the
sort of discipline that can have its pursuits settled by empirical
results. And to a large extent, scientific arguments can be settled
by empirical results, making psychologizing less relevant.
But maybe psychologizing has some place in the discipline of
philosophy? To be clear, I think a philosopher's work needs to stand
on its own, apart from the historical context of its production, but I
still can't shake the feeling that the intentions and desires of
philosophers have some relevance for understanding their work. Should
Heidegger's 'Nazi speeches' have some relevance for understanding what
Heidegger means when he stresses the importance of listening to
language and truth? Should Kant's very negative feelings on Pietism
have any relevance for interpreting Kant's understanding of religion?
Does it matter that Kant was a Prussian for understanding the
absoluteness of his ethics? I would answer 'no' to these, but not
with great enthusiasm, since I still wonder whether, in some way,
these facts about the philosopher are important for understanding what
they wrote.
Sincerely,
Phil Enns
Yogyakarta, Indonesia
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