http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/HE10Ad01.html China's 'two-faced' nuclear stance By Todd Crowell HUA HIN, Thailand - Are the Chinese playing a double game on the issue of North Korean nuclear disarmament? Syndicated columnist Tom Plate evidently thinks so. In his latest column he suggests darkly a "secret pro-nuclear understanding between Beijing and Pyongyang". In other words, Beijing tells the world and Washington that it favors a Korean Peninsula free of nuclear weapons, while quietly telling the North Koreans to resist any overtures from the other participants in the six-party talks to dismantle its nuclear program. The column is filled with heavy, loaded words, such as "big lie", "two-faced", "Machiavellian", "bad faith", "secret double-dealer" and so on, but it is light on specifics. He cites a "nasty rumor" about China playing a double game in the aftermath of Chinese President Hu Jintao's recent visit to Washington and a sense that Hu's response on the matter of a nuclear-free Korea was "far less emphatic than Bush's". He didn't elaborate on the rumor. I have always had a lot of respect for Plate's work, and he is certainly no knee-jerk China-basher, so you have to wonder just what set him off. Surely it couldn't have been pronouncements of the summit. How can anyone take seriously anything that came out of that misbegotten meeting? If people think China is playing a double game, it may be because they have set themselves up for disillusionment by becoming victims of their own rhetoric about how important China is to reaching a resolution of the Korean nuclear issue. It has often been said that China could bring Pyongyang around to an agreement any time it chose to do so by simply withdrawing aid and trade. This is undoubtedly true, but Beijing has said more than once, openly and up front, that it will not do this. Nothing two-faced about it. The Chinese are not particularly worried whether North Korea has an atomic bomb. They don't believe Pyongyang would be stupid enough to drop one on them. Historically, China has not been concerned about nuclear non-proliferation. Indeed, it is a recovering proliferator herself. The North Korean nuclear program concerns China because it concerns the United States. The Chinese worry that it might trigger a US attack on North Korea, something they obviously don't want, even as the threat of its actually happening recedes. China's main interest in hosting the six-party talks is to be a good world citizen, reap the prestige that comes in helping broker any diplomatic breakthroughs and garner any rewards that might come its way. Beyond that it is indifferent to whether North Korea has a bomb. The South Koreans, too, are not overly worried about a North Korean bomb. Deep down they don't believe that their Korean brothers would ever drop one on them. Seoul is currently obsessed with reconciliation with Pyongyang and will not countenance anything that impedes that goal. This posture might change if the conservative opposition wins the South Korean presidency in late 2007, but it is doubtful a new president would do much to alter the situation except possibly to put more emphasis on human rights. The "Sunshine Policy" initiated by former president Kim Dae-jung is too popular to be abandoned no matter who is president. One might think that of the six parties to the negotiations, Japan would take the strongest stand, having the most to fear. After all, the North Koreans have fired ballistic missiles in their direction in the past. But I was in Japan a year ago in February when North Korea formally declared itself to be a nuclear-weapons state, and the reaction in Japan was underwhelming, to say the least. The headline in the Japan Times read: "Announcement might complicate abduction issue", which pretty much shows where Tokyo's priorities lie - an accounting for its nationals abducted by Pyongyang. Of course, the reaction might have been entirely different if the North Koreans had proved their assertion beyond a doubt by actually exploding an atomic bomb. There is a school of thought that believes - or wishes to believe - that North Korea does not have a bomb because it has not mastered all the elements of producing a workable weapon. Plutonium bombs are tricky. Supposedly the US is the one participant most committed to ending North Korea's nuclear-weapons program. But the ink was no sooner dry on the "breakthrough" September 19 agreement at the last session of the six-party talks than Washington raised the extraneous issue of Pyongyang's counterfeiting US currency. This may be a legitimate beef on the part of Washington, but how can a few million fake US$100 notes weigh against the prospect of a mushroom cloud somewhere in the United States? One has to wonder what kind of game Washington is playing. If this is some kind of gambit in the complicated game to bring Pyongyang to the negotiating table, it is too Machiavellian - to use Plate's words - for me to understand. In this long, weary story, the US has dragged out delivery of the aid and recognition it promised when North Korea agreed to freeze its nuclear-weapons program in 1994. For its part, Pyongyang violated the spirit by experimenting with uranium enrichment. You don't have to look to China alone to find plenty of bad faith. Todd Crowell is an Asia Times Online correspondent based in Thailand. (Copyright 2006 Asia Times Online Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact us about sales, syndication and republishing .) __________________________________________________ Do You Yahoo!? Tired of spam? Yahoo! Mail has the best spam protection around http://mail.yahoo.com ------------------------------------------------------------------ To change your Lit-Ideas settings (subscribe/unsub, vacation on/off, digest on/off), visit www.andreas.com/faq-lit-ideas.html