[lit-ideas] Re: Can, logically, there be any such thing as a "performative contradiction"?

It seems to me that here there is a confusion between 'performative 
contradiction' in the Kantian sense and the illocutionary force of 
performatives as used by J.L. Austin. The first seems to be the case where the 
fact the utterance itself is made constitutes evidence that contradicts the 
propositional content of the utterance, e.g. "I cannot speak any English." Here 
the fact that I am able to say this at all contradicts the content of what I am 
saying. I'm not sure that "all truth is relative" is the same kind of 
contradiction as it's not my ability to say this or the act of saying it that 
contradicts the proposition but the content of the proposition itself appears 
to be self-contradictory on logical grounds.
 
Performative utterances in Austin's sense, such as "I now pronounce you man and 
wife" are not supposed to have a truth value so it would not be possible to 
speak of contradiction here. They might fail to have the appropriate 
illocutionary force if the suitable conditions for making the performative 
utterance are not. met, e.g. I am not a minister, either a bride or a groom is 
already married etc. This is at least true of Austin's account of 
performatives, though others like Searle may have had different views.
 
O.K.
 
 
--- On Sat, 5/30/09, Donal McEvoy <donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:


From: Donal McEvoy <donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx>
Subject: [lit-ideas] Re: Can, logically, there be any such thing as a 
"performative contradiction"?
To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
Date: Saturday, May 30, 2009, 10:22 PM





--- On Sat, 30/5/09, Walter C. Okshevsky <wokshevs@xxxxxx> wrote:

> A
> performative
> contradiction is a contradiction not between 2 propositions
> as in a logical
> contradiction but rather between (the semantic content of)
> a proposition and
> the act of asserting it. Examples: 
> 
> 1. "All truth is relative." 
> 
> 2. "I speak no English."
> 
> 3. N is a universalizable norm (judgement) but the views of
> Russians from
> Volgograd are not included in the discourse. 

1. and 2. are logically different imo. 

"2." would, arguably, fit the criterion "a contradiction.....between (the 
semantic content of) a proposition and the act of asserting it". I say arguably 
to acknowledge some possible quibbles: someone who is unable to speak might 
write [and thereby assert it through an act] "I speak no English" without 
contradiction. But a variant of 2. like "I am unable to express or assert 
anything in English" would doubtless be some kind of contradiction.

"1." is different. One may be re-written as "All truth is relative (including 
the 'truth' of this claim)." This claim may be self-defeating as a truth-claim, 
since it denies its own absolute truth, but it is more problematic to conclude 
that it is any kind of contradiction. 

For example, there is no obvious contradiction between its semantic content and 
the act of asserting it in the way there is with "2": "1" can, unlike "2", be 
asserted without obviously disproving itself. Or without giving grounds for its 
falsity - instead it gives grounds for its truth being at best relative. If we 
assume that any claim to only relative truth is impermissible, then we might 
say its claim to offer only relative truth must be judged false; - but this 
assumption is question-begging: it assumes rather than proves that there is no 
such thing as relative truth, and thus does not clearly show the contrary 
assumption involves some form of contradiction. 

But even if we make the assumption that the view that "all claims are at best 
only true relatively speaking" is a contradiction, the contradiction is not 
between the semantic content and the act of asserting but between the semantic 
content and its logical implications. On this view "1" is perhaps a 
contradiction but not for reasons to do with it being a "performative". On the 
view that it is not a logical contradiction to assert that the all claims are 
only relatively true, "1" is not a logically self-contradictory claim - though 
it is somewhat self-defeating.

This is aside from the point that "1" might be re-written as "All claims (with 
the exception of this one) are only true relatively". In this form "1" is even 
more obviously free of self-contradiction.

CB's words were/are not a performative contradiction, at least not in the exact 
same sense that "2" may be one. "2" is one in a way similar to "This statement 
contains only three words" may be one. CB's injunction to "Stop being so 
%"$"%"% rude" is, logically, very different: for one, it is a moral injunction 
rather than a statement of fact; for another, sometimes an emphasiser like 
&%%"^&&" might be thought justified and not rude.

Anyway. It's good to talk. Sometimes.

Donal





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