[lit-ideas] Re: Agnotology

from distant memories and half baked insights, it &may& follow
if J&T&B are taken to be essentially a matter of a conscious state of believing, if os one may be willing to claim that being conscious of a belief is to know that one knows (this is dave rosenthal view, e.g.) 

in sum
I know [that p]
requires
that
p is true
I possess a justification of the belief [that p]
I believe[that p]
coupled with a HOT theory of consciousness, I get the required thorem, or allegedlet Hintikka's theorem
On Tue, 19 Apr 2011, Donal McEvoy wrote: 




--- On Tue, 19/4/11, Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx <Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx> wrote:


Indeed, Hintikka, in his "Logic of Knowledge" proposes
to  call "Socrates"
-- 'the agnotological agent'.

For Hintikka, it is a  theorem:

If S knows that p, S knows that he knows that  p.


Speaking off the cuff, if this is what Hintikka says, it seems wrong to me: either the 
"knows" is a redundancy (with no secondary meaning) or it is a meta-knowing - a 
higher level knowing that pertains to some lower level knowledge about p.

It does not obviously follow, even within a subjectivist theory like 'epistemic 
logic', that because 'I know p' I am further aware of having knowledge that 'I 
know p' beyond the mere fact of having a mental state that might be described 
as 'I know p'. There is an infinite regress looming otherwise: for surely then 
if 'I know p' entails 'I know that I know p' it also entails 'I know that I 
know that I know p' etc.; and yet 'I know p' is surely a finite mental state 
and not one that spins off into infinity.

What might be argued is that I cannot claim both that 'I know p' and that 'I 
know that I do not know p'. But this would not mean that 'I know p' entails 
some further knowing-state only that it rules out as a further knowing-state 
one that it is inconsistent with it. In fact, this is arguably true if we 
substitute 'believe' for 'know': I cannot at the same time both 'believe p' and 
'believe that I do not believe p'.

Where does this get us though?

Btw, Hintikka is also a defender of inductive logic isn't he? Also btw, for Popper 
"epistemic logic" is a subjectivist blunder in the theory of knowledge: largely 
irrelevant and point-missing. Btw, so is 'inductive logic' mostly.

Donal
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