[lit-ideas] According to Wittgenstein elem.props are "sayable"

According to Wittgenstein elementary propositions are "sayable," this word
being used (by Robert Paul and Donal McEvoy) in a way I dispute, but which
does not render the discussion useless. That is, I have a problem with
saying that propositions are sayable or unsayable (read my lips--I said it
didn't I--every sort of nonsense can be said--I could even say
"ü09jßw9iubnmurgm9apmrujrijüwjroöiytj fuaw" if I had a mind to); what
Wittgenstein says is that "that of which we cannot speak, of that we should
remain silent: "that," then, is unsayable, not the infelicitous utterance
that dares to say "that."

But if we grant that Robert and Donal both understand Wittgenstein to be
talking about propositions that are sayable or not sayable, their difference
seems clear:

Robert: Witt says many of his propositions (like "God does not reveal
himself in the world" are not sayable.
Nonetheless, Witt says "the propositions of natural science" are sayable
("can be said").
Plus, Witt says elementary propositions are sayable.

In a recent response to me, Donal quotes Wittgenstein:

'The simplest kind of proposition, an elementary proposition, asserts
> the existence of a state of affairs.' [4.21]

Donal, at least here do you deny that Wittgenstein thinks and wants to say
that elem.props are sayable? An elem.prop, in his mind, "asserts the
existence of a state of affairs." If he thought it was unsayable he would
have said it. (In my corrective definition of unsayable above I noted that
it is really the "existence of a state of affairs" that is sayable or
unsayable, not the proposition asserting it, but that does not change the
fact that Wittgenstein, in a sense, legitimizes some ways of speaking [about
the world].)

If Donal is denying Wittgenstein's view, he can propose his own reasons for
thinking that (I think his view would be) no propositions are sayable. But I
thought he had a theory about Wittgenstein's views?

So, Donal, do you deny that 4.21 says that one kind of proposition at least
is "sayable" in your terms, to wit the elem.props?

But even the "natural science props"--"There are 180° total in the interior
angles of a triangle--do you maintain that they are unsayable in your terms
or in Wittgenstein's terms or per se?

Richard Henninge
University of Mainz

Some Thoughts on Mr. McEvoy's Recent Paper. (Donal is in square brackets; I
am
> unbounded.)
>
> [... among the things that cannot be said, only shown, are the
propositions of
> TLP itself - 6.54 "..anyone who understands [my propositions] eventually
> recognises them as nonsensical".]
>
 Nevertheless, 'my propositions'
> refers to propositions such as e.g. 6.432 'How things are in the world is
a
> matter of complete indifference for what is higher. God does not reveal
himself
> in the world.' . . .  The propositions which
> 'can be said,' viz., 'the propositions of natural science,' and the
'factual'
> propositions of ordinary language ('The cat is on the mat') are neither
> dispensable nor nonsensical, and it does not follow that because 'my
> propositions' in the foregoing sense are (should be?) unsayable, that
atomic
> propositions, the ultimate residue of the 'analysis' of propositions are
> unsayable: 'The simplest kind of proposition, an elementary proposition,
asserts
> the existence of a state of affairs.' [4.21]
>

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