[geocentrism] Philosophy of Science
- From: Bernie Brauer <bbrauer777@xxxxxxxxx>
- To: geocentrism@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Thu, 5 Apr 2007 09:02:35 -0700 (PDT)
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophy_of_science
Falsifiability
Another way to distinguish science from pseudoscience (e.g. astronomy from
astrology), first formally discussed by Karl Popper in 1919-20 and reformulated
by him in the 1960s, is falsifiability. This principle states that in order to
be useful (or even scientific at all), a scientific statement ('fact', theory,
'law', principle, etc) must be falsifiable, that is, able to be tested and
proven wrong.
Popper described falsifiability using the following observations, paraphrased
from a 1963 essay on "Conjectures and Refutations":
It is easy to confirm or verify nearly every theory ? if we look for
confirmations.
Confirmations are significant only if they are the result of risky
predictions; that is, if, unenlightened by the theory, we should have expected
an event which was incompatible with the theory ? an event which would have
refuted the theory.
"Good" scientific theories include prohibitions which forbid certain things
to happen. The more a theory forbids, the better it is.
A theory which is not refutable by any conceivable event is non-scientific.
Irrefutability is not a virtue of a theory.
Every genuine test of a theory is an attempt to falsify or refute it.
Theories that take greater "risks" are more testable, more exposed to
refutation.
Confirming or corroborating evidence is only significant when it is the
result of a genuine test of the theory; "genuine" in this case means that it
comes out of a serious but unsuccessful attempt to falsify the theory.
Some genuinely testable theories, when found to be false, are still upheld
by their advocates ? for example by introducing ad hoc some auxiliary
assumption, or by reinterpreting the theory ad hoc in such a way that it
escapes refutation. Such a procedure is always possible, but it rescues the
theory from refutation only at the price of destroying, or at least lowering,
its scientific status.
These observations are part of Popper's case for defending the idea that what
makes a theory scientific is its falsifiability, or refutability. However,
Popper's ideas have been heavily criticized by many philosophers, especially on
the grounds that they do not adequately describe scientific activity. For
instance, very few scientific theories specifically forbid events from
happening, which are not open to ad-hoc adjustments (3 above). Similarly, taken
in a strict sense, no theory is refutable on the basis of an event (at least
not without a guiding set of background theories and ad-hoc restrictions).
Nevertheless, Popper's notion of falisiability remains a cornerstone of the
personal philosophy of many working scientists, e.g. Stephen Hawking.
Coherentism Induction and falsification both attempt to justify scientific
statements by reference to other specific scientific statements. Both must
avoid the problem of the criterion, in which any justification must in turn be
justified, resulting in an infinite regress. The regress argument has been used
to justify one way out of the infinite regress, foundationalism.
Foundationalism claims that there are some basic statements that do not require
justification. Both induction and falsification are forms of foundationalism in
that they rely on basic statements that derive directly from observations.
The way in which basic statements are derived from observation complicates
the problem. Observation is a cognitive act; that is, it relies on our existing
understanding, our set of beliefs. An observation of a transit of Venus
requires a huge range of auxiliary beliefs, such as those that describe the
optics of telescopes, the mechanics of the telescope mount, and an
understanding of celestial mechanics. At first sight, the observation does not
appear to be 'basic'.
Coherentism offers an alternative by claiming that statements can be
justified by their being a part of a coherent system. In the case of science,
the system is usually taken to be the complete set of beliefs of an individual
or of the community of scientists. W. V. Quine argued for a Coherentist
approach to science. An observation of a transit of Venus is justified by its
being coherent with our beliefs about optics, telescope mounts and celestial
mechanics. Where this observation is at odds with one of these auxiliary
beliefs, an adjustment in the system will be required to remove the
contradiction.
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