[ExchangeList] Re: I NEED TO GRIPE!

  • From: "John T \(Lists\)" <johnlist@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
  • To: <exchangelist@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
  • Date: Tue, 24 Oct 2006 09:44:48 -0700

FYI, that should have been 270 some-ought RBLs.

 

John T

eServices For You

 

"Seek, and ye shall find!"

 

-----Original Message-----
From: exchangelist-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
[mailto:exchangelist-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx] On Behalf Of John T (Lists)
Sent: Monday, October 23, 2006 2:13 PM
To: exchangelist@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
Subject: [ExchangeList] Re: I NEED TO GRIPE!

 

Very true, that is why of the 70 some-ought RBLs out there, only about 2
dozen are used by those of use who know how to use them, in a weighted
anti-spam configuration.

 

John T

eServices For You

 

"Seek, and ye shall find!"

 

-----Original Message-----
From: exchangelist-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
[mailto:exchangelist-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx] On Behalf Of Thomas W Shinder
Sent: Monday, October 23, 2006 12:47 PM
To: exchangelist@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
Subject: [ExchangeList] Re: I NEED TO GRIPE!

 

You're right about that. When you deal with unaccountable entities with
questionable motivations and methods, it's better to avoid them all and use
more sophisticated and trustworthy methodologies to stem the spam tide. Why
put a company at risk using these "do-gooders" when you can benefit from
vendors who take responsibility for their products?

 

Thomas W Shinder, M.D.
Site: www.isaserver.org <http://www.isaserver.org/> 
Blog: http://blogs.isaserver.org/shinder/
Book: http://tinyurl.com/3xqb7
MVP -- Microsoft Firewalls (ISA)

 

 


  _____  


From: exchangelist-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
[mailto:exchangelist-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx] On Behalf Of William Holmes
Sent: Monday, October 23, 2006 12:21 PM
To: exchangelist@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
Subject: [ExchangeList] Re: I NEED TO GRIPE!

Hello,

 

This is the primary reason we do not use any external RTBL. You are
subscribing to a service that has its own policies. Every anti-spam system
has a cost benefit ratio, when that ratio drops below an acceptable ratio
its time to move on. There are more effective ways to handle spam that your
organization can have direct control over. 

 

Bill

 


  _____  


From: exchangelist-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
[mailto:exchangelist-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx] On Behalf Of Danny
Sent: Monday, October 23, 2006 12:30 PM
To: exchangelist@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
Subject: [ExchangeList] Re: I NEED TO GRIPE!

 

If you accept email for recipients that do not exist, you must pay a toll
for causing backscatter on the Internet. 

On 10/18/06, Chris Wall < Chris.Wall@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
<mailto:Chris.Wall@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> > wrote:

Any one wanting to read or chime in, please feel free!  I know all of you
are e-mail admins, and you may have some thoughts on the subject as well.

 

I am extremely disappointed with SpamCop.net - one of the few blacklist
sites that have - rather, HAD a good reputation.

Is any one else being affected by their actions of Blacklisting domains
because they follow RFC822 and send NDR's when a mail is not successfully
delivered?

 

Okay, here's the overall story - SpamCop sets up these 'HoneyPot' email
addresses (whatever@xxxxxxx).  SpamCop then sends e-mails out to many
domains (illegitimate e-mail addresses - basically acting as spammer's
themselves) and wait to see which domains send an NDR back to the 'HoneyPot'
email address.  If your domain follows RFC822 and sends the NDR, they
blacklist the IP address of the server that sends the NDR.

 

Their website ( http://www.spamcop.net/fom-serve/cache/329.html#bounces
<http://www.spamcop.net/fom-serve/cache/329.html#bounces> ) even details
their stance on the issue.  I have copied it below:

'Q: Why not allow bounces? They are required by RFC822! 
A: Originally, SpamCop made attempts to forgive misdirected bounce messages
- to reject them as evidence of spam. However, there are two factors
conspiring to force us to rescind this policy. First of course, is that
these misdirected messages *are* spam as we define it (Unsolicited Bulk
Mail). They are objectionable to recipients and can even cause denial of
service to innocent third parties. Users of our blocking service want us to
stop them.'

 

 

I understand what they are trying to accomplish - to prevent NDR's from
being sent to you when spammers 'spoof' your personal e-mail address.
However, SpamCop is punishing domains that abide by all security standards
for e-mail except for their 'rogue' approach to NDR delivery.  Total BS in
my opinion.

 

Now of course, any domain could enable LDAP authentication on incoming
e-mail and block NDR's being sent when an e-mail address is sent to a
non-existent e-mail address in your domain - BUT, even excluding RFC822
rules requiring NDR's on e-mails that are not successfully delivered, most
organizations want to keep NDR's enabled so that senders are aware if a
message is not successfully sent.   I mean, if a customer sends an e-mail to
our domain and misspells the SMTP address of one of our sales people - You
want an NDR to go back to them so hopefully they realize their mistake.

 

Spamcop.net even says to use SPF for checking the e-mail origin.  Well, I
use SPF.  But only block e-mails where the sending domain provides an SPF
record and the authentication fails.  I am not going to block emails coming
into our domain just because a sending domain may not have SPF setup for
their domain.  I mean, I cant force them to provide and SPF record, even
though it is recommended.  

 

SpamCop.net users should either stop relying on their services or either use
SpamCop.net in a 'weighted' approach for determining SPAM.

 

Any way - I had to gripe about this poor decision on SpamCop's behalf and
would like to get your opinions.

 

Regards,

 

Chris Wall - MCSE + Messaging

NAM Exchange Administrator

Chris.Wall@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

T (919) 460.3236

F (919) 468.4889

 

Global Knowledge

LEARNING. To Make a Difference.

http://www.globalknowledge.com 

 

 




-- 
CPDE - Certified Petroleum Distribution Engineer
CCBC - Certified Canadian Beer Consumer 

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